European international broadcasting and Islamist terrorism in Africa: The case of Boko Haram on <i>France 24</i> and <i>Deutsche Welle</i>

This article examines the relationship between European (international) broadcasting and Islamist terrorism in Africa and positions media portrayal of Boko Haram within the larger picture of Europe’s relations with Africa. Two international broadcasters provide the basis for the analysis: France 24 and Deutsche Welle. The article compares and contrasts their discourse on terrorism to advance several arguments: 1) that through their respective portrayal of Boko Haram and Nigeria both France 24 and Deutsche Welle’s reporting is in line with their respective countries’ foreign policies towards Africa, 2) that discourse on both F24 and DW perpetuates the unequal relationship between African countries and Western powers, 3) that portraying terrorism in terms of ‘clash of civilisations’, as in the case of France 24, may unintentionally contribute to the strengthening of the extremist cause. This is due to the transformation of violent extremism into ‘new wars’. The concept, elaborated in the article, differently explains the logic of extremist behaviour and its relationship with media

Forecasting the Adoption of GM Oilseed Rape: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany

This paper explores farmers' willingness to adopt genetically modified (GM) oilseed rape prior to its commercial release and estimates the 'demand' for the new technology. The analysis is based upon choice experiments with 202 German arable farmers. A multinomial probit estimation reveals that GM attributes such as gross margin, expected liability from cross pollination, or flexibility in returning to conventional oilseed rape significantly affect the likelihood of adoption. Neighbouring farmers' attitudes towards GM cropping and a number of farmer and farm characteristics were also found to be significant determinants of prospective adoption. Demand simulations suggest that adoption rates are very sensitive to the profit difference between GM and non-GM rape varieties. A monopolistic seed price would substantially reduce demand for the new technology. A monopolistic seed supplier would reap between 45% and 80% of the GM rent, and the deadweight loss of the monopoly would range between 15% and 30% of that rent. The remaining rent for farmers may be too small to outweigh possible producer price discounts resulting from the costs of segregating GM and non-GM oilseed rape along the supply chain. Copyright (c) 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation (c) 2008 The Agricultural Economics Society.