Mystique et politique chez Abdessalam Yassine et ses adeptes

Au Maroc, le mouvement islamique et mystique « Justice et bienfaisance » est étroitement lié à la personne de son fondateur Abdessalam Yassine. L'idée principale développée ici est que Abdessalam Yassine est à la fois médiateur religieux et médiateur politique. Être sous son autorité spirituelle signifie pour lui et ses adeptes être sous son autorité politique. Cet article tente de comprendre les ressorts de cette synthèse entre religion et politique en étudiant une ziyâra [visite] au maître à Salé, et quelques passages du livre le plus important de Abdessalam Yassine dans lequel il s'appuie sur un soufisme scripturaire.In Morocco, the mystical Islamic movement “Justice and Beneficence” is strongly linked to the personality of his founder, Abdessalam Yassine. The argument is that Abdessalam Yassine is a religious mediator and a political mediator at the same time. Being under his spiritual authority means for him and his enthusiasts being under his political authority. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis two main points are developed. First, this article analyses a ziyâra, a visit to the master at Salé. Second, it deals with some passages of his most important book in which Abdessalam Yassine relies on a scriptural Sufism.En Marruecos, el movimiento mistico islamico « Justicia y beneficencia »  es estrechamente atado a la persona de su fundador Abdessalam Yassine. La idea principal desarollada aqui es que Abdessalam Yassine es a la vez un mediador religioso y un mediador politico. Estar bajo su autoridad espiritual significa, por él y sus seguidores, estar bajo su autoridad politica. Ese articulo trata de demostrar esa hipotesis, analizando una ziyâra, visita al maestro en Salé, y algunos pasajes de su libro el mas importante en el cual Abdessalam Yassine se basa en un sufismo escripturario

Global age-sex-specific mortality, life expectancy, and population estimates in 204 countries and territories and 811 subnational locations, 1950–2021, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

Background: Estimates of demographic metrics are crucial to assess levels and trends of population health outcomes. The profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on populations worldwide has underscored the need for timely estimates to understand this unprecedented event within the context of long-term population health trends. The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2021 provides new demographic estimates for 204 countries and territories and 811 additional subnational locations from 1950 to 2021, with a particular emphasis on changes in mortality and life expectancy that occurred during the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic period. Methods: 22 223 data sources from vital registration, sample registration, surveys, censuses, and other sources were used to estimate mortality, with a subset of these sources used exclusively to estimate excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 2026 data sources were used for population estimation. Additional sources were used to estimate migration; the effects of the HIV epidemic; and demographic discontinuities due to conflicts, famines, natural disasters, and pandemics, which are used as inputs for estimating mortality and population. Spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression (ST-GPR) was used to generate under-5 mortality rates, which synthesised 30 763 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 1365 surveys and censuses, and 80 other sources. ST-GPR was also used to estimate adult mortality (between ages 15 and 59 years) based on information from 31 642 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 355 surveys and censuses, and 24 other sources. Estimates of child and adult mortality rates were then used to generate life tables with a relational model life table system. For countries with large HIV epidemics, life tables were adjusted using independent estimates of HIV-specific mortality generated via an epidemiological analysis of HIV prevalence surveys, antenatal clinic serosurveillance, and other data sources. Excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 was determined by subtracting observed all-cause mortality (adjusted for late registration and mortality anomalies) from the mortality expected in the absence of the pandemic. Expected mortality was calculated based on historical trends using an ensemble of models. In location-years where all-cause mortality data were unavailable, we estimated excess mortality rates using a regression model with covariates pertaining to the pandemic. Population size was computed using a Bayesian hierarchical cohort component model. Life expectancy was calculated using age-specific mortality rates and standard demographic methods. Uncertainty intervals (UIs) were calculated for every metric using the 25th and 975th ordered values from a 1000-draw posterior distribution. Findings: Global all-cause mortality followed two distinct patterns over the study period: age-standardised mortality rates declined between 1950 and 2019 (a 62·8% [95% UI 60·5–65·1] decline), and increased during the COVID-19 pandemic period (2020–21; 5·1% [0·9–9·6] increase). In contrast with the overall reverse in mortality trends during the pandemic period, child mortality continued to decline, with 4·66 million (3·98–5·50) global deaths in children younger than 5 years in 2021 compared with 5·21 million (4·50–6·01) in 2019. An estimated 131 million (126–137) people died globally from all causes in 2020 and 2021 combined, of which 15·9 million (14·7–17·2) were due to the COVID-19 pandemic (measured by excess mortality, which includes deaths directly due to SARS-CoV-2 infection and those indirectly due to other social, economic, or behavioural changes associated with the pandemic). Excess mortality rates exceeded 150 deaths per 100 000 population during at least one year of the pandemic in 80 countries and territories, whereas 20 nations had a negative excess mortality rate in 2020 or 2021, indicating that all-cause mortality in these countries was lower during the pandemic than expected based on historical trends. Between 1950 and 2021, global life expectancy at birth increased by 22·7 years (20·8–24·8), from 49·0 years (46·7–51·3) to 71·7 years (70·9–72·5). Global life expectancy at birth declined by 1·6 years (1·0–2·2) between 2019 and 2021, reversing historical trends. An increase in life expectancy was only observed in 32 (15·7%) of 204 countries and territories between 2019 and 2021. The global population reached 7·89 billion (7·67–8·13) people in 2021, by which time 56 of 204 countries and territories had peaked and subsequently populations have declined. The largest proportion of population growth between 2020 and 2021 was in sub-Saharan Africa (39·5% [28·4–52·7]) and south Asia (26·3% [9·0–44·7]). From 2000 to 2021, the ratio of the population aged 65 years and older to the population aged younger than 15 years increased in 188 (92·2%) of 204 nations. Interpretation: Global adult mortality rates markedly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, reversing past decreasing trends, while child mortality rates continued to decline, albeit more slowly than in earlier years. Although COVID-19 had a substantial impact on many demographic indicators during the first 2 years of the pandemic, overall global health progress over the 72 years evaluated has been profound, with considerable improvements in mortality and life expectancy. Additionally, we observed a deceleration of global population growth since 2017, despite steady or increasing growth in lower-income countries, combined with a continued global shift of population age structures towards older ages. These demographic changes will likely present future challenges to health systems, economies, and societies. The comprehensive demographic estimates reported here will enable researchers, policy makers, health practitioners, and other key stakeholders to better understand and address the profound changes that have occurred in the global health landscape following the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, and longer-term trends beyond the pandemic

Global age-sex-specific mortality, life expectancy, and population estimates in 204 countries and territories and 811 subnational locations, 1950–2021, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021

BACKGROUND: Estimates of demographic metrics are crucial to assess levels and trends of population health outcomes. The profound impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on populations worldwide has underscored the need for timely estimates to understand this unprecedented event within the context of long-term population health trends. The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2021 provides new demographic estimates for 204 countries and territories and 811 additional subnational locations from 1950 to 2021, with a particular emphasis on changes in mortality and life expectancy that occurred during the 2020–21 COVID-19 pandemic period. METHODS: 22 223 data sources from vital registration, sample registration, surveys, censuses, and other sources were used to estimate mortality, with a subset of these sources used exclusively to estimate excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 2026 data sources were used for population estimation. Additional sources were used to estimate migration; the effects of the HIV epidemic; and demographic discontinuities due to conflicts, famines, natural disasters, and pandemics, which are used as inputs for estimating mortality and population. Spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression (ST-GPR) was used to generate under-5 mortality rates, which synthesised 30 763 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 1365 surveys and censuses, and 80 other sources. ST-GPR was also used to estimate adult mortality (between ages 15 and 59 years) based on information from 31 642 location-years of vital registration and sample registration data, 355 surveys and censuses, and 24 other sources. Estimates of child and adult mortality rates were then used to generate life tables with a relational model life table system. For countries with large HIV epidemics, life tables were adjusted using independent estimates of HIV-specific mortality generated via an epidemiological analysis of HIV prevalence surveys, antenatal clinic serosurveillance, and other data sources. Excess mortality due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 was determined by subtracting observed all-cause mortality (adjusted for late registration and mortality anomalies) from the mortality expected in the absence of the pandemic. Expected mortality was calculated based on historical trends using an ensemble of models. In location-years where all-cause mortality data were unavailable, we estimated excess mortality rates using a regression model with covariates pertaining to the pandemic. Population size was computed using a Bayesian hierarchical cohort component model. Life expectancy was calculated using age-specific mortality rates and standard demographic methods. Uncertainty intervals (UIs) were calculated for every metric using the 25th and 975th ordered values from a 1000-draw posterior distribution. FINDINGS: Global all-cause mortality followed two distinct patterns over the study period: age-standardised mortality rates declined between 1950 and 2019 (a 62·8% [95% UI 60·5–65·1] decline), and increased during the COVID-19 pandemic period (2020–21; 5·1% [0·9–9·6] increase). In contrast with the overall reverse in mortality trends during the pandemic period, child mortality continued to decline, with 4·66 million (3·98–5·50) global deaths in children younger than 5 years in 2021 compared with 5·21 million (4·50–6·01) in 2019. An estimated 131 million (126–137) people died globally from all causes in 2020 and 2021 combined, of which 15·9 million (14·7–17·2) were due to the COVID-19 pandemic (measured by excess mortality, which includes deaths directly due to SARS-CoV-2 infection and those indirectly due to other social, economic, or behavioural changes associated with the pandemic). Excess mortality rates exceeded 150 deaths per 100 000 population during at least one year of the pandemic in 80 countries and territories, whereas 20 nations had a negative excess mortality rate in 2020 or 2021, indicating that all-cause mortality in these countries was lower during the pandemic than expected based on historical trends. Between 1950 and 2021, global life expectancy at birth increased by 22·7 years (20·8–24·8), from 49·0 years (46·7–51·3) to 71·7 years (70·9–72·5). Global life expectancy at birth declined by 1·6 years (1·0–2·2) between 2019 and 2021, reversing historical trends. An increase in life expectancy was only observed in 32 (15·7%) of 204 countries and territories between 2019 and 2021. The global population reached 7·89 billion (7·67–8·13) people in 2021, by which time 56 of 204 countries and territories had peaked and subsequently populations have declined. The largest proportion of population growth between 2020 and 2021 was in sub-Saharan Africa (39·5% [28·4–52·7]) and south Asia (26·3% [9·0–44·7]). From 2000 to 2021, the ratio of the population aged 65 years and older to the population aged younger than 15 years increased in 188 (92·2%) of 204 nations. INTERPRETATION: Global adult mortality rates markedly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, reversing past decreasing trends, while child mortality rates continued to decline, albeit more slowly than in earlier years. Although COVID-19 had a substantial impact on many demographic indicators during the first 2 years of the pandemic, overall global health progress over the 72 years evaluated has been profound, with considerable improvements in mortality and life expectancy. Additionally, we observed a deceleration of global population growth since 2017, despite steady or increasing growth in lower-income countries, combined with a continued global shift of population age structures towards older ages. These demographic changes will likely present future challenges to health systems, economies, and societies. The comprehensive demographic estimates reported here will enable researchers, policy makers, health practitioners, and other key stakeholders to better understand and address the profound changes that have occurred in the global health landscape following the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, and longer-term trends beyond the pandemic. FUNDING: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

Effects of hospital facilities on patient outcomes after cancer surgery: an international, prospective, observational study

Background Early death after cancer surgery is higher in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) compared with in high-income countries, yet the impact of facility characteristics on early postoperative outcomes is unknown. The aim of this study was to examine the association between hospital infrastructure, resource availability, and processes on early outcomes after cancer surgery worldwide.Methods A multimethods analysis was performed as part of the GlobalSurg 3 study-a multicentre, international, prospective cohort study of patients who had surgery for breast, colorectal, or gastric cancer. The primary outcomes were 30-day mortality and 30-day major complication rates. Potentially beneficial hospital facilities were identified by variable selection to select those associated with 30-day mortality. Adjusted outcomes were determined using generalised estimating equations to account for patient characteristics and country-income group, with population stratification by hospital.Findings Between April 1, 2018, and April 23, 2019, facility-level data were collected for 9685 patients across 238 hospitals in 66 countries (91 hospitals in 20 high-income countries; 57 hospitals in 19 upper-middle-income countries; and 90 hospitals in 27 low-income to lower-middle-income countries). The availability of five hospital facilities was inversely associated with mortality: ultrasound, CT scanner, critical care unit, opioid analgesia, and oncologist. After adjustment for case-mix and country income group, hospitals with three or fewer of these facilities (62 hospitals, 1294 patients) had higher mortality compared with those with four or five (adjusted odds ratio [OR] 3.85 [95% CI 2.58-5.75]; p<0.0001), with excess mortality predominantly explained by a limited capacity to rescue following the development of major complications (63.0% vs 82.7%; OR 0.35 [0.23-0.53]; p<0.0001). Across LMICs, improvements in hospital facilities would prevent one to three deaths for every 100 patients undergoing surgery for cancer.Interpretation Hospitals with higher levels of infrastructure and resources have better outcomes after cancer surgery, independent of country income. Without urgent strengthening of hospital infrastructure and resources, the reductions in cancer-associated mortality associated with improved access will not be realised

1. Islam, protectorat et nationalisme

Allal al-Fassi et la salafiyya Les années 1930-1940 sont présentées comme celles d’un « reflux du religieux » dans le monde musulman. Pourtant, le cas du Maroc infirme cette hypothèse : le religieux assure sa permanence dans la société en se transformant. Il convient d’étudier les modalités de sa transformation et de son usage au sein du mouvement national. Avec Allal al-Fassi, illustre défenseur de la nation marocaine, le religieux est réformé et rénové pour mieux épouser les exigences du te..

The Life of Shari'a

This dissertation is a conceptual inquiry about Shari’a exploring distinct and yet interrelated dimensions of the revealed law of Islam: (i) political, (ii) spiritual, (iii) ethical, (iv) epistemic and (v) rational. These dimensions are studied from the perspective of Sunni Islam in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Egypt on the basis of a fieldwork conducted in Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo in 2012-2014, as well as of works by classical and contemporary Islamic scholars. This study of Shari’a is guided by the following questions: What kind of political subjectivity is enabled by Islamic jurisprudence when dealing with revolutionary protests, power, and order? What kind of spirituality is entailed by Shari’a rules? To what extent is Shari’a a kind of law distinct from contemporary state law that gives shape to a form of ethical life based on the relationship between acts of worship and social interactions? Under what epistemic conditions does revealed speech call for deeds? How does the Islamic legal episteme involve the use of reason in relationship to revelation?This dissertation shows that any attempt to deepen our understanding of Shari’a and the epistemic and cultural practices associated with it requires the study not only of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the sources of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) but also of other forms of knowledge such as Sufism, theology (kalam), and philosophy and the ways in which they are intertwined with the revealed law. It brings to light the epistemic language and the evidential regime displayed in shared assumptions and agreements between Islamic scholars versed in these disciplines as much as in disagreements between them. In the light of this research, this dissertation reconsiders several theses which have been influential in the study of Shari’a. First, it reassesses the claim that Shari’a should be studied merely as a juridical law enforced by a central authority. Second, it revisits the thesis of Shari’a’s demise in modern times. Third, it recasts the thesis according to which Shari’a is set in opposition to spirituality, ethics, philosophy and rationality. Finally, if modernity is understood as the regime of separation of between knowledge, religion, law, ethics and politics understood as autonomous spheres within the modern polity, then my dissertation is an invitation to question this normative assumption and to think about the intertwinement of all these dimensions in Islam

Le cheikh et le calife

L’auteur s’interroge dans cet ouvrage sur la place du religieux islamique dans la société civile marocaine et apporte des éléments de réponse à travers une passionnante enquête de terrain menée auprès des deux principaux mouvements islamiques marocains. Acteur engagé du printemps arabe, et issu lui-même de la gauche démocratique et séculière marocaine, Youssef Belal démontre, par une sociologie religieuse attentive aux formes pratiques de la mobilisation, que l’islam n’est pas incompatible avec la démocratie, et que l’islam politique tel qu’il s’est développé au Maroc, qu’il soit celui de la monarchie ou celui de certains mouvements dits islamistes, participe pleinement de la rationalisation et de la sécularisation de la société de ce pays.In this volume, the author examines the place of followers of the Muslim faith in Moroccan civil society and provides some answers by means of a fascinating field survey involving the two main Islamic movements in Morocco. An active participant in the Arab Spring, and himself a product of the Moroccan democratic and secular Left, Youssef Belal shows, through religious sociology which takes into account practical forms of mobilisation, that Islam is not incompatible with democracy. He also demonstrates that the form of political Islam which has developed in Morocco, whether in the form of monarchy or so-called Islamist movements, plays a major role in the rationalisation and secularisation of society in the country.À la mémoire de mon père Ce livre est le fruit d’une observation participante et d’entretiens réalisés en 2003 et 2004 auprès des membres de Jamâ’at al-‘Adl wa al-Ishân (Communauté pour la justice et l’élévation spirituelle), de Harakat al-Tawhîd wa al-Islâh (Mouvement pour l’unicité et la réforme) et du Parti pour la justice et le développement (PJD). Je suis reconnaissant envers toutes celles et ceux qui ont bien voulu me consacrer du temps, et m’ont permis d’accéder aux rencontres restreintes consacrées notamment aux pratiques rituelles. Je remercie l’équipe d’ENS Éditions, en particulier Frédéric Abécassis pour sa lecture attentive du manuscrit et ses remarques pertinentes. Je souhaite également remercier Mohammed Mourabiti qui a donné son accord pour la reproduction de sa peinture en couverture. Les discussions avec mes amis, notamment Mohammed Khatib, Abdeslam Kadiri et Tariq Boumahdi ont souvent été fructueuses. Abdelkrim Belal m’a assuré de son appui fraternel. Sarah Cherrabi El Alaoui m’a constamment encouragé. Enfin, toute ma gratitude va à Afifa Hilali, ma mère, dont le soutien au fi l des ans, a toujours été précieux. Tout en s’inspirant de l’Encyclopédie de l’Islam, la translittération des termes arabes a été simplifi ée. Les signes diacritiques pour les noms propres et les mots passés dans la langue française ont été évités. Le lecteur familier de la langue arabe s’y retrouvera sans peine tandis que la lecture en sera facilitée pour le lecteur non arabophone. Le mot « islam » écrit avec une minuscule désigne la religion des musulmans. Le terme d’« Islam » avec une majuscule désigne la civilisation appartenant à l’aire culturelle qui lui est associée. Les dates associées à des personnages de l’Islam classique (par exemple Ghazali) ont été indiquées aussi bien dans le calendrier musulman de l’Hégire que dans le calendrier grégorien

3. Mystique soufie et communauté émotionnelle : Yassine l’enchanteur

En sociologie religieuse, le type mystique, tel qu’il a été élaboré par Max Weber, correspond à une voie de salut qui se caractérise par la contemplation et la « fuite hors du monde », conçu comme une massa perditionis. En réalité, le phénomène mystique est riche d’une grande variété de rapports au monde. Comme le note Ernst Troeltsch, le Spiritualismus comprend aussi bien « l’eschatologisme apocalyptique » de Thomas Müntzer que la « simple mais totale indifférence » de l’ermite. Un entrepren..

5. Monarchie, mouvements islamiques et espace public

Nous avons vu dans les chapitres précédents que la monarchie marocaine a un ancrage religieux qu’elle s’évertue à consolider. L’accumulation d’un solide capital symbolique par Hassan II a précédé l’émergence de mouvements se réclamant de l’islam. Face à la concurrence de nouveaux entrepreneurs en biens de salut au début des années 1980, il cherche à réglementer le marché des valeurs religieuses et l’utilisation de l’islam dans l’espace public. Après avoir longuement discuté avec le Shah – déc..

L’usure des oppositions islamistes au Maroc

Au Maroc, il existe trois types d’oppositions islamistes confrontés à l’usure de leur stratégie politique. Le Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD) représente l’opposition de type parlementaire. Malgré son score relativement élevé aux élections législatives de 2007 et son attachement proclamé à la monarchie, le PJD n’a pas réussi à entrer au gouvernement alors qu’il voyait là l’occasion de prouver qu’il pourrait devenir un parti efficace dans la gestion des affaires publiques. Il reste cantonné à une opposition formelle qui ne remet pas en cause la monopolisation du pouvoir par la monarchie. À l’inverse, la Jamâ’a du cheikh Yasîn s’oppose frontalement à la monarchie et aux institutions officielles, mais ne parvient pas à rompre son isolement. Après avoir annoncé par ses rêves que l’année 2006 serait celle d’une « révolution », le cheikh Yasîn et sa Jamâ’a ont échoué à investir l’espace public. L’avenir politique de la Jamâ’a dépendra de sa capacité à réussir la succession du maître Yasîn en maintenant son unité. Enfin, les groupuscules terroristes, qui s’inscrivent dans un réseau global, ont échoué à tirer des gains politiques ou géostratégiques des attentats commis sur le territoire marocain.In Morocco, there are three types of Islamist opposition subject to the exhaustion of political strategies. The Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is the parliamentary type. Although it obtained a relatively high score in the 2007 parliamentary elections and despite its claimed proximity to the Monarchy, the PJD was not invited to join the government. Its opposition is trivial and does not threaten the authority of the Monarchy. Conversely, the Jamâ’a of the sheikh Yasîn is directly opposed to the Monarchy and to official institutions, but is unable to overcome its isolation. After “predicting” through dreams that 2006 would be a year of “revolution”, Jamâ’a failed to make its presence felt in the public domain. Its political future depends on its ability to ensure the succession of master Yasîn without breaking its unity. Finally, terrorist groups linked to global networks were not able to gain political or geostrategic traction from attacks on Moroccan territory.في المغرب، يوجد ثلاثة نماذج للمعارضة الإسلامية التي تواجه استنفادا لإستراتيجيتها السياسية. فحزب العدالة و التنمية (PJD) يمثل المعارضة من النوع البرلماني. بالرغم من نتيجته المرتفعة نسبيا في الانتخابات التشريعية لعام 2007 و ارتباطه الصريح بالنظام الملكي، فإن حزب العدالة و التنمية لم ينجح في الدخول إلى الحكومة إذ يرى فيها الفرصة التي يبين من خلالها أنه يستطيع أن يصبح حزبا فعالا في تسيير الشؤون العامة. بقي معسكِرا مؤقتا في معارضة صريحة، [هذه المعارضة] التي لا تنتقد استحواذ النظام الملكي على السلطة. بالعكس من ذلك، فإن جماعة الشيخ يسين تعارض النظام الملكي و المؤسسات الرسمية مجابهة، لكنها لم تنجح في كسر عزلتها. بعد أن أعلن الشيخ يسين انطلاقا من أحلامه أن العام 2006 سيكون عام "ثورة"، فإن الشيخ يسين و جماعته فشلوا في اقتحام الفضاء العام. إن مستقبل الجماعة يتوقف على قدرة نجاحها في إيجاد خليفة للشيخ يسين للحفاظ على وحدتها. أخيرا، فإن الجماعات الإرهابية الصغيرة، التي تنتمي إلى شبكة عالمية، فشلت في إحراز مكاسب سياسية أو جيوستراتيجية من العمليات المنفذة على التراب المغربي