Against the mainstream, nazi privatization in 1930s Germany.

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception, the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery of public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.Privatization, Public Enterprise, Nazi Economy, Germany.

THE FIRST PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY: SELLING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN 1948-1950 PUERTO RICO.

In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government was answerable only to the US Federal government, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established on the island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico, and analyzes the role played by ideology, political interests, and economic concerns in the decision to privatize them. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the SOEs operated, and by the desire to attract private industrial investment to the Puerto Rican economy.Public enterprise, Privatization, Industrial policy,Puerto Rico.

Does privatization spur regulation?Evidence from the regulatory reform of European airports

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between privatization and regulation drawing on data from a wide sample of European airports. We find that privatization promotes a shift from basic regulation to a situation of more detailed or non-regulation, depending on the specific characteristics of the privatization process and on the type of airport being privatized. Moreover, we report a significant association between high traffic volumes and more detailed regulation. By contrast, airports where slot allocation is noncoordinated are significantly associated with non-regulation.Privatization; regulation; air transportation; airports JEL classification: L33; L42; L93;

INTERCONTINENTAL FLIGTHS FROM EUROPEAN AIRPORTS: TOWARDS HUB CONCENTRATION OR NOT?

This paper empirically analyzes changes in the supply of non-stop intercontinental flights from European airports. We take advantage of OAG data for air services from a rich sample of European airports to intercontinental destinations in the period 2004-2008. Results of the empirical analysis indicate a tendency towards a more balanced distribution of intercontinental flights across European airports. We also find that the demographic size of a region, its sector specialization, the political role of its central city and the proportion of connecting traffic explain the amount of and changes in long-haul air services supplied from European airports.airports, air transportation, intercontinental flights

Intermunicipal cooperation and privatization of solid waste services among small municipalities in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of intermunicipal cooperation and privatization on the delivery costs of urban solid waste services. The results of our empirical analysis, which we conducted among a sample of very small municipalities, indicate that small towns that cooperate incur lower costs for their waste collection service. Cooperation also raises collection frequency and improves the quality of the service in small towns. By contrast, the form of production, whether it is public or private, does not result in systematic differences in costs. Interestingly, the degree of population dispersion has a significant positive relation with service costs.No evidence of scale economies is found because, it would seem, small municipalities exploit them by means of intermunicipal cooperation.local government, intermunicipal cooperation,privatization, contracting-out, solid waste collection.

Getting there fast: Globalization, intercontinental flights and location of headquarters

Information exchanges across firms within cities are considered to be one of the major agglomeration forces in the regional economics literature. In addition, the quality of transport infrastructures arises as one of the major determinants in the location decisions of firms across cities and hence on urban economic growth. However, the significance of information exchanges between cities and the role of airports as a mean of managing such information efficiently has received much less attention. We deal with these issues through the empirical analysis of the determinants of the location of large firms´ headquarters across major European urban areas, focusing the attention on the attractiveness of a city for large firms due to the supply of non-stop intercontinental flights.Headquarters, Airports, Information.

Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis

This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.Competition, Concentration, Local Services, Privatization.

Factors explaining urban transport systems in large European cities: A cross-sectional approach

The importance of effective and efficient mobility in large cities is becoming essential for planners and citizens due to its impact in terms of social, economic and geographic development. The aim of this research is to determine factors explaining urban transport systems by estimating aggregate supply and demand equations for 45 large European cities. Supply and Demand equations are separately and jointly determined using OLS and SUR estimation models. On one hand, our findings suggest the importance of economic variables on the supply of public transport. On the other, we highlight the role of those factors influencing the generalized cost of transport as main drivers of demand for public transit. Additionally, regional variables are introduced to capture institutional heterogeneity in this service, and we find that regional patterns are powerful explanatory determinants of urban transportation systems in Europe.Urban transportation, Local government policy, Mobility.

Preventing competition because of “solidarity”: Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain

Spain is the only large European country in which airport management is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system regularly justify it on grounds of interterritorial solidarity. This paper tests whether allocation of investments in airports is effectively based on redistributive purposes, as claimed and looks at other factors to explain such allocation. Our empirical analysis suggests that neither a progressive redistribution target nor the scale economies criterion explain allocation decisions. Instead, we find that political factors have significant influence on the allocation decisions made by the government.Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with Panel Data

Comparison of Recent Toll Road Concession Transactions in the United States and France.

Recent concessions in France and in the US have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was twelve times current cash flow whereas investors paid sixty times current cash flow for the U.S. toll roads. In this paper we explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and what are the implications with respect to the public interest. Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.Transport infrastructures, roads, privatization, regulation and tolls.