1,285 research outputs found
Suicide Among Young Alaska Native Men: Community Risk Factors and Alcohol Control
Indigenous residents of Alaska (Alaska Natives)
die by suicide at a rate nearly 4 times the US
average and the average for all American
Indians and Alaska Natives (AI/ANs).1---3 An
astonishing 7% of Alaska respondents to
a 2003 international household survey of
Arctic Indigenous people indicated that they
had seriously contemplated suicide within the
past year.4 Studies have shown that alcohol is
directly or indirectly involved in most of these
deaths.5---9
Although Alaska Natives have encountered
alcohol for well over a century, the high suicide
risk is an entrenched but comparatively recent
phenomenon affecting only the past 2
generations.9,10 Figure 1 shows that crude
suicide rates for this group rose rapidly in the
decade after Alaska achieved statehood in
1959. The 3-year moving average rate peaked
at more than 50 per 100 000 in the early
1980s, before declining to a level of about
40 per 100 000 during the past decade. The
dip in suicide rates in the late 1970s likely
represents faulty data rather than a real
departure from the secular trend.11
An emerging new pattern of risk drove the
increase in suicide rates in the 1960s. Higher
suicide rates among young men led the rise
in suicide as a whole.9,12,13 More recently,
another important pattern of differential risk
emerged as more Alaska Natives moved to the
state’s growing urban areas in search of jobs.
Suicide rates among Alaska Native residents
remaining in small rural communities are more
than twice as high as those among Native
residents of urban areas and vary greatly
among communities even in the same region
(Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics, unpublished
data).13 In fact, suicide rates may have declined
since the peak in the 1980s (Figure 1) only
because the lower risk population of urbandwelling
Alaska Natives has grown relative
to the more vulnerable rural population.
The large disparities among populations with
similar ethnicity and histories suggest that the
elevated suicide risk is not simply an unfortunate
side effect of rapid social change but
may be influenced directly by contemporary
living conditions.
The associationYe
Resource rents, universal basic income, and poverty among Alaska’s Indigenous peoples
The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) program provides universal basic income (UBI) to all residents from investment earnings of a state sovereign wealth fund created from oil rents. This paper evaluates the effect of the PFD to mitigate poverty among the state’s rural Indigenous (Alaska Native) peoples: a population with historically high poverty rates living in a region with limited economic opportunities. Errors in recording PFD income in data used to calculate official poverty statistics cause them to misrepresent poverty in Alaska and understate the effect of the PFD. Estimating poverty rates with and without PFD income therefore requires reconstruction of family incomes from household-level data. Estimated poverty rates from reconstructed income show that the PFD has had a substantial, although diminishing mitigating effect on poverty for rural Indigenous families. The PFD has had a larger effect on poverty among children and elders than for the rural Alaska Native population as a whole. Alaska Native seniors, who receive additional sources of UBI derived primarily from resource rents besides the PFD, have seen a decline in poverty rates, while poverty rates for children have increased. Evidence has not appeared for commonly hypothesized potential adverse social and economic consequences of UBI.Ye
Energy Costs and Rural Alaska Out-Migration
This report contains results of a formal statistical analysis of the association of high prices
for home heating fuel with out-migration from rural Alaska communities, using data from
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend applications from 2003 to 2015. Although anecdotal
reports have described hardships caused by the rising cost of fuel, this study is the first to
subject the hypothesis of fuel-related out-migration to rigorous statistical testing.
This study addressed five main research questions:
1. What is the evidence that out-migration from rural Alaska communities was associated
with fuel prices?
2. How sensitive are out-migration rates to fuel prices?
3. Does the effect of high prices on out-migration in communities with the chronically
high fuel prices differ from the effect across all communities of high-cost years?
4. How do effects of fuel prices on out-migration differ for regional hubs and smaller
villages?
5. How does the magnitude of the effect of fuel prices compare to that of other drivers of
mobility, such as employment and income?
The study region was defined as the area of western and northern Alaska with neither
road nor year-round water access. We divided this region into local areas consisting of the
nine Census Areas/Boroughs in the region with the regional hub communities of
Dillingham, Bethel, Nome, Barrow/Utqiagvik, and Kotzebue separated from smaller
villages in their respective Census Areas/Boroughs.
The statistical analysis examined five binary variables representing different types of
potential moves that an individual could make outside the local area of residence:
1. Leave rural Alaska (yes or no, all residents of the rural region);
2. Leave the local area (yes or no, all residents of the rural region);
3. If leave the local area, leave rural Alaska: (yes or no, residents leaving local area);
4. If leave a village, leave rural Alaska: (yes or no, residents leaving local area who
started in a smaller village and not a regional hub);
5. Leave rural Alaska (yes or no, regional hub residents only)
Logistic regression equations were estimated for residents 18 years old to associate each
of the five binary variables with fuel prices, controlling for age, gender, employment
status and earnings, as well as several characteristics of the community of residence.
Teachers, oil workers, mining workers, and pilots were excluded from the analysis.
Alaska Department of Labor staff used the applicant’s Social Security Number to link
individual Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) applications across successive years and to
2
state employment security records. Data from PFD applications included age and gender,
as well as place of residence. Employment records included earnings by occupation and
industry. Retail fuel price surveys conducted by the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation
and the Alaska Division of Community and Regional Community Affairs provided price
data for home heating fuels. Fuel prices for communities not included in the surveys were
estimated from wholesale diesel fuel prices published in Power Cost Equalization
program reports. Additional community level data on labor force size, employment, and
earnings supplemented data from individual records. Earnings and fuel prices were
adjusted to 2015 dollar values using the Anchorage Consumer Price Index.
The study found that high fuel prices were associated with more rural Alaska residents
moving to urban Alaska, but the size of the effect was relatively small: less than 40 adults
each year for each $1 rise in fuel prices. Observed increases in moves to urban Alaska
triggered by higher fuel prices came entirely from regional hubs rather than from smaller
villages. Although rural Alaska residents were more likely to move from both villages
and regional hubs when fuel prices rose, higher fuel prices diverted more village movers
to hubs instead of urban areas, so there was a negligible net effect from villages to urban
Alaska. Other factors besides fuel prices that change over time also affect migration
decisions. The study found that local labor market conditions, as well as the individual’s
employment status and earnings had much stronger effects on out-migration than fuel
prices.Alaska Energy Authorit
Web Note No. 18
In a recent analysis comparing the current oil production tax, More Alaska Production
Act (MAPA, also known as SB 21) to the tax it replaced, Alaska’s Clear and Equitable
Share (ACES), Scott Goldsmith, professor emeritus of economics at ISER, found that
MAPA would produce higher revenues in the future, if changing to MAPA causes
producers to make investments that lead to more production than would have occurred
under ACES.2
Professor Goldsmith did not advocate for either tax, but projected effects of each under
a range of different future oil prices, production rates, and costs. He noted that
comparative revenues are highly sensitive to future costs and oil prices. Oil prices are
notoriously difficult to forecast. Future North Slope oil production, as well as lease costs
that can be deducted from producers’ tax liabilities under both ACES and MAPA, are
also highly uncertain. Proponents of either MAPA or ACES appear to make assumptions
about prices, production, and costs that support their arguments.
Given the inherent uncertainty about oil prices, new production, and expenditures for
capital and operating costs, what assumptions would be most reasonable to make for
assessing outcomes of the tax regimes? This note critically examines the relevant
assumptions for projecting tax outcomes, and explores how the different taxes compare
under a set of assumptions that seem most reasonable, given our best current
information.
The comparisons address not only the amount of revenue the state would collect, but
also how the taxes differently share risk between the industry and the state, and
administrative issues affecting the nature of the relationship between the oil industry and
state government. The analysis also places the debate about MAPA vs. ACES in the
longer term context of Alaska oil production taxes, comparing MAPA and ACES to the
original petroleum profits tax (PPT) that preceded ACES, and to the old severance tax
PPT replaced.Northrim Bank
Treatment of Petroleum Refining and Other Energy-Intensive and Trade-Sensitive Industries in Pending National Climate Legislation
One of the major issues confronting Congress as it deliberates about legislation to limit
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions is the effect on international
trade. If the U.S. implements a cap and trade program, the cost of emissions rights
becomes a new business cost for domestic establishments that foreign establishments
do not face. This puts domestic industry at a competitive disadvantage in export markets
as well as against imported goods. Over time, investments in U.S. industries decline,
taking jobs oversees and undermining progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The concern, often called “carbon leakage,” is most acutely felt in trade-sensitive,
energy-intensive manufacturing industries.
The main climate bills that Congress is currently considering include H.R. 2454 and S.
1733, commonly termed the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills, respectively, in
reference to their original sponsors. H.R. 2454 passed the House on June 26, 2009 with
a recorded vote of 219-212. The companion Senate bill was filed on September 30,
2009, and is at this writing (11/06/09) under markup in the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works. S.1733 incorporates many sections of HR 2454
verbatim, but differs in some respects in the way it treats energy-intensive and tradesensitive
industries.
This policy brief analyzes the way that both bills approach the issue of carbon leakage,
with particular attention to the petroleum processing industry. The next section outlines
the general treatment of energy-intensive and trade-sensitive industries that is common
to both bills. Then, the brief discusses the specific treatment of refined petroleum
products. Following that comes an analysis of the limitations and deficiencies in the
approach that Congress is taking. The brief concludes with a discussion of potential
modifications -- an outline of proposed amendments -- that could address the
deficiencies consistent with the overall approach of H.R. 2454 and S. 1733
Effect of Alaska Fiscal Options On Children and Families
Alaska’s state government faces an unprecedented challenge, with the need to close an
estimated 1.3 billion, or about $1,800 per resident. That was barely more than the
state dispenses annually to Alaska school districts, to support public education (Alaska Office
of Management and Budget, Enacted Fiscal Summary). Despite low oil prices and declining
production, petroleum revenues still accounted for 72 percent of these funds (Alaska
Revenue Sources Book, Fall 2016, Alaska Department of Revenue, Tax Division). Alaska is
the only state that does not have either state income or sales taxes. It is clear that Alaskans
will soon have to accept some form of broad-based revenue measure to enable continued
funding of basic public services.
A 2016 analysis by ISER researchers discussed the potential effects on Alaska’s economy
and households of various options to reduce expenditures and increase revenues.1 That
study examined how the effects of revenue measures varied for Alaska households with
different levels of income. These same revenue measures and expenditure cuts are also
likely to have a much bigger effect on some households than others, depending on the
presence and number of children in the family. This study extends the previous analysis by
specifically examining how different options would be likely to affect families and children.
Many large expenditures in the state budget can easily be identified as specifically benefiting
children. These include state-funded programs such as the Alaska Public School Foundation
program and the Division of Juvenile Justice and Office of Children’s Services, for example,
as well as joint federal-state programs such as Medicaid and Denali Kidcare. Less obvious
are the effects on children of potential measures to fund these and other state expenditures.
This study focuses on describing and quantifying the effects of alternative state revenue
options on Alaska families and children. In addition to considering how the revenue
measures might affect families with children compared to households without children, we
also consider how the burden of each measure might differ for rural and urban families.National Science Foundation
Alaska Children's Trust
UA Strategic Investment FUnd
Contribution of Land Conservation and Freshwater Resources to Residential Property Values in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough
Growing interest in quantifying values of ecosystem services has generated numerous studies
attempting to measure the contribution of neighborhood environmental amenities to urban and
suburban property values. Proximity to freshwater resources -- lakes and streams -- has also figured
prominently in many of these studies.
Alaska’s Matanuska-Susitna (Mat-Su) Borough, analogous to a county under state law, is a large and
rapidly urbanizing local government jurisdiction adjacent to Anchorage, the state’s largest
metropolitan area. As the population of the borough grows, and more land becomes subdivided and
developed, an important question arises regarding the contribution of remaining undeveloped land
and natural amenities to the economy of the borough. Visitors who are attracted to the scenery and
recreation opportunities of the borough capture some of that value, and contribute to the borough
economy through local purchases of goods and services. Private owners of borough real estate, who
are willing to pay more for property located close to natural areas and recreation sites, also
appropriate a portion of the value, however. This study focuses on this latter component of value of
ecosystem services. It provides estimates of the enhanced value of private residential property and
undeveloped land in the Mat-Su borough created by local protected open space and outdoor
recreation opportunities.
After briefly describing the Mat-Su Borough region, we summarize the valuation methods and the data
available for the study. Then we present statistical results, followed by a discussion of the implications
of the findings for valuing ecosystem services in the Borough. We conclude with suggestions for
future research to improve the estimates.The Nature Conservancy of Alaska.
The Bullitt Foundation.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servic
Adapting to Environmental and Social Change: Subsistence in Three Aleutian Communities
Our surroundings and society are both constantly evolving. Some changes are due to natural
processes. People are responsible for other changes, because of what we do—for example, increasing
the size of the population, expanding technology, and increasing mobility and connectivity. And some
changes—like climate change—are due to a combination of natural processes and actions of people. In
the Arctic, including the Aleutian Islands, marine and coastal ecosystems have seen the largest number
of regime shifts with direct and indirect consequences for subsistence activities, commercial fisheries,
and coastal communities (Council 2016). This paper describes current subsistence activities and changes
local residents have observed over time in three Aleutian Island communities—Akutan, Nikolski, and
Atka. As described more later, we did initial household surveys in 2016 and a second round in 2017, as
well as more detailed interviews with some residents
Measuring Community Adaptive and Transformative Capacity in the Arctic Context
Adaptive capacity (AC) plays a prominent role in reducing community vulnerability, an
essential goal for achieving sustainability. The related concept, transformative capacity
(TC), describes a set of tools from the resilience paradigm for making more fundamental
system changes. While the literature appears to agree generally on the meaning of AC
and TC, operational definitions vary widely in empirical applications. We address
measurement of AC and TC in empirical studies of community vulnerability and
resilience, with special attention to the problems of arctic communities. We discuss how
some challenges follow from ambiguities in the broader vulnerability model within which
AC is embedded. Other issues are more technical, such as a confounding of stocks
(capacity) with flows (time-specific inputs or outcomes). We view AC and TC as forms
of capital, as distinct from flows (i.e., ecosystem services, well-being), and propose a set
of sequential steps for measuring the contribution of AC and TC assets to reducing
vulnerability. We demonstrate the conceptual application in a comparative analysis of AC
in two arctic Alaska communities responding to an increase in the price of fuel. The
comparative case study illustrates some key empirical challenges in measuring AC for
small arctic communities
Short-Run Economic Impacts of Alaska Fiscal Options
Today Alaskans are talking about how to close the huge budget deficit the state government is facing,
with the oil revenues it has depended on for decades now a small fraction of what they once were.
Alaska has had budget deficits for several years, and it has made budget cuts—but it has mainly relied
on billions of dollars in savings from the Constitutional Budget Reserve and other funds to cover the
deficit. Those savings are dwindling, and the state needs to take measures to close the deficit.
An important consideration is how various ways of reducing the deficit might affect Alaska’s economy.
This study compares potential short-run economic effects of 11 options the state might take in the next
few years to reduce the deficit and that are sustainable over the long term. We looked at economic
effects of several types of spending cuts and taxes, as well as reducing the Permanent Fund dividend—
the annual cash payment the state makes to all residents—and saving less of Permanent Fund earnings.
We’re not advocating or opposing any option: our purpose is to estimate and compare the magnitude of
the short-run economic effects of different ways of reducing the deficit. Broadly speaking:
• Different ways of collecting money from Alaskans affect those with lower and higher incomes in
significantly different ways.
• Anything the state does to reduce the deficit will cost the economy jobs and money. But spending
some of the Permanent Fund earnings the state currently saves would not have short-run economic
effects. Saving less would, however, slow Permanent Fund growth and reduce future earnings.
• Because the deficit is so big, the overall economic effects of closing the deficit will also be big.Executive Summary / Table of Contents / Introduction / Revenue Impacts of Taxes and Dividend Cuts / Short-Run Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options / Regional Differences in Impacts of Fiscal Options / Total Economic Impact of Reducing the Deficit / Other Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options / Estimation of Revenue Impacts of Fiscal Options /Expenditure Equations Estimated From the Consumer Expenditure Survey / IMPLAN Model / Estimation of Short-Run Economic Impact
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