Genetic Selective Abortion: Still a Matter of Choice

Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to abort based on fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised, and conclude that a liberal pro-choice stance on selective abortion for disability entails the permissibility of selective abortion for most genetic traits

An introduction to ethical theory for healthcare assistants

This article will explore and summarise the four main ethical theories that have relevance for healthcare assistants. These are utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and principlism. Understanding different ethical theories can have a number of significant benefits, which have the potential to shape and inform the care of patients, challenge bad practice and lead staff to become better informed about areas of moral disagreement

Quotas: Enabling Conscientious Objection to Coexist with Abortion Access.

The debate regarding the role of conscientious objection in healthcare has been protracted, with increasing demands for curbs on conscientious objection. There is a growing body of evidence that indicates that in some cases, high rates of conscientious objection can affect access to legal medical services such as abortion-a major concern of critics of conscientious objection. Moreover, few solutions have been put forward that aim to satisfy both this concern and that of defenders of conscientious objection-being expected to participate in the provision of services that compromise their moral integrity. Here we attempt to bring some resolution to the debate by proposing a pragmatic, long-term solution offering what we believe to be an acceptable compromise-a quota system for medical trainees in specialties where a conscientious objection can be exercised, and is known to cause conflict. We envisage two main objectives of the quota system we propose. First, as a means to introduce conscientious objection into countries where this is not presently permitted. Second, to minimise or eliminate the effects of high rates of conscientious objection in countries such as Italy, where access to legal abortion provision can be negatively affected

Schrödinger’s fetus examined

Joona Räsänen has proposed a concept he calls Schrödinger’s Fetus as a solution to reconciling what he believes are two widely held but contradictory intuitions. I show that Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle, upon which Schrödinger’s Fetus is based, uses a more convincing account of personhood. I also argue that both Räsänen and Harman, by embracing animalism, weaken their arguments by allowing Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion into the frame

Applying Pascal’s Wager to Procreation

Pascal’s wager uses decision theory to argue that it is rational to attempt to nurture belief in God, based on the expected utility of believing (infinite happiness) compared to not believing (at best, only finite happiness). A belief in an eternal conscious torment in hell (infinite suffering) for non-believers makes the differences in expected utility even more apparent, strengthening the argument. Similar reasoning can also be used to calculate the expected moral value of actions, including procreation. Under theism, if possible future children might suffer eternal conscious torment, the expected moral value of procreation is extremely negative. This implies that theists have a moral obligation not to procreate, which for most theists, entails a moral obligation to be celibate or to undergo sterilisation surgery.<br/

Detached From Humanity::Artificial Gestation and the Christian Dilemma

The development of artificial womb technology (AWT) is continuing to proceed and raises important ethical and theological questions for Christians. While there has been extensive secular discourse on artificial wombs in recent years, there has been minimal Christian engagement with this topic. There are broadly two primary uses of artificial womb technology: first, ectogestation, which is a form of enhanced neonatal care, where only some of the gestation period takes place in an artificial womb, and second, ectogenesis, where the entire period of gestation occurs in an artificial womb. It is plausible that some form of ectogestation in the latter weeks or months of pregnancy could be possible within a decade or so, while ectogenesis for humans remains far more speculative. Ectogestation is likely to significantly reduce maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality, and so there is a strong prima facie case for supporting its development. Ectogenesis, however, may bring several challenges, including the further commodification of children, and the potential pathologizing of pregnancy and childbirth. Its long-term effects on those created through this process are also unknown. If it becomes ubiquitous, we may also find the central theological significance of pregnancy and birth diminished. The dilemma for Christians is that the development of seemingly unproblematic ectogestation is likely to normalize the use of artificial gestation, and, in time, pave the way for ectogenesis.<br/

Using animal-derived constituents in anaesthesia and surgery: the case for disclosing to patients

Animal-derived constituents are frequently used in anaesthesia and surgery, and patients are seldom informed of this. This is problematic for a growing minority of patients who may have religious or secular concerns about their use in their care. It is not currently common practice to inform patients about the use of animal-derived constituents, yet what little empirical data does exist indicates that many patients want the opportunity to give their informed consent. First, we review the nature and scale of the problem by looking at the groups who may have concerns about the use of animal-derived constituents in their care. We then summarise some of the products used in anaesthesia and surgery that can contain such constituents, such as anaesthetic drugs, surgical implants and dressings. Finally, we explore the problem of animal-derived constituents and consent using Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles approach, examining issues of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice. Disclosing the use of animal-derived constituents in anaesthesia and surgery is warranted under Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles approach to the problem. Although there exist systemic and practical challenges to implementing this in practice, the ethical case for doing so is strong. The Montgomery ruling presents additional legal reason for disclosure because it entails that patients must be made aware of risks associated with their treatment that they attach significance to

Detached From Humanity::Artificial Gestation and the Christian Dilemma

The development of artificial womb technology (AWT) is continuing to proceed and raises important ethical and theological questions for Christians. While there has been extensive secular discourse on artificial wombs in recent years, there has been minimal Christian engagement with this topic. There are broadly two primary uses of artificial womb technology: first, ectogestation, which is a form of enhanced neonatal care, where only some of the gestation period takes place in an artificial womb, and second, ectogenesis, where the entire period of gestation occurs in an artificial womb. It is plausible that some form of ectogestation in the latter weeks or months of pregnancy could be possible within a decade or so, while ectogenesis for humans remains far more speculative. Ectogestation is likely to significantly reduce maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality, and so there is a strong prima facie case for supporting its development. Ectogenesis, however, may bring several challenges, including the further commodification of children, and the potential pathologizing of pregnancy and childbirth. Its long-term effects on those created through this process are also unknown. If it becomes ubiquitous, we may also find the central theological significance of pregnancy and birth diminished. The dilemma for Christians is that the development of seemingly unproblematic ectogestation is likely to normalize the use of artificial gestation, and, in time, pave the way for ectogenesis.<br/

Zooming in on Justice: The Case for Virtual Bioethics Conferencing.

No abstract available

The Non-identity Problem and the Psychological Account of Personal Identity

According to the psychological account of personal identity, our identity is based on the continuity of psychological connections, and so we do not begin to exist until these are possible, some months after conception. This entails the psychological account faces a challenge from the non-identity problem—our intuition that someone cannot be harmed by actions that are responsible for their existence, even if these actions seem clearly to cause them harm. It is usually discussed with regard to preconception harms, but in the context of the psychological account, it is also applicable to prenatal harms. Inflicting prenatal injury is widely thought to be morally impermissible, but if the injury is identity-determining on the psychological account, then no-one seems to be harmed—rather, the injury is responsible for bringing them into existence. Here, I argue that identity-determining injuries can routinely occur on the psychological account, and that this undermines the account. I assess Nicola Williams’ proposal to salvage the account based on a trans-world account of personal identity, and show that it is unsuccessful. I then show that Jeff McMahan’s embodied mind account of personal identity is also susceptible. I conclude that identity-determining prenatal injuries pose a significant challenge for the psychological account and its variants, and provide a reason for supporting alternative accounts that fix personal identity at conception