Simulating potential spills of Bakken crude oil from the Dakota Access Pipeline at Lake Oahe to evaluate relative impact of spill scenarios on endangered bird species

Honors (Bachelor's)EnvironmentUniversity of Michiganhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/147395/1/rbeglin.pd

The classification of bulimic eating disorders: a community-based cluster analysis study

Published online by Cambridge University Press 09 Jul 2009There is controversy over how best to classify eating disorders in which there is recurrent binge eating. Many patients with recurrent binge eating do not meet diagnostic criteria for either of the two established eating disorders, anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa. The present study was designed to derive an empirically based, and clinically meaningful, diagnostic scheme by identifying subgroups from among those with recurrent binge eating, testing the validity of these subgroups and comparing their predictive validity with that of the DSM-IV scheme. A general population sample of 250 young women with recurrent binge eating was recruited using a two-stage design. Four subgroups among the sample were identified using a Ward's cluster analysis. The first subgroup had either objective or subjective bulimic episodes and vomiting or laxative misuse; the second had objective bulimic episodes and low levels of vomiting or laxative misuse; the third had subjective bulimic episodes and low levels of vomiting or laxative misuse; and the fourth was heterogeneous in character. This cluster solution was robust to replication. It had good descriptive and predictive validity and partial construct validity. The results support the concept of bulimia nervosa and its division into purging and non-purging subtypes. They also suggest a possible new binge eating syndrome. Binge eating disorder, listed as an example of Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified within DSM-IV, did not emerge from the cluster analysis.P. J. Hay, C. G. Fairburn and H. A. Dol

Unconditional Forgiveness and Normative Condescension

This paper argues that the moral value of unconditional forgiveness is more complicated and constrained than it is often taken to be. When we unconditionally forgive, we engage with someone in a way that doesn’t take seriously their perspective about the meanings and values at stake in our relations with them. Other things being equal, this is problematic; it is normatively condescending, belittling the place of the other person’s moral agency in our relations with them. This doesn’t mean that unconditional forgiveness is always bad or impermissible. It does, though, complicate how we should think about its moral value

Sliding Scales of Justice? An Analysis of California’s Approach to Unconscionability

The unconscionability doctrine empowers courts to make a moral judgment about whether to enforce a contract. This judgment has two dimensions: first, courts consider the fairness of the contract formation process (“procedural unconscionability”); and second, they consider the fairness of the contract’s terms (“substantive unconscionability”). Most courts apply the unconscionability doctrine only if a contract evinces both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Of these courts, some require a fixed degree of both kinds of unconscionability, while others—a growing majority—assess unconscionability on a sliding scale, allowing a significant degree of one kind of unconscionability to compensate for a lesser degree of the other. Despite its growing prominence, the sliding-scale approach to unconscionability remains undertheorized. Courts have seldom discussed its rationale, and scholarly commentators have largely neglected the concept. To help fill this lacuna, this Note provides a history and analysis of California’s sliding-scale approach to unconscionability. The history of California’s unconscionability doctrine reveals that the doctrine has traditionally revolved around substantive unconscionability. California courts have generally avoided finding unconscionability in the absence of significant substantive unconscionability. Nonetheless, recent case law suggests that this trend is changing. This Note argues that this change is welcome; a genuine, bidirectional sliding-scale approach, which allows procedural unfairness to play a larger role in the unconscionability analysis, is justified and desirable. This Note also argues that the sliding-scale approach should sometimes allow courts to find contracts unconscionable due to significant procedural or substantive unconscionability alone. </p