Privatization with Government Control: Evidence from the Russian Oil Sector

Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency. In particular, private and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/57206/1/wp826 .pd

Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: Evidence from the American States

Using state-level data from the United States, we find that differences in colonial legal institutions affect the current quality of state legal institutions. These differences in colonial legal institutions arose because some states were settled by Great Britain, a common law country, and other states were settled by France, Spain, and Mexico, all civil law countries. To explain these findings, we develop a transplant-civil law hypothesis that highlights the disruption associated with large-scale legal transplantation and the possible relative inefficiencies of colonial civil law. We find strong support for the transplant-civil law hypothesis. Our results are robust to inclusion of additional variables capturing climate, geography, initial population and resource endowments. Given the 150-200 year gap between the initial conditions and the measures of the current quality of legal institutions, we provide indirect evidence on the persistence of legal institutions. We then use initial legal systems and climate to quantify the substantial impact of current institutions on current economic performance.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40001/3/wp615.pd

Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia

In pursuit of its transition from a command to a market economy, post-Soviet Russia has witnessed enormous regional differences in economic growth rates. Moreover, the economic reforms implemented under this transition, while initiated at the federal level, have also differed markedly across regions, as regional governments have had considerable discretion over the implementation of reform policies in their jurisdictions. We exploit these differences in analyzing whether regional differences in reform policies can account for regional differences in growth rates, and conclude that to a considerable degree, they can. Most notably, we find that local-government privatization initiatives and regional-government initiatives to gain control over their capital stock (e.g. plants, equipment, machinery and social infrastructure) exhibit close correspondence with the formation of new legal enterprises, which in turn exhibits close correspondence with economic growth.optimal taxation, tax evasion, organized crime

Institutional Change and Product Composition: Does the Initial Quality of Institutions Matter?

We argue that the quality of institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights influences the costs of producing high-value added (complex) versus low-value added (simple) products. Since data is hardly available for domestic transactions, we generate predictions about the relationship between the quality of institutions and product composition with an international trade model and use a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. We find that improvements in institutional quality increase the share and volume of a country's complex product exports. However, the initial quality of institutions is important, since in countries with the least developed institutions, the share of complex products in exports is generally small and, institutional reform has almost no influence on simple product exports. These findings cast doubts on the efficacy of institutional reform in countries with underdeveloped institutions.Complex and simple products, volume effect of institutions, compositional effect of institutions

Entrepreneurship and Post-Socialist Growth

A growing body of national-level survey evidence indicates that small-scale entrepreneurial activity has been an important engine of growth in post-socialist economies. Here we use a rich regional data set to obtain a statistical characterization of the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth within post-Soviet Russia. Russia is a useful laboratory for evaluating links between entrepreneurial activity and growth because of the striking variation in initial conditions, the adoption of policy reforms, and entrepreneurial activity observed across its large number of regions in the early stages of transition. Russia has also experienced striking regional variation in subsequent growth. Conditional on variations in initial conditions and policy reform measures, we find that regional entrepreneurial activity exhibits a strong and enduring relationship with subsequent growth.economic transition; small legal enterprises

Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: Evidence from the American States

Using state-level data from the United States, we find that differences in colonial legal institutions affect the current quality of state legal institutions. These differences in colonial legal institutions arose because some states were settled by Great Britain, a common law country, and other states were settled by France, Spain, and Mexico, all civil law countries. To explain these findings, we develop a transplant-civil law hypothesis that highlights the disruption associated with large-scale legal transplantation and the possible relative inefficiencies of colonial civil law. We find strong support for the transplant-civil law hypothesis. Our results are robust to inclusion of additional variables capturing climate, geography, initial population and resource endowments. Given the 150-200 year gap between the initial conditions and the measures of the current quality of legal institutions, we provide indirect evidence on the persistence of legal institutions. We then use initial legal systems and climate to quantify the substantial impact of current institutions on current economic performance.common law, civil law, transplant, initial conditions, state courts and public corruption

Legal Origins and the Evolution of Institutions: Evidence from American State Courts

Several important studies of institutions assume that the quality of institutions is persistent following some formative historic event. The assumption of institutional persistence, however, begs the question of how these institutions persisted. To better understand this issue, this paper examines the evolution of state courts in the United States. We begin by reviewing the evidence that France, Spain, and Mexico operated civil-law legal systems in territory that would later make up thirteen states. One important philosophical difference between civil-law and common-law legal systems arises from differences in their beliefs regarding the appropriate degree of judicial independence. To show how these beliefs, if persistent, would manifest themselves, we present a model in which legislatures allocate budgets to their judges. In the model, common and civil-law legislatures have different preferences regarding the level of judicial independence. Our model predicts civil-law legislatures will give fewer discretionary resources to their judges when judicial elections are replaced by a system of appointments. We confirm this prediction using state-level data for the period 1961-1999. Finally, we argue that one important reason why civil-law preferences for a weak judiciary appear to have persisted in the American states is that the political culture within state legislatures is slow-moving.

Privatization with Government Control: Evidence from the Russian Oil Sector

Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency. In particular, private and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.control, ownership, oil pipeline, Tobit

Integration: An Empirical Assessment of Russia

In the process of implementing market reforms, many post-socialist countries have struggled to preserve economic and political integration. Using a statistical model of commodity trade, we quantify the evolution of economic integration observed among regions within Russia during 1995-1999, and then explore potential determinants of the patterns of integration we observe. Our measure of integration exhibits rich regional variation that, when aggregated to the national level, fluctuates substantially over time. In seeking to account for this behavior, we draw in part on theoretical models that emphasize the potential role of openness to international trade, regional disparities in income, and inflation volatility in threatening economic and political integration. Controlling for a host of additional regional- and national-level variables, we find a strong negative correspondence between openness to international trade and internal economic integration within Russia. We also find negative links but weaker links between integration and regional-income disparities and inflation volatility.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39873/3/wp488.pd