Private environmental incentive contract and a weather signal

The authors of the paper are interested in an environmental incentive payment mode for risk-averse contracting farmers. The incitement joins the environmental output produced by the farmer to his effort through an environmental contract reported to be motivating. However, we suppose an environmental output depending on a weather signal and we consider the effect of a weather variable on the incentive contract. The first and usual incentive contract studied takes into account the average effect of a weather indicator on the farmer's environmental output. The paper studies a second incentive contract taking into account the instantaneous effect of a weather indicator on the fanner's environmental output. Then in complement of the reservation farmer's utility, authors consider a minimum incentive payment given to the farmer through a constraint of a minimum payment for every point of farmer's output. It is possible to increase this minimum payment in the second type contract (compared to the first one) without reducing the expected utility of the principal and the expected utility of the fanner, by increasing the level of the farmer's environmental action. The use of such minimum farmer's payment and the increase of this minimum payment could be very conclusive to bind a farmer by an environmental contrac

Spontaneous ash tree reforestation in the Central Pyrenees: a future local energy source?

With the agricultural economy of the Central Pyrenees in steady decline, natural forest stands are colonising abandoned agricultural meadows. The present study seeks to define the economic conditions for a new fuel-wood local economy based on these extensions of the forest cover. Farmer/forest owners are capable of exploiting this resource, involving logging, hauling and cutting the wood to size, to meet their own heating needs. In this way, owners could thus recuperate a maximum unit value estimated at 11.2 to 22.3 € per stere (1 cubic metre), or an average value of 16.8 € per stere after deduction of all costs. An economy based on wood energy, using wood from spontaneously generated forest growth on private land, is therefore possible. A development policy for such an activity could be envisaged with appropriate initiatives to stimulate the owners of land where spontaneous ash reforestation has occurred to harvest this potential resource

Les accrus de frêne dans les Pyrénées Centrales : un avenir énergétique local ?

Alors que l’économie agricole de la montagne pyrénéenne centrale régresse, des peuplements forestiers naturels ont progressé sur des terres agricoles abandonnées, plus précisément sur d’anciennes prairies d’altitude. Nous définissons les conditions d’un usage énergétique de peuplements d’accrus de frênes installés sur ces terres. Un agriculteur propriétaire forestier d’accrus peut prendre en charge lui-même leur exploitation, y compris le transport jusqu’à sa ferme et la fente de ses bois, afin de satisfaire ses propres besoins de bûches de chauffage. Le propriétaire pourrait ainsi récupérer une valeur résiduelle unitaire maximale variant de 11,2 à 22,3 €/st (euros par stère), soit une valeur moyenne d’environ 16,8 €/st, tous coûts déduits. L’exploitation des accrus en bois bûche pour le chauffage est donc financièrement possible. Une politique de développement d’une telle filière serait alors envisageable. Elle stimulerait les initiatives des agriculteurs propriétaires d’accrus forestiers

Développement environnemental et agriculture

Within the framework of the European common agricultural policy, we call back the environmental development implemented by the French agricultural policy to underline their weak points. In this way, each farmer engaged on an agri-environmental contract acts in a reference of constraints of his farm management and of a defined polluted agricultural territory. We show that such a contract is difficult to achieve. So to ensure individually and collectively an efficient environmentally friendly agricultural production, these farmers must commit to respect environmental standards, within a frame of an environmental management instrument like iso 14000 or Emas.development, environment, agriculture

Développement environnemental et agriculture

attendre doi pas encore en ligne sur reru internetNational audienceWithin the framework of the European common agricultural policy, we call back the environmental development implemented by the french agricultural policy to underline their weak points. In this way, each farmer engaged on an agri-environmental contract acts in a reference of constraints of his farm management and of a defined polluted agricultural territory. We show that such a contract is difficult to achieve. So to ensure individually and collectively an efficient environmentally friendly agricultural production, these farmers must commit to respect environmental standards, within a frame of an environmental management instrument like iso 14000 or Emas

La rémunération des travaux forestiers

The payment of forest works. In the French country, sawmills and paper-mills buy some parts offorests, a wood-cutting, to private-owner forests or to public-owner forests. But wood-cutting is made with standing timber. The use of the standing timber is either the production of paper either the production of wood-lumber. So in French forests, the private-owner forests, sawmill and paper factory, employ a woodcutter-contractor to make forest works. But an important number of these French wood-cutter contractors have no experience in forest works and the employers, sawmills and paper-mills, do not know the real capacity of the woodcutter-contractor to make forest works. The contract between the woodcutter-contractor and the employer is simple and do not take account of the real capacity of the contractor to make forest works. The contract between the employer and the wood-cutter contractor is dependent on a private information of the contractor : adverse selection is important in the relation between the employer and the wood-cutter contractor. So we propose a non linear pricing, based on a contractor's private information, applied to these forest works. The aim is to improve supplies of sawmills or paper factories and the development of the woodcutter's profession. In the first part of this paper, we describe the work's conditions of the woodcutter-contractor in French forests and the payment used at présent. Then we propose a first model of contract in adverse selection and based on a contractors private information about costs for forest works. We give a numerical example of a non linear pricing for forest works. A second model of payment in adverse sélection is carried ouf. the aim is to incite the woodcutter-contractor to get back some timbers in a wood-cutting intended to a paper-mill. This is possible with an experienced woodcutter contractor. So we propose a non linear pricing that takes account of the woodcutter contractor's experience in forest works. A numerical example is carried out. In the conclusion we examine the necessary social conditions to apply a non linear pricing in forest works, to improve supplies of French wood industry.En France, les entrepreneurs de travaux forestiers occupent une place importante dans la mise en marché des bois : ils réalisent les travaux d'exploitation forestière pour le compte des acheteurs de bois sur pied que sont les scieurs et papetiers. Cependant l'entrée non contrôlée d'entrepreneurs occasionnels contribue à la dégradation des rémunérations. De ce fait, des industriels du bois qui ont passé un contrat avec ces entrepreneurs occasionnels sont en situation d'incertitude sur la façon dont sera exécuté le contrat de travaux. De plus, les entrepreneurs de travaux forestiers ont souvent à exploiter des coupes difficiles et peu rémunérées de petits bois, au détriment d'autres produits, plus rares et plus intéressants, mais qui, en l'absence d'incitations financières, ne sont pas exploités. Ces situations s'assimilent à celles où l'on a un paramètre de la relation contractuelle connu du seul sous-traitant. Nous proposons de construire une tarification en conséquence pour le paiement des travaux forestiers. Chaque modèle est suivi d'un exemple numérique.Elyakime Bernard. La rémunération des travaux forestiers. In: Cahiers d'Economie et sociologie rurales, N°34-35, 1er et 2e trimestres 1995. pp. 45-57

Groupement d'employeurs agricoles : quelle aide publique locale?

National audienceWe first give a typology, according to the various agricultural sectors, of agricultural precarious labour and we then specify the relationships between these jobs and the employment provided by pools of employers, farm equipment co-operatives or farm work companies. We can then analyze the advantages and the limits of the use of pools of employers, in order to analyze and improve the local governamental aid to pools of employers.Après avoir donné une typologie sectorielle agricole des emplois que nous regroupons comme emplois salariés agricoles précaires, nous précisons les liens de ces emplois avec les emplois de salariés agricoles issus de groupements d'employeurs, de coopératives d'utilisation de matériels agricoles et d'entreprises de travaux agricoles. Ceci nous permet d'analyser les avantages et les limites économiques du recours au groupement d'employeurs, puis d'analyser, pour les améliorer, les aides publiques locales vis-à-vis des groupements d'employeurs

Groupement d'employeurs agricoles : quelle aide publique locale ?

We first give a typology, according to the various agricultural sectors, of agricultural precarious labour and we then specify the relationships between these jobs and the employment provided by pools of employers, farm equipment co-operatives or farm work companies. We can then analyze the advantages and the limits of the use of pools of employers, in order to analyze and improve the local governmental aid to pools of employers.employment, agriculture, precariousness, pools of employers, local aid