Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context

Despite the military efforts of the Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali Federal governments, the collaboration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces with US and coalition forces, and despite the enormous tactical and strategic set-backs that al-Shabaab has faced over the last five years, its insurgency in the Horn of Africa (HoA) remains resilient. The Kenyan government’s approach to stemming domestic recruitment to al-Shabaab remains fixated on law enforcement control and surveillance. As a result, many Somali communities are subject to daily crackdowns, interrogations, and discriminatory profiling practices whose negative effects are only heightened by current tribal and clan-based tensions in the country. Current scholarly evaluations of Kenya’s ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE) & ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) policies tend to adhere to three major approaches: top-down evaluations by elites repeatedly locating the protection of national security in inter-agency cooperation; bottom-up CVE/PVE evaluations placing primacy on the voices of Muslim community elders, such as imams, social workers, parents, and community leaders for interventions with at-risk youth; and social scientific evaluations of CVE/PVE policy through empirical exploration of the push and pull factors of youth recruitment into militancy. To date, there is a dearth of studies asking what Kenyan youth leaders think about CVE/PVE policies especially in light of the fact that they are often the main targets of al-Shabaab attacks. This study has one key objective: to use input from Kenyan youth to evaluate the effectiveness, suitability, and appropriateness of Kenya’s current CVE/PVE policies in order to dissect their utility, inefficiencies, and possible harms, and contribute to the academic and policy discussions on the best CVE/PVE policy mix

The Oil-producing Gulf States, the IMF and the International Financial Crisis

As the finance-strapped International Monetary Fund (IMF) was placed at the centre of coordinating funding and offering ideas to navigate out of the international financial crisis, it became clear that the international community needed to reinvigorate the emerging market economies’ role in the organisation and in the broader international financial architecture. At the time of the Group of 20 (G20) meetings, the Gulf states were viewed as likely contributors to IMF liquidity. Despite the UK’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s visit to the Gulf in November 2008, and his claim that the Gulf would assist in an injection of liquidity into the IMF, the Saudi rulers decided to go empty-handed to the G20 meetings in Washington. Unlike the 1970s, when the Gulf came to the rescue of the western and international banking system, today Gulf rulers are more responsive to a new class that is more scrutinising of petrodollar recycling.

IMF and monetary reforms : Middle Eastern perspectives ; conference report

Bessma Momani ..

IMF-Egyptian Debt Negotiations

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/faculty_books/1132/thumbnail.jp

IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals

IMF, Organizational culture, Reform, IMF staff, D73, F33, F34, O19,