Nonpoint source pollution, space, time, and asymmetric information, a deposit refund approach

The incorporation of space allows the establishment of a more precise relationship between a contaminating input, a contaminating byproduct and emissions that reach the final receptor. However, the presence of asymmetric information impedes the implementation of the first-best policy. As a solution to this problem a site specific deposit refund system for the contaminating input and the contaminating byproduct are proposed. Moreover, the utilization of a successive optimization technique first over space and second over time enables definition of the optimal intertemporal site specific deposit refund system.nonpoint source pollution; spatial economics; deposit refund system; asymmetric information

The madelung synthesis of dihydro-1H-pyrrolo- and tetrahydropyrido[1,2-a]- indoles under mild conditions

Benzeneacetonitriles substituted with lactam moieties in the ortho-position cyclize under the influence of a base, dependent on the ring-size of the lactam function, to dihydropyrrolo-, tetrahydropyrido[1,2-a]indole or dihydro-1-benzazepin derivatives, respectively

Single-dipped preferences

We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider different subclasses of single-dipped preferences: we provide examples of subdomains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. We establish exact bounds on the maximal size of strategy-proof functions on each of these domains, and prove that the relationship between the sizes of the subdomains and those of the ranges of strategy-proof functions on them need not be monotonic. Our results exhibit a sharp contrast between the structure of strategy-proof rules defined on subdomains of single-dipped preferences and those defined on subsets of single-peaked ones.strategy-proof, group strategy-proof, binary range rules, single-dipped

Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient?

A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.strategy-proofness, reshuffling invariance, monotonicity, intertwined domains

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.Social choice functions, Binary ranges, group strategy-proofness, xy-monotonicity, xy-based rules.