The challenge of the chiral Potts model

The chiral Potts model continues to pose particular challenges in statistical mechanics: it is ``exactly solvable'' in the sense that it satisfies the Yang-Baxter relation, but actually obtaining the solution is not easy. Its free energy was calculated in 1988 and the order parameter was conjectured in full generality a year later. However, a derivation of that conjecture had to wait until 2005. Here we discuss that derivation.Comment: 22 pages, 3 figures, 29 reference

The order parameter of the chiral Potts model

An outstanding problem in statistical mechanics is the order parameter of the chiral Potts model. An elegant conjecture for this was made in 1983. It has since been successfully tested against series expansions, but as far as the author is aware there is as yet no proof of the conjecture. Here we show that if one makes a certain analyticity assumption similar to that used to derive the free energy, then one can indeed verify the conjecture. The method is based on the ``broken rapidity line'' approach pioneered by Jimbo, Miwa and Nakayashiki.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figures. Citations made more explicit and some typos correcte

Corner transfer matrices in statistical mechanics

Corner transfer matrices are a useful tool in the statistical mechanics of simple two-dimensinal models. They can be very effective way of obtaining series expansions of unsolved models, and of calculating the order parameters of solved ones. Here we review these features and discuss the reason why the method fails to give the order parameter of the chiral Potts model.Comment: 18 pages, 4 figures, for Proceedings of Conference on Symmetries and Integrability of Difference Equations. (SIDE VII), Melbourne, July 200

Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians

Confucius gave counsel that is notoriously hard to follow: "What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others" (Huang 1997: 15.24). People tend to be concerned with themselves and to be indifferent to most others. We are distinct from others so our self-concern does not include them, or so it seems. Were we to realize this distinctness is merely apparent--that our true self includes others--Confucius's counsel would be easier to follow. Concern for our true self would extend concern beyond the narrow selves we appear to be. The neo-Confucians held just such a view. They espoused an identity with the universe and everything in it, arguing that this identity explains a natural concern for everyone and everything, not just for our narrow selves. However, many things in the universe differ from each other, that is, some have qualities others lack. If they are all one and the same thing then that one thing differs from itself. I will suggest that the objection can be answered with some metaphysical innovation. I will address the objection by sketching a theory--call it the theory of aspects--that explains how numerically identical things can differ qualitatively

Hume on Substance: A Critique of Locke

The ancient theory of substance and accident is supposed to make sense of complex unities in a way that respects both their unity and their complexity. On Hume’s view such complex unities are only fictitiously unities. This result follows from his thoroughgoing critique of the theory of substance. I will characterize the theory Hume is critiquing as it is presented in Locke, presupposing what Bennett calls the “Leibnizian interpretation.” Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in two senses. Call substance in the first sense “individual substance” and in the second sense “pure substance.” I will discuss the seven main parts of Hume’s view: (I) that we have no idea of pure substance, (II) that there is no complex individual substance, except in a loose sense, (III) that the fiction of complex individual substance arises in a way parallel to that of the fiction of identity through time, and (IV) results in the fiction of pure substance, (V) that simple qualities and perceptions satisfy the definition of individual substance, (VI) that there is no such thing as inherence, and (VII) that there is no such thing as pure substance. Hume’s views on substance are often mentioned without being discussed in detail. Kemp Smith, Stroud, and Garrett, for example, mostly summarize various claims of Hume in the course of expounding on his theory of the idea of personal identity. In contrast, I will attempt to present a systematic treatment of Hume on substance as a refutation of Locke

Some comments on developments in exact solutions in statistical mechanics since 1944

Lars Onsager and Bruria Kaufman calculated the partition function of the Ising model exactly in 1944 and 1949. Since then there have been many developments in the exact solution of similar, but usually more complicated, models. Here I shall mention a few, and show how some of the latest work seems to be returning once again to the properties observed by Onsager and Kaufman.Comment: 28 pages, 5 figures, section on six-vertex model revise