Gender Regrets: Banning Abortion and Gender-Affirming Care

Conservative politicians, lawmakers, and media have generated a national moral panic about transgender children and youth that has resulted, as of early 2024, in restrictions or bans on GAC for minors in twenty-four states. In these bans and the advocacy around them gender-affirming care for minors is presented as harmful, ideological, unnecessary, and likely to lead to future regret. The role of regret in the movement to ban gender-affirming care parallels the role of regret in the ongoing conservative campaign to ban abortion. In the years between Roe v. Wade (1973) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), politicians and lawmakers promoted the idea that pregnant people may come to regret the decision to end a pregnancy, and that laws should protect them from that decision. This Article analyzes the use of “regret” in bans on abortion and on gender-affirming care for minors. It identifies two overlapping legal threads. First, both campaigns against medical care point to protection of patients from future regret as a legitimate state interest justifying restrictions on providing medical care. Second, both rely on alleged concerns about regret to redefine the legal meaning of “informed consent” and make it easier for potential future plaintiffs to prevail in civil suits against providers of medical care. In doing so, both treat the emotion of regret as a distinct injury that may give rise to a range of legal rights and liabilities. The Article reveals how conservative politicians and lawmakers use “regret” as a disciplinary tool to promote traditional family values, especially involving natalism and “biological” sex difference

Gender Regrets: Banning Abortion and Gender-Affirming Care

This Article analyzes the use of “regret” in the campaigns to ban GAC and abortion. It identifies two overlapping threads. First, both campaigns against medical care point to protection of patients from future regret as a legitimate state interest justifying restrictions on providing medical care. Second, both rely on concerns about regret to redefine the legal meaning of “informed consent” and make it easier for potential future plaintiffs to prevail in civil suits against providers of medical care. In doing so, both treat the emotion of regret as a distinct injury that may give rise to a range of legal rights and liabilities. The Article reveals a strategic conservative legal movement that has used “regret” as a disciplinary tool to promote “traditional family values,” especially those of natalism and “biological” sex difference. A few words on terminology. First, regret can be a vague concept subject to a variety of definitions. We define it simply as the backward-looking preference that “things should have been otherwise.” Regret can also be understood by contrast to its inverse, “affirmation.” To affirm a decision or event “is to prefer on balance that [the past] should have the features it actually had.” Second, although conservative media, politicians, and lawmakers often refer to individuals who decide to discontinue GAC as “detransitioners,” this Article refers to them as those who decided to desist gender-affirming care. The Article proceeds in three main parts. Part I explores the role of regret in state laws that restrict or ban access to GAC for minors, and the judicial treatment of those laws. Part II considers state abortion restrictions and bans, and the judicial treatment of those laws. Part III analyzes how the concept of regret is used by conservative thinktanks, politicians, and lawmakers to promote “traditional family values,” especially involving natalism, traditional gender norms, and “biological” sexual difference. This Part also considers two other choices--the choice to have children and the choice to be childless. It contrasts regret narratives in these two contexts with those in the GAC and abortion contexts to reveal the work that regret is doing for anti-GAC and anti-abortion movements

The Right Family

The family plays a starring role in American law. Families, the law tells us, are special. They merit many state and federal benefits, including tax deductions, testimonial privileges, untaxed inheritance, and parental presumptions. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court expanded individual rights stemming from familial relationships. In this Article, we argue that the concept of family in American law matters just as much when it is ignored as when it is featured. We contrast policies in which the family is the key unit of analysis with others in which it is not. Looking at four seemingly disparate areas of recent policymaking—the travel ban, family separation at the southern border, agricultural subsidies, and the religious rights of closely held corporations—we explore the interplay between the family, the individual, and the corporation in modern law. We observe that both liberals and conservatives make use of the family to humanize or empower certain people, and both reject the family when seeking to dehumanize or disempower. Where liberals and conservatives differ is which families they choose to champion. Ultimately, we conclude that the use of family as a mechanism through which to confer rights and benefits is a cover to hide policies that entrench and exacerbate existing racial and religious hierarchies. Further, in the context of family businesses, it risks becoming a steppingstone for radical expansion of rights to businesses themselves. To tell this story, we analyze the use and rhetoric of family in politics, media, and recent Supreme Court decisions such as Trump v. Hawaii (2018), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Kerry v. Din (2015), and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018)

Talking about Black Lives Matter and #MeToo

This essay explores the apparent differences and similarities between the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movements. In April 2019, the Wisconsin Journal of Gender, Law and Society hosted a symposium entitled “Race-Ing Justice, En-Gendering Power: Black Lives Matter and the Role of Intersectional Legal Analysis in the Twenty-First Century.” That program facilitated examination of the historical antecedents, cultural contexts, methods, and goals of these linked equality movements. Conversations continued among the symposium participants long after the end of the official program. In this essay, the symposium’s speakers memorialize their robust conversations and also dive more deeply into the phenomena, implications, and future of Black Lives Matter and #MeToo. This essay organizes around internal and external spatial metaphors and makes five schematic moves. First, internal considerations ground comparisons of the definitions, goals, and ideas of success employed by or applied to Black Lives Matter and #MeToo. Second, external concerns inspire questions about whether both movements may be better understood through the lens of intersectionality, and relatedly, what challenges these movements pose for an intersectional analysis. Third, a meta-internal framework invites inquiry into how the movements shape the daily work of scholars, teachers, lawyers, and community activists. Fourth, a dialectical external-internal frame drives questions about the movements’ effects on law and popular culture, and the reciprocal effects between those external influences and the movements themselves. Returning to an external, even forward-looking, approach, we ask what the next steps are for both movements. This five-part taxonomy frames the inquiry into where the Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements are located individually, but also where they are co-located, and, perhaps most importantly, where they are going

Memorandum on Mississippi House Bill 1523

As legal scholars with expertise in matters of religious freedom, civil rights, and the interaction between those fields, we offer our opinion on the scope and meaning of Mississippi House Bill 1523, which was signed into law today by Governor Phil Bryant. Specifically, we wish to call attention to language in the law that we believe conflicts with the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We share the view of Justice Kennedy when he expressed that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,” and would add that neither can such a desire be justified in the name of religious liberty. HB 1523 presents a conflict with First Amendment religious freedom doctrine by providing for religious exemptions that will meaningfully harm the rights of others, particularly LGBT Mississippians

Haplotype structure and selection of the MDM2 oncogene in humans

The MDM2 protein is an ubiquitin ligase that plays a critical role in regulating the levels and activity of the p53 protein, which is a central tumor suppressor. A SNP in the human MDM2 gene (SNP309 T/G) occurs at frequencies dependent on demographic history and has been shown to have important differential effects on the activity of the MDM2 and p53 proteins and to associate with altered risk for the development of several cancers. In this report, the haplotype structure of the MDM2 gene is determined by using 14 different SNPs across the gene from three different population samples: Caucasians, African Americans, and the Ashkenazi Jewish ethnic group. The results presented in this report indicate that there is a substantially reduced variability of the deleterious SNP309 G allele haplotype in all three populations studied, whereas multiple common T allele haplotypes were found in all three populations. This observation, coupled with the relatively high frequency of the G allele haplotype in both and Caucasian and Ashkenazi Jewish population data sets, suggests that this haplotype could have undergone a recent positive selection sweep. An entropy-based selection test is presented that explicitly takes into account the correlations between different SNPs, and the analysis of MDM2 reveals a significant departure from the standard assumptions of selective neutrality

Superconducting Accelerating Cavity Pressure Sensitivity Analysis and Stiffening

The Soreq Applied Research Accelerator Facility (SARAF) design is based on a 40 MeV 5 mA light ions superconducting RF linac. Phase-I of SARAF delivers up to 2 mA CW proton beams in an energy range of 1.5 - 4.0 MeV. The maximum beam power that we have reached is 5.7 kW. Today, the main limiting factor to reach higher ion energy and beam power is related to the HWR sensitivity to the liquid helium coolant pressure fluctuations. The HWR sensitivity to helium pressure is about 60 Hz/mbar. The cavities had been designed, a decade ago, to be soft in order to enable tuning of their novel shape. However, the cavities turned out to be too soft. In this work we found that increasing the rigidity of the cavities in the vicinity of the external drift tubes may reduce the cavity sensitivity by a factor of three. A preliminary design to increase the cavity rigidity is presented