Circuit theory of finance and the role of incentives in financial sector reform

The author analyzes the financial system's role in economic growth and stability, addressing several core policy issues associated with financial sector reform in emerging economies. He studies finance's role in the context of a circuit model, with interacting rational, forward-looking, heterogeneous agents. He shows finance to essentially complement the price system in coordinating decentralized intertemporal resource allocation choices made by agents operating with limited information and incomplete trust. He discusses the links between finance and incentives for efficiency and stability in the context of the circuit model. He also identifies incentives and incentive-compatible institutions for reform strategies for financial sectors in emerging economies. Among his conclusions: 1) Circuit theory features important methodological advantages to analyze the role of finance, and to assess structural weaknesses of financial systems under different institutional settings and in different stages of economic development. 2) Incentives for prudence and honesty can protect the stability of the circuit by directing private sector forces unleashed by liberalization. In particular: a) Financial institutions should be encouraged to invest in reputational capital. b) Governments should complement the creation of franchise value by strengthening supervision and by adopting a regulatory regime based on rules designed to align the private incentives of market players with the social goal of financial stability. c) Safety nets to reduce systemic risk should minimize the moral hazard from stakeholders by limiting risk protection and by making the cost of protection sensitive to the risk taken. d) Governments should encourage self-policing in the financial sector. e) Where information and trust are scarce, there is a potential market for them, and governments can greatly improve incentives for optimal provision of information. f) Governments should strengthen the complementarity between the formal and the informal financial sectors. Emphasizing incentives is not to deny the importance of good rules, capable regulators andsupervisors, and strong enforcement measures. It is to suggest that the returns on investments to set up rules, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms can be greater if market players have an incentive to align their own objectives with the social goal of financial stability.Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

The role of trust in financial sector development

In any economic environment where decisions are decentralized, agents consider the risk that others might unfairly exploit informational asymmetries to their own disadvantage. Incomplete results, especially, lies at the heart of financial transactions in which agents trade real claims for promises of future real claims. Agents thus need to invest considerable resources to assess the trustworthiness of others with whom they know they can interact only under conditions of limited and asymmetrically distributed information. Thinking of finance as the complex of institutions and instruments needed to reduce the cost of trading promises among anonymous individuals who do not fully trust each other, the author analyzes how incomplete trust shapes the transaction costs in trading assets, and how it affects resource allocation and pricing decisions from rational, forward-looking agents. His analysis leads to core propositions about the role of finance and financial efficiency in economic development. He recommends areas of financial sector reform in emerging economies aimed at improving the financial system's efficiency in dealing with incomplete trust. Among other things, the public sector can improve trust in finance by improving financial infrastructure, including legal systems, financial regulation, and security in payment and trading systems. But fundamental improvements in financial efficiency may best be gained by eliciting good conduct through market forces.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Financial development and industrial capital accumulation

In an economy where decisions are decentralized and made under conditions of uncertainty, the financial system can be seen as the complex of institutions, infrastructure, and instruments that society adopts to minimize the costs of trading promises when agents have incomplete trust and limited information. Building on a microeconomic general equilibrium model that portrays such fundamental financial functions, the author shows that, in line with recent empirical evidence, the development of financial infrastructure stimulates greater and more efficient capital accumulation. He also shows that economies with more developed financial infrastructure can more easily absorb exogenous shocks to output. The results call for addressing a crucial issue in the sequencing of reform in the financial sector: early in development, banks provide essential financial infrastructure services as part of their exclusive relationships with borrowers. Further economic development requires that such services be provided extrinsically to the bank-borrower relationship, clearly at the expense of bank rents. There may be a compelling discontinuity to financial sector development in that banks need to be supported early in development but to be"weakened"later - at the expense of bank rents - to foster further development. The important question for policy is when and how to generate and manage this discontinuity so that it is not forced on society by costly and traumatic events such as bank failures.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring

"Should Banks Be Narrowed?"

Over the past 70 years, a proposal to narrow the scope of banks has emerged more and more frequently in financial debates and research. Narrow banking would prevent deposit-issuing banks from lending to the private sector and restrict nonbank intermediaries from funding investments with demand deposits. Proponents of narrow banking defend it as a step toward greater financial stability and efficiency. This study reviews the literature on the subject, contrasts the concept of narrow banking with contemporary banking theories, and evaluates the potential effects of narrow banking on finance and the real economy. The study also delineates an empirical exercise to estimate the costs of bank narrowness and draws policy conclusions based on those estimates.

What makes banks special ? a study of banking, finance, and economic development

Over the past decades, finance theory has contributed significantly to understanding banks and identifying what qualifies them to be special financial intermediaries. Historically, banks have had a comparative advantage in certain functions - such as providing liquidity and payment services and supplying credit and information - which competition, technological change, and institutional development have increasingly eroded. And the spread of e-money could deal a blow to conventional banking, generating entirely new ways of doing finance. After integrating his examination of money, production, and investment, the author argues that banks remain special in that they lend claims on their own debt and the public accepts the debt claims as money. His study shows the banks and nonbank financial intermediaries perform complementary functions essential to the economy. Risk reduction policies in payment systems, banking asset allocation, and the deposit market affect the economy's tradeoff between risk and efficiency and the cost of generating resources to finance production. As possibilities for global communications expand, trust will matter more than ever, and banks and other financial intermediaries will be in a good position to bridge gaps in trust when it comes to creating money and intermediating funds.Decentralization,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies

Bank Deposits as {\em Money Quanta}

According to the Accounting View of Money (AVM), the money issued by commercial banks in the form of demand deposits features a hybrid nature, since deposits can be shown to consist of a share of deposits bearing the characteristics of debt (debt-deposits) and a share of deposits bearing the characteristics of equity (equity-deposits), in a mix that depends on factors that relate to the issuing banks and the environment where they operate and interact, which may change over time. Following this important finding of the AVM, it is only consequential to associate the hybrid nature of bank deposits with the dual nature of the objects which is typical in quantum physics, and to investigate whether and how the application of quantum analytical methods and ideas to a form of money showing dualistic features could be used to extract valuable economic information.Comment: In press in Quantum Economics and Financ