Beyond Cryptocurrencies - A Taxonomy of Decentralized Consensus Systems

The advent of Bitcoin in 2009 has not only introduced Cryptocurrencies and lead to a new digitization movement in the financial, especially payments industry but also made way for a new breed of innova-tive technologies based on decentralized digital currencies. Generally, decentralized consensus sys-tems could change the very nature of how companies, organizations and individuals are built and in-teract with each other. Decentralized consensus systems, decentralized applications and smart con-tracts provide the conceptual framework as well as the technological basis to establish predefined, incorruptible protocols and contracts to organize human behavior and interconnectedness. However, the technical protocols and implementations are quite complex and practitioners as well as interdisci-plinary researchers not familiar with cryptography, network protocols or decentralized networks are struggling to find access to these concepts and grasp their potential. To fill this gap, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy of decentralized consensus systems in order to provide a tool for researchers and practitioners alike to facilitate classification and analysis of emerging technologies in the field of Crypto 2.0 , the next level of innovation beyond cryptocurrencies

How Preussag became TUI : kissing too many toads can make you a toad

In the period 1997-2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of old economy businesses, changed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. This paper analyzes how this strategy was executed and how it contributed to Preussag’s underperformance of the stock market. We collect 417 announcements of acquisitions, financial disclosures and other news and disentangle the impact of different parts of the company’s strategy. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. Bad luck like the events of September 11, 2001 cannot account for the poor performance of the stock. Poor management resulted from poor governance, combining a state-owned bank as the largest shareholder, board interlocks, and insufficient managerial incentives. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management beyond free operating cash flows and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders

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Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 1990von Tilman BezzenbergerLiteraturverz. S. [189] - 20