The Return to Schooling in Structural Dynamic Models: A Survey

This papers contains a survey of the recent literature devoted to the returns to schooling within a dynamic structural framework. I present a historical perspective on the evolution of the literature, from early static models set in a selectivity framework (Willis and Rosen, 1979) to the recent literature, stimulated by Keane and Wolpin (1997), and which uses stochastic dynamic programming techniques. After reviewing the literature thoroughly, I compare the structural approach with the IV (experimental) approach. I present their commonalities and I also discuss their fundamental differences. To get an order of magnitude, most structural estimates reported for the US range between 4% and 7% per year. On the other hand, IV estimates between 10% and 15% per year are often reported. The discrepancy prevails even when comparable (if not identical) data sets are used. The discussion is focussed on understanding this divergence. The distinction between static and dynamic model specifications is a recurrent theme in the analysis. I argue that the distinction between the IV approach and the structural approach may be coined in terms of a trade off between behavioral and statistical assumptions. For this reason, and unless one has very specific knowledge of the true data generating process, it is neither possible, nor sensible, to claim which approach to estimation is more flexible. More precisely, I show that structural and IV approaches differ mainly at the level of i) the compatibility of the underlying models with truly dynamic behavior, ii) the role of heterogeneity in ability and tastes, iii) the consideration of post-schooling opportunities, and (iv) the specification (and interpretation) of the Mincer wage equation.Returns to Schooling ; Human Capital ; Ability Bias ; Dynamic Programming ; Dynamic Self-Selection ; Natural experiments ; IV estimation

Can Risk Aversion Explain Schooling Attainments?: evidence from Italy

Using unique Italian panel data, in which individual differences in behavior toward risk are measured from answers to a lottery question, we investigate if (and to what extent) risk aversion can explain differences in schooling attainments. We formulate the schooling decision process as a reduced-form dynamic discrete choice. The model is estimated with a degree of flexibility virtually compatible with semi- parametric likelihood techniques. We analyze how grade transition from one level to the next varies with preference heterogeneity (risk aversion), parental human capital, socioeconomic variables and persistent unobserved (to the econometrician) heterogeneity. We present evidence that schooling attainments decrease with risk aversion, but despite a statistically significant effect, differences in attitudes toward risk account for a modest portion of the probability of entering higher education. Differences in ability(ies) and in parental human capital are much more important. in the most general version of the model, the likelihood function is the joint probability of schooling attainments, and post-schooling wealth and risk aversion.dynamic discrete choices ; education ; human capital ; risk aversion

Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and Earnings Dynamics of American Executives

This paper explores the dynamics of wage growth in corporate hierarchies. Using panel data techniques, we estimate the causal effect of current and past transitions in reporting level and past earnings growth on components of current earnings and earnings growth using a large panel of US executives. After conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity, current compensation growth is positively correlated with past promotion outcomes but negatively correlated with past compensation growth. In a flexible model of wage growth, there is an important asymmetry between the effect of a promotion and a demotion. The effect of promotion is smaller in magnitude than the effect of a demotion. The causal effect of a promotion is positive on both growth in base pay and total cash compensation but is negative on bonus growth. The effect of a demotion is negative on growth in all pay components.earning growth ; promotion ; reputation

Risk Aversion and Schooling Decisions

We develop a non-rational expectation econometric model of sequential schooling decisions. Using unique Italian panel data in which individual differences in attitudes toward risk are measurable (with error), we investigate the effect of risk aversion on the probability of entering higher education. This allows us to characterize the subjective (as opposed to the objective) effect of higher education on marginal risk exposure. Because the measure of risk aversion (the classical Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion) is posterior to schooling decisions, it depends on current wealth realizations and we must therefore take into account its endogeneity. We also allow risk aversion to be measured with error. After taking into account both the endogeneity of wealth and measurement error, we find that risk aversion is a key determinant (comparable to parents' educational background) of the decisions to enter higher education. Precisely, risk aversion acts as a deterrent to higher education investmentdynamic discrete choices, éducation, ex-ante risk, risk aversion

Earnings Dispersion, Risk Aversion and Education

We estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions in which the degree of risk aversion can be inferred from schooling decisions. In our model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to school and market abilities but homogeneous with respect to the degree of risk aversion. We allow endogenous schooling attainments to affect the level of risk experienced in labor market earnings through wage dispersion and employment rate dispersion. We find a low degree of relative risk aversion (0.93) and the estimates indicate that both wage and employment rate dispersions decrease significantly with schooling attainments. We find that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion will increase schooling attainments. Finally, the low degree of risk aversion implies that an increase in earnings dispersion would have little effect on schooling attainments.dynamic programming; earnings dispersion; human capital; returns to education; risk aversion

Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.Second-generation immigrants ; schooling attainments ; fixed term employment

The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives

We formulate an empirical model of promotion with dynamic selfselection where the current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual human capital, unobserved (to the econometrician) individual specific attributes, time varying firm specific variables (firm size and profits) as well as endogenous past promotion histories. We examine the causal effect of previous promotion histories (as measured by realized speed of promotion) on future promotion outcomes. The model is fit on an 8 year panel of promotion histories of 30,000 American executives employed in more than 380 different firms. The stochastic process generating promotions is weakly correlated with standard human capital endowment variables (age, schooling and tenure). It may be viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become smaller as an individual moves up in the hierarchy and is primarily explained by individual (or firm) specific factors other than measured human capital. We also find that, conditional on unobservables, the promotion probability is only mildly enhanced, on average, by the speed of promotion achieved in the past (a structural fast track effect). However, we find the existence of a relatively high cross-sectional dispersion in the effect of past promotion histories and we are able to provide an explanation for this relatively high dispersion. In general, the magnitude of the individual specific effect of achieved speed of promotion is inversely related to accumulated human capital (schooling and tenure). We believe that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the signaling aspect of past promotions is stronger for those who are less educated and stronger for those who are relatively new in a firm. We also find that a negative correlation between current promotion and past speed of promotion cannot be ruled out for a portion of the population, and we are able to relate this finding to the “Peter Principle”.dynamic discrete choices; personnel economics; promotions

The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives

We formulate an empirical model of promotion with dynamic selfselection where the current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual human capital, unobserved (to the econometrician) individual specific attributes, time varying firm specific variables (firm size and profits) as well as endogenous past promotion histories. We examine the causal effect of previous promotion histories (as measured by realized speed of promotion) on future promotion outcomes. The model is fit on an 8 year panel of promotion histories of 30,000 American executives employed in more than 380 different firms. The stochastic process generating promotions is weakly correlated with standard human capital endowment variables (age, schooling and tenure). It may be viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become smaller as an individual moves up in the hierarchy and is primarily explained by individual (or firm) specific factors other than measured human capital. We also find that, conditional on unobservables, the promotion probability is only mildly enhanced, on average, by the speed of promotion achieved in the past (a structural fast track effect). However, we find the existence of a relatively high cross-sectional dispersion in the effect of past promotion histories and we are able to provide an explanation for this relatively high dispersion. In general, the magnitude of the individual specific effect of achieved speed of promotion is inversely related to accumulated human capital (schooling and tenure). We believe that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the signaling aspect of past promotions is stronger for those who are less educated and stronger for those who are relatively new in a firm. We also find that a negative correlation between current promotion and past speed of promotion cannot be ruled out for a portion of the population, and we are able to relate this finding to the "Peter Principle". Dans ce papier, nous estimons un modèle dynamique de promotion où la notion d'effet causal (causal fast track) est différenciée de la notion non-causale (spurious fast track). La probabilité de promotion est fonction du niveau hiérarchique dans la firme, des attributs observables et non observables des individus, des attributs observables (et dynamiques) de la firme (tels que les profits et la taille), ainsi que de l'historique (endogène) des promotions passées mesuré par la rapidité moyenne de promotion. Le modèle est appliqué à un échantillon de 30 000 cadres du secteur privé américain, travaillant pour plus de 380 grandes firmes. Les résultats indiquent que le processus aléatoire générant les promotions dépend faiblement du niveau de capital humain, et très peu de la vitesse passée, mais beaucoup plus des facteurs non observables tels que la motivation. Les résultats montrent également qu'il y a une large dispersion dans l'effet de la vitesse de promotion sur les promotions futures. Bien que l'effet soit positif en moyenne, il est négatif pour une sous-population. De façon générale, l'effet de la vitesse passée décroît avec le niveau de capital humain et l'ancienneté dans la firme. L'effet négatif de la vitesse de promotion est compatible avec le "principe de Peter", souvent mentionné dans la littérature sur la dynamique des promotions.personnel economics, promotions, dynamic discrete choices, random effects, promotions, tournois, choix discrets dynamiques, économie des ressources humaines, effets aléatoires

Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.schooling attainments, second-generation immigrants, fixed term employment

Unobserved Ability and the Return to Schooling

We estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling decisions with unobserved heterogeneity in school ability and market ability on a sample taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Both the instantaneous utility of attending school and the wage regression function are estimated flexibly. The null hypothesis that the local returns to schooling are constant is strongly rejected in favor of a convex wage regression function composed of 8 spline segments. The local returns are very low until grade 11 (1% per year or less), increase to 3.7% in grade 12 and exceed 10% only from grade 14 to grade 16. The average return increases smoothly from 0.4% (grade 7) to 4.6% (grade 16). The convexity of the log wage regression function implies that those who obtain more schooling also experience higher average returns. We strongly reject the null hypothesis that unobserved market ability is uncorrelated with realized schooling attainments, which underlies many previous studies that have used OLS to estimate the return to schooling. The correlation between realized schooling and market ability is found to be positive and is consistent with the existence of a positive "Ability Bias". À partir d'un échantillon tiré du National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), nous estimons un modèle de programmation dynamique des choix d'éducation en présence d'hétérogénéité non observée dans les capacités scolaires et aptitudes sur le marché de l'emploi. L'utilité instantanée de la fréquentation scolaire ainsi que la fonction de salaire sont évaluées de façon flexible. L'hypothèse nulle que les rendements marginaux de l'éducation sont constants est catégoriquement rejetée en faveur d'une fonction de salaire convexe composée de huit segments de fonction d'approximation spline. Les rendements marginaux s'avèrent être très faibles jusqu'à la onzième année (1 % ou moins par an), augmentent jusqu'à 3,7 % pour la douzième année et dépassent les 10 % pour les années 14 à 16. Le rendement moyen augmente uniformément de 0,4 % (7ème année) à 4,6 % (16ème année). La convexité de la fonction de régression logarithmique du salaire implique que ceux qui atteignent un plus haut niveau de scolarisation obtiennent également de meilleurs rendements moyens sur le marché de l'emploi. Nous rejetons l'hypothèse nulle selon laquelle les aptitudes non observées sur le marché du travail ne sont pas corrélées avec les niveaux d'éducation atteints. Ce résultat va à l'encontre de ceux obtenus dans plusieurs études antérieures qui estimaient le rendement de l'éducation par la méthode des MCO. Nous trouvons une corrélation positive entre le niveau de scolarité atteint et les aptitudes sur le marché de l'emploi, confirmant ainsi l'existence d'un «Biais d'aptitude» positif.Return to Schooling, Dynamic Programming, Ability Bias, Discount Rate Bias, Rendements de l'éducation, Programmation dynamique, Biais d'aptitude, Biais de taux d'escompte