Venture capital exit rights

Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D8

Stereoselective Transformations Starting with Chiral (Alkoxy)methyl-Substituted Organosilicon Compounds

The following short review summarizes the results we achieved with the investigation of chiral silicon groups as auxiliaries for the enantioselective synthesis. (Alkoxy)methyl-substituted silicon compounds with 'Si-centered chirality', which were prepared in optically active form by application of a bioreduction, have been efficiently used as starting materials for a number of stereoselective reactions. Acylsilanes of this type upon treatment with organometallic reagents gave rise to 1,2-addition products with high degrees of stereoselectivities. The respective α-hydroxysilanes could be stereospecifically desilylated to chiral secondary alcohols, or, depending on the substitution pattern, further used as starting compounds for stereocontrolled oxidation, Cope- or Claisen-type rearrangement reactions. Chiral α-metallated vinylsilanes were converted to α-silyl-substituted allylic alcohols and to α-silyl-substituted α,β-unsaturated ketones. The prior led to chiral allenes in a Peterson-type reaction – however, without stereoselectivity – the latter delivered stereoselectively β-chiral silicon-free ketones upon stereocontrolled conjugate cuprate addition followed by removal of the silicon auxiliary

The Defeasance of Control Rights

We analyze one frequently used clause in public bonds called covenant defeasance. Covenant defeasance allows the bond issuer to remove all of the bond's covenants by placing the remaining outstanding payments with a trustee in an escrow account to be paid out on schedule. Bond covenants are predominantly noncontingent, action-limiting covenants. By giving the issuer an option to remove covenants, noncontingent control rights can be made state-contingent even when no interim signals are available. We provide a theoretical justi cation for covenant defeasance and show empirically that such a clause allows for the inclusion of more covenants in public bond issues. In line with the model's prediction, our empirical analysis documents a 13-25 basis points premium for defeasible bonds. This premium amounts to an annual saving of about $1m per year, or$11m over the lifetime of an average bond.Bonds; Covenants; Defeasance; Renegotiation

Intracellular shuttling of a Drosophila APC tumour suppressor homolog

RIGHTS : This article is licensed under the BioMed Central licence at http://www.biomedcentral.com/about/license which is similar to the 'Creative Commons Attribution Licence'. In brief you may : copy, distribute, and display the work; make derivative works; or make commercial use of the work - under the following conditions: the original author must be given credit; for any reuse or distribution, it must be made clear to others what the license terms of this work are.Abstract Background The Adenomatous polyposis coli (APC) tumour suppressor is found in multiple discrete subcellular locations, which may reflect sites of distinct functions. In Drosophila epithelial cells, the predominant APC relative (E-APC) is concentrated at the apicolateral adherens junctions. Genetic analysis indicates that this junctional association is critical for the function of E-APC in Wnt signalling and in cellular adhesion. Here, we ask whether the junctional association of E-APC is stable, or whether E-APC shuttles between the plasma membrane and the cytoplasm. Results We generated a Drosophila strain that expresses E-APC (dAPC2) tagged with green fluorescent protein (GFP-E-APC) and we analysed its junctional association with fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) experiments in live embryos. This revealed that the junctional association of GFP-E-APC in epithelial cells is highly dynamic, and is far less stable than that of the structural components of the adherens junctions, E-cadherin, α-catenin and Armadillo. The shuttling of GFP-E-APC to and from the plasma membrane is unaltered in mutants of Drosophila glycogen synthase kinase 3 (GSK3), which mimic constitutive Wingless signalling. However, the stability of E-APC is greatly reduced in these mutants, explaining their apparent delocalisation from the plasma membrane as previously observed. Finally, we show that GFP-E-APC forms dynamic patches at the apical plasma membrane of late embryonic epidermal cells that form denticles, and that it shuttles up and down the axons of the optic lobe. Conclusions We conclude that E-APC is a highly mobile protein that shuttles constitutively between distinct subcellular locations.Published versio

Governance und Vertragsstrukturen in der deutschen VC Industrie: eine empirische Einschätzung

Diese Arbeit analysiert die wesentlichen Elemente der Vertragsstrukturen in der Venture Capital-Industrie. Aufbauend auf einem sehr umfangreichen und detaillierten Datensatz, der die Verträge zwischen Venture Capital-Investoren und deren Portfoliounternehmen abbildet, werden die Kontroll-, Entscheidungs- und Vetorechte einer detaillierten Analyse unterzogen. Dabei zeigt sich eine klare Tendenz in der Entwicklung der Vertragsstrukturen in Deutschland hin zu angelsächsisch strukturierten Verträgen. Dies beinhaltet unter anderem eine verstärkte Verwendung von Kontroll- und Entscheidungsrechten aber auch ein breiteres Spektrum dieser Rechte. Außerdem finden wir eine klare Interaktionen zwischen Kontrollrechten, Cash-Flow Rechten und Liquidationsrechten. Insbesondere ist zu betonen, dass Cash-Flow und Kontrollrechte einerseits und Stimmrechte und Aufsichtsratsanteile andererseits separat alloziiert werden und viele Kontrollrechte als Komplemente und nicht als Substitute zueinander aufgefasst werden müssen. JEL Classification: G24, G32, D86, D80, G3

Ex. 277-US-413

A report on the status of three Lacustrine Sucker species (catostomidae)