Water Funds: Conserving Green Infrastructure

This manual is an effort by TNC to compile, analyze and synthesize its own experience, together with that of the water funds already in existence and under creation, in order to provide operational guidelines to people and organizations interested in establishing a water fund or similar mechanism. Each location has different ecological, social, economic, legal and institutional features and, therefore, each water fund will have its own characteristics, phases and projections. This manual presents general guidelines and logical steps that must be followed to boost the opportunities and benefits of a water fund and to minimize possible obstacles for its creation. It is not intended to be an in-depth look at every aspect of water funds. Although TNC participates in several other initiatives and similar approaches to watershed management, such as the water producers program in Brazil, this document will not address those initiatives and will only focus on the water funds scheme, placing greater emphasis on experiences in the Andean region

On Quantity Competition and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market

In this paper we characterize equilibria in a quantity game where symmetric firms face a local demand together with an export-constrained demand. Firms have unlimited access to a local demand but a restricted access to a second market, like in the electricity network where generators compete to satisfy demand but competition is restricted by transmission capacity. We show the existence of an effective demand that is continuous but not differentiable due to the transmission constraint. Three types of equilibria emerge in this context, parametrized by capacity. First, a symmetric equilibrium (unique) when the access to the second market is constrained. Second, a set of continuous and asymmetric equilibria with a fully used link but not constrained; and finally, a symmetric and unique equilibrium in which the link is not fully used. We also show how multiplicity of equilibria tends to disappear as the number of competitors increaseelectricity markets, Cournot games, capacity constraints

Relevance of cis- and trans-dichloride Ru intermediates in Grubbs-II olefin metathesis catalysis (H(2)IMesCl(2)Ru=CHR)

Using density functional theory with the B3LYP and M06 functionals, we show conclusively that the (H2IMes)(Cl)2Ru olefin metathesis mechanism is bottom-bound with the chlorides remaining trans throughout the reaction, thus attempts to effect diastereo- and enantioselectivity should focus on manipulations that maintain the trans-dichloro Ru geometry

Conformational analysis of olefin-carbene ruthenium metathesis catalysts

We settle a long-standing disagreement of DFT with experiment (both solution and gas phase) for the phosphine dissociation process in Grubbs metathesis catalysis. Our findings with the M06 functional provide further support to gas-phase experimental work, concluding that for the ring-closing metathesis of norbornene, the resting state is the alkylidene−olefin complex and the rate-determining step is the loss of norbornene as a ligand and generation of the 14-electron activated species. Comparing to recent solution NMR data on olefin−carbene Ru complexes relevant to olefin metathesis, we find that the M06 density functional leads to accurate predictions for the stability of conformers, ~0.5 kcal/mol better than is found by B3LYP. Using this methodology, we suggest that Piers and co-workers observed the cis-dichloro “down” isomer exclusively following the ring opening of acenaphthalene

Can the Gains from Argentina's Utilities Reform Offset Credit Shocks?

Computable general equilibrium, Regulation

Are cost models useful for telecoms regulators in developing countries?

Worldwide privatization of the telecommunications industry, and the introduction of competition in the sector, together with the ever-increasing rate of technological advance in telecommunications, raise new and critical challenges for regulation. Fo matters of pricing, universal service obligations, and the like, one question to be answered is this: What is the efficient cost of providing the service to a certain area or type of customer? As developing countries build up their capacity to regulate their privatized infrastructure monopolies, cost models are likely to prove increasingly important in answering this question. Cost models deliver a number of benefits to a regulator willing to apply them, but they also ask for something in advance: information. Without information, the question cannot be answered. The authors introduce cost models and establish their applicability when different degrees of information are available to the regulator. They do no by running a cost model with different sets of actual data form Argentina's second largest city, and comparing results. Reliable, detailed information is generally scarce in developing countries. The authors establish the minimum information requirements for a regulator implementing a cost proxy model approach, showing that this data constraint need not be that binding.ICT Policy and Strategies,Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Business Environment,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Geographical Information Systems,Economic Theory&Research,Educational Technology and Distance Education

Antigen staining for detection of MUC13 and MCU16 in carcinoma tissue

MUC13 and MUC16 are mucosal epithelial expressed proteins associated with various carcinomas. Overexpression of these biomarkers appear to play a role in tumor growth; this discovery has paved a road for multiple studies discussing the potential of targeting mucin proteins and optimize immunotherapy approaches against carcinomas. Our study serves to investigate the level of expression of MUC13 and MUC16 in cancerous and normal tissue and to discuss the implications our findings may have for the utilization of these biomarkers for cancer therapy