Job motivation in high-tech knowledge work- the unintended detrimental role of management

Title: Job motivation in high-tech knowledge work- the unintended detrimental role of management Seminar Date: 4th June 2015 Course: FEKH49 Author: Chaitra Harish Bhat Supervisor: Sverre Spoelstra Key Words: Knowledge Worker, Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation, Priority Task, Recognition. Purpose: The purpose of this research is to critically examine the role of intrinsic motivation in knowledge work. It intends to investigate the managerial attempt to motivate knowledge workers and examines the role of the management from the knowledge workers’ perspective. Methodology: This research has taken the interpretive viewpoint. It is a qualitative study with an abductive approach. Eight semi-structured interviews have been conducted and analyzed. Theoretical Perspectives: The theoretical framework is focused mainly on the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the context of knowledge work. The knowledge worker’s work ambiguity is presented. And the equity theory of motivation is and analyzed as to how it affects motivation in knowledge work. Empirical foundation: The empirical foundation of this research consists of eight semi-structured interviews conducted in a knowledge intensive firm, Motiv AB. Conclusion: This research shows that even though intrinsic motivation is important, the role of extrinsic motivation is also found to be vital in knowledge workers. In this context, the role of the management can also be detrimental at times (though unintentional) in affecting the knowledge worker motivation

An investigation into interlinkages between CEO compensation and firm risk

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to do an investigation on the interlinkages between CEO compensation and the firm risk. It further intends to see in particular, whether the firm risk has been interlinked with components of compensation like CEO’s incentive/bonus and stock options. Theoretical framework: CEO compensation, Incentives programs, Stock option, Risk management, Principal agency theory, Managerial power theory, Econometrics. Method: Regression analysis were CEO compensation is a dependent variable in one regression, Proportion of incentive/bonus in one regression and Stock option as a limited dependent variable. Explanatory variables are firm risk, firm size and leverage. Quality test were performed on the data to secure the credibility and reliability of the data. Empirical analysis: Found a significant relationship, but negative one, between CEO compensation with leverage. Insignificant relationship was both with firm risk and firm size. For analysis of the relationship of Proportion of incentives/bonus all of the explanatory variables were insignificant. Significant relationship was found between stock option and both leverage and firm size. A negative with leverage and a positive one for firm size. Insignificant relationship with firm risk. Based on 95% α-level. Conclusion: Based on analysis of Swedish large cap companies the CEO compensation is mostly influenced by managerial power theory rather than agency theory. CEO supply and demand forces can influence the compensation structure. No evidence for the dependency of compensation with firm risk, leverage and size.Based on analysis of Swedish large cap companies the CEO compensation is mostly influenced by managerial power theory rather than agency theory. CEO supply and demand forces can influence the compensation structure. No evidence for the dependency of compensation with firm risk, leverage and size