Are banks excessively monitored?

Insuffucient monitoring by depositors, and thus a lack of market discipline, are often seen as a typical feature of banks. We show that the opposite may be the case. Banks, defined as firms that borrow from a large number of partially uninformed investors, have a tendency to be excessively monitored by informed investors. This is shown in a model of intermediation in which heterogenous investors choose whether they want to monitor the intermediary or not. We also find that banks finance is preferable to non-bank finance when assets are relatively safe or opaque. The model which is set in a banking context may be applicable to a wider range of information problems.

Can bank supervisors rely on market data? A critical assessment from a Swiss perspective

Market data, such as bond spreads or equity price volatility, are a complementary source to bank supervisory information. In Switzerland, meaningful market data are available for a number of banks which constitute a major part of the banking system. Notwithstanding some limitations (biases due to state guarantee for cantonal banks and potential "too-big-to-fail" expectations for big banks) these market data are likely to play a supervisory role in the future. However, once the market expects supervisors to react to market data, these data become endogenous. This may jeopardize the very potential of market data to serve as policy guides.bank-supervision

Do Depositors Discipline Swiss Banks?

In this paper, we test for the presence of market discipline in the Swiss deposit market. In particular, we examine whether depositors monitor their banks by withdrawing their saving deposits whenever the fundamentals of their bank is no longer satisfactory. We use a panel of bank-specific data an 250 Swiss banks over the period 1987-1998. We find considerable evidence of market discipline, in the sense that depositors are sensitive to bank-specific fundamentals, to institutional differences across bank groups, and to institutional changes in the Swiss depositor protection system. Our study complements the existing literature which predominantly builds on price indicators of market discipline (like yield spreads) by an approach based on quantities (the uninsured share of deposits). As few banks have traded debt outstanding, our approach is applicable to a much larger number of banks, including banks from non-industrialized countries.

Bankruptcy Priority for Bank Deposits: a Contract Theoretic Explanation

Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.

Der Nationalbank sind die Hände gebunden

Gestern hat der Schweizer Franken wieder sprunghaft an Wert zugelegt. Damit erhält die Forderung nach der Festsetzung eines Wechselkursziels neuen Auftrieb. Urs Birchler, ein ehemaliges Mitglied der Nationalbank, hält dies jedoch für zu riskant

Welche Rolle das Bankgeheimnis spielt

Der Druck aus dem Ausland auf das Schweizer Bankgeheimnis trifft auch die unabhängigen Vermögensverwalter. Besonders die in der Westschweiz und im Tessin ansässigen Unternehmen verwalten viele Vermögen von Kunden mit Domizil im Ausland

Which Swiss Gnomes Attract Money? Efficiency and Reputation as Performance Drivers of Wealth Management Banks

Wealth management constitutes an important aspect of today's banking world, but very little is known about what explains the differences among banks in their ability to attract new assets under management. Using a unique panel database of Swiss private banks, we test the hypothesis that the performance of a bank in attracting new money depends on two input factors: skill and reputation. Relatively skilled banks -- that is, banks that are more cost-efficient than predicted by their input factors -- also perform better in attracting net new money. We also find that negative media coverage (such as in the context of fraudulent business practices related to tax evasion) strongly diminishes the future ability to attract assets under management, especially at small banks. The present value of lost profits is 3.35 (0.73) times the median annual net profit of a small (large) bank. Thus, adding to the explicit fines that many Swiss banks had to pay in the course of the U.S. Department of Justice's investigations, there are substantial implicit and reputational costs to banks of having negative media coverage. Investment performance for clients seems not to explain future net new money growth. In sum, these results underscore the importance of trust in money management

CS und UBS sind im Tanga unterwegs

Im Streit um höhere Sicherheiten für die Grossbanken stellt sich der Bankenprofessor Urs Birchler auf die Seite der Nationalbank. Wenn die CS und die UBS ihre Kapitalbasis nicht erhöhten, sei das gefährlich