Inequality

Inequality has become a malignant, contagious disease. It feeds, it grows, it attaches itself to nearly all aspects of life. It poisons or impedes many of our relationships. Above all, it is a threat to the health and stability of our democratic republic. It has become the major issue of our time. We can see more clearly how and why it has become so as we review eight major features of our society. Refer to the diagram below as you read

Populism & Political Participation

This article defines both populism and political participation, tells why they are both important and how they interact and interrelate. Program and policy implications are drawn

Finance and Political Participation

This essay identifies and discusses the factors and forces arising from finance that influence peoples’ political participation. It does so at two levels: (1) micro-economic or individual and (2) macro-economic and social. We find that both factors and forces at work are significantly adverse to political participation at all levels. The prime intermediate factor here is economic inequality, which is the subject of a companion essay published earlier

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across house- holds by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.Education ; Households

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.vouchers, political economy, opting out, education finance

Why do Education Vouchers Fail?

We examine quantitatively why uniform vouchers have repeatedly su¤ered electoral defeats against the current system where public and private schools coexist. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households to prefer the uniform vouchers to the current mix of public and private education. We then develop a model of publicly funded means-tested edu- cation vouchers where the voucher received by each household is a linearly decreasing function of income. Public policy, which is determined by majority voting, consists of two dimensions: the overall funding level (or the tax rate) and the slope of the means testing function. We solve the model when the political decisions are sequential ?households vote ?rst on the tax rate and then on the extent of means testing. We establish that a majority voting equilibrium exists. We show that the means-tested voucher regime is majority preferred to the status-quo. These results are robust to alternative preference parameters, income distribution parameters and voter turnout.

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system