Taxing the Brain to Uncover Lying? Meta-analyzing the Effect of Imposing Cognitive Load on the Reaction-Time Costs of Lying

Lying typically requires greater mental effort than telling the truth. Imposing cognitive load may improve lie detection by limiting the cognitive resources needed to lie effectively, thereby increasing the difference in speed between truths and lies. We test this hypothesis meta-analytically. Across 21 studies using response-time (RT) paradigms (11 unpublished; total N = 792), we consistently found that truth-telling was faster than lying, but found no evidence that imposing cognitive load increased that difference (Control, d = 1.45; Load, d = 1.28). Instead, load significantly decreased the lie–truth RT difference by increasing the RT of truths, g = −.18, p = .027. Our findings therefore suggest that imposing cognitive load does not necessarily improve RT-based lie detection, and may actually worsen it by taxing the mental system and thus impeding people's ability to easily—and thus quickly—tell the truth

Fundamental social motives measured across forty-two cultures in two waves

How does psychology vary across human societies? The fundamental social motives framework adopts an evolutionary approach to capture the broad range of human social goals within a taxonomy of ancestrally recurring threats and opportunities. These motives—self-protection, disease avoidance, affiliation, status, mate acquisition, mate retention, and kin care—are high in fitness relevance and everyday salience, yet understudied cross-culturally. Here, we gathered data on these motives in 41 countries (N=15,885) in two cross-sectional waves, including 19 countries (N=11,095) for which data were gathered in both waves. Wave 1 was collected from 2016 through mid-2019 (32 countries, N=9353; 3537 male, 5574 female; Mage=24.58, SD=8.07). Wave 2 was collected from May through October 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic (N=6532; 2194 male, 4165 female; Mage=28.82, SD=11.49). These data can be used to assess differences and similarities in people’s fundamental social motives both across and within cultures, at different time points, and in relation to other commonly studied cultural indicators and outcomes

Cross-cultural regularities in the cognitive architecture of pride

Pride occurs in every known culture, appears early in development, is reliably triggered by achievements and formidability, and causes a characteristic display that is recognized everywhere. Here, we evaluate the theory that pride evolved to guide decisions relevant to pursuing actions that enhance valuation and respect for a person in the minds of others. By hypothesis, pride is a neurocomputational program tailored by selection to orchestrate cognition and behavior in the service of: (i) motivating the costeffective pursuit of courses of action that would increase others' valuations and respect of the individual, (ii) motivating the advertisement of acts or characteristics whose recognition by others would lead them to enhance their evaluations of the individual, and (iii) mobilizing the individual to take advantage of the resulting enhanced social landscape. To modulate how much to invest in actions that might lead to enhanced evaluations by others, the pride system must forecast the magnitude of the evaluations the action would evoke in the audience and calibrate its activation proportionally. We tested this prediction in 16 countries across 4 continents (n = 2,085), for 25 acts and traits. As predicted, the pride intensity for a given act or trait closely tracks the valuations of audiences, local (mean r = +0.82) and foreign (mean r = +0.75). This relationship is specific to pride and does not generalize to other positive emotions that coactivate with pride but lack its audience-recalibrating function