10 research outputs found
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FMDP reactor alternative summary report. Volume 1 - existing LWR alternative
Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials [primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] are becoming surplus to national defense needs in both the United States and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. This document summarizes the results of analysis concerned with existing light water reactor plutonium disposition alternatives
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FMDP Reactor Alternative Summary Report: Volume 2 - CANDU heavy water reactor alternative
The Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD) initiated a detailed analysis activity to evaluate each of ten plutonium disposition alternatives that survived an initial screening process. This document, Volume 2 of a four volume report, summarizes the results of these analyses for the CANDU reactor based plutonium disposition alternative
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FMDP Reactor Alternative Summary Report: Volume 3 - partially complete LWR alternative
The Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD) initiated a detailed analysis activity to evaluate each of ten plutonium disposition alternatives that survived an initial screening process. This document, Volume 3 of a four volume report summarizes the results of these analyses for the partially complete LWR (PCLWR) reactor based plutonium disposition alternative
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The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapon plutonium as spent fuel
In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years