The Many Faces of Modern Legal Realism

This work offers an overview of the consequences and implications of the work of the American Legal Realists. First, the article considers Brian Leiter’s naturalist understanding of the realist project and how he uses it as an occasion to argue for a generally naturalist approach to legal philosophy. Second, Frederick Schauer transforms a legal realist-like focus on the concerns of average citizens for legal enforcement to advocate for the view that coercion is central to understanding law. Third, self-styled New Legal Realists try to merge a realist-inspired search for the effects of legal rules with a more traditional respect for the importance of legal doctrine in understanding behavior within and in relation to law. Finally, with the comment, “we are all Legal Realists now”, the article discusses the ways in which the American Legal Realists have – and have not – significantly transformed legal thinking and legal education in the United States

Law and Reasons: Comments on Rodriguez-Blanco

Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco explora con minuciosidad en su detallado e importante artículo, “Reasons in Action v Triggering Reasons: A Reply to Enoch on Reason-Giving and Legal Normativity”, la naturaleza del otor- gamiento de razones, en aras de cuestionar el influyente trabajo reciente de David Enoch sobre el otorgamiento de razones y el derecho. Si bien el artículo de Rodriguez-Blanco constituye una importante contribución a la literatura en cuanto a la mejor comprensión del otorgamiento de razo- nes y la razón práctica, no está claro si el enfoque hacia las razones para la acción, reformado sobre la línea de lo que sugiere Rodríguez-Blanco, clarificaría la cuestión primordial de la que se ocupa: la manera en que los sistemas jurídicos en general o las normas jurídicas individuales le dan (o no) a los ciudadanos razones para la acción. La cuestión sobre si tenemos una obligación moral (presuntiva) general de actuar (o de abste- nerse de actuar) tal como lo disponen las normas depende en gran medi- da de si hay buenos argumentos en contra de un enfoque individualista y casuístico para responder a tales normas

Raz, Authority, and Conceptual Analysis

In Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, Joseph Raz reflects on his work on the nature of authority, defending much of what he has written on the subject, while offering some additional clarifications and modifications. I must leave to others a more direct assessment of Raz\u27s views on authority, and the revisions he has suggested in this most recent paper. I will instead focus on some of the methodological considerations he discusses in this paper; in particular, I will compare and contrast Raz\u27s discussion here about conceptual analysis and the concept of authority with his recent analyses of the conceptual analysis of law