Kinstate intervention in ethnic conflicts : Albania and Turkey compared

Albania and Turkey did not act in overtly irredentist ways towards their ethnic brethren in neighboring states after the end of communism. Why, nonetheless, did Albania facilitate the increase of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia, while Turkey did not, with respect to the Turks of Bulgaria? I argue that kin-states undergoing transition are more prone to intervene in external conflicts than states that are not, regardless of the salience of minority demands in the host-state. The transition weakens the institutions of the kin-state. Experiencing limited institutional constraints, self-seeking state officials create alliances with secessionist and autonomist movements across borders alongside their own ideological, clan-based and particularistic interests. Such alliances are often utilized to advance radical domestic agendas. Unlike in Albania's transition environment, in Turkey there were no emerging elites that could potentially form alliances and use external movements to legitimize their own domestic existence or claims

Yugoslavia A continuing crisis?

7.50SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:3410.66(225) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Kosova The Balkan powder keg

SIGLEGBUnited Kingdo

Post-Socialist transformation, penal reform and justice sector transition in Albania

The place of prisons is largely ignored in the literature on political transitions. Yet, given the historic role that prisons served in the former Communist bloc, as instruments of repression, the management of the penal system is an important indicator of democratic change. This article considers the development of the penal system in Albania from 1990 to the present day. It examines the state of pre-trial detention facilities, prisons and prison hospitals, and evaluates efforts by the Albanian government to reform the penal system. The empirical basis of this article is informed by 20 interviews conducted in autumn 2006 with Albanian government officials, members of the prison administration, human rights monitors, international organizations, NGOs, penal experts, and donor governments. It also evaluates attempts by the European Union and Council of Europe to promote penal reform in Albania. The main finding is that in spite of its considerable investment in Albania, the European Union and associated partners have not managed to curb occurrences of torture and have had a limited impact over substantive penal reform. This article examines four explanations for the EU's relative failure in this policy area. The principal reasons for Albania's non-convergence with European norms lie with the weakness of Albanian state structures and the persistence of systemic illiberal practices

A quasi-proportional electoral system ‘only for honest men’? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems

Mixed compensatory systems have risen in popularity in recent years. Under such systems, single-seat districts elect only the leader of the local suffrage, but the systems nevertheless produce (nearly) proportional outcomes overall, via compensatory mandates. Elections in Albania, Italy, Lesotho, and Venezuela, however, demonstrate a particular loophole for such systems: strategic voting, organized by political parties. Large parties can achieve over-representation by encouraging their voters to split their votes. In this way, they outsmart the compensatory mechanism designed to lead to proportional results. These disproportional results are particularly controversial, since they are deliberate and strategic. This article takes the 2005 Albanian elections as its main case study, and uses simulations to illustrate its political consequences