Reasoning about self and others

Dit proefschrift gaat over hoe mensen redeneren over andermans denken - hun kennis, gedachten en intenties. Het redeneren over andermans denken is noodzakelijk in sociale interacties, om het gedrag van anderen te begrijpen.In tegenstelling tot andere studies, die impliceren dat ‘sociaal redeneren’ complex is en gelimiteerd door cognitieve capaciteiten, laten wij zien dat mensen beter kunnen worden in deze vaardigheid. Cognitieve limieten verdwijnen door simpele ingrepen, zoals stapsgewijs trainen, visuele ondersteuning en het stellen van vragen. Ons onderzoek laat tevens zien dat suboptimale uitkomsten in sociale interacties soms te wijten zijn aan het gebruik van verkeerde strategieën. Simpele ingrepen kunnen ook hier uitkomst zijn: door mensen te helpen betere strategieën te ontdekken en toepassen.De belangrijkste bevinding van dit proefschrift is dat mensen sociale interacties daadwerkelijk interpreteren in termen van andermans denken, ook al is een niet-mentale interpretatie die formeel equivalent is, mogelijk. Zo wordt een rationale computer opponent niet hetzelfde behandeld als een equivalent mechaniek, ook al is de uitkomst in beide situaties hetzelfde. Bovendien is het spelen van een spel vanuit het perspectief van een ander moeilijker dan het spelen van datzelfde spel vanuit het eigen perspectief. Met andere woorden, sociaal redeneren gaat echt over andermans denken. Als zodanig, is het een unieke cognitieve vaardigheid.The topic of this dissertation is how people reason about the minds of others, their beliefs, desires, and intentions. Such reasoning is required in social interactions when we are trying to understand other people’s behavior. Whereas previous research seems to imply that ‘social reasoning’ is complex and limited by cognitive resources, we show that it is susceptible to improvement. Our research shows that cognitive limitations can be alleviated by relatively simple measures, such as stepwise instruction, visual cues, and interactive prompts. Furthermore, additional findings seem to hint at the possibility that suboptimal performance might not be due to limited cognitive capacity, but due to suboptimal strategies instead. The previously mentioned measures might be beneficial here as well: Help people discover and apply better strategies when reasoning about the minds of others. The most important finding of this dissertation is that people do not interpret social interactions as formal or logical problems without considering mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. For example, a rational computer opponent in a game is still considered differently than an equivalent mechanical device, even if the outcome is the same in both situations. Moreover, playing a game from someone else’s perspective is more complicated than playing the same game oneself. In other words, social reasoning really is about the minds of others. As such, it is a unique cognitive skill

Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games

People model other people's mental states in order to understand and predict their behavior. Sometimes they model what others think about them as well: ``He thinks that I intend to stop.'' Such second-order theory of mind is needed to navigate some social situations, for example, to make optimal decisions in turn-taking games. Adults sometimes find this very difficult. Sometimes they make decisions that do not fit their predictions about the other player. However, the main bottleneck for decision makers is to take a second-order perspective required to make a correct opponent model. We report a methodical investigation into supporting factors that help adults do better. We presented subjects with two-player, three-turn games in which optimal decisions required second-order theory of mind (Hedden and Zhang, 2002). We applied three ``scaffolds'' that, theoretically, should facilitate second-order perspective-taking: 1) stepwise training, from simple one-person games to games requiring second-order theory of mind; 2) prompting subjects to predict the opponent's next decision before making their own decision; and 3) a realistic visual task representation. The performance of subjects in the eight resulting combinations shows that stepwise training, but not the other two scaffolds, improves subjects' second-order opponent models and thereby their own decisions

Enacting experimental alternative spaces

This paper analyses the experimental nature of alternative spaces and the affective, emotional and embodied experience their enactment generates. In so doing, it grounds the analysis on the intentional community of Damanhur (Italy), as an example of experimental spaces. Scholarship concerning intentional communities draws on utopian studies that consider them as utopian laboratories. More recently, non‐representational approaches have emphasised the processual nature of utopias, yet studies have overlooked the experimental nature of these alternative spaces. Drawing upon in‐depth ethnographic data, this paper engages with community experimentations that took place in Damanhur for residents and visitors. It illustrates how utopian enactment is experimental and thus, disordering, unsettling and creative. Moreover, I argue that experimentations are not limited to unsettling the social structure of the community and, when studying the enactment of alternative spaces, emphasis should also be on their capacity to affect the individual