Performance Issues in U.S.–China Joint Ventures

Based on an in-depth study of U.S.-China joint ventures, this article offers some insights into the performance of such international business relationships. While the conventional literature treats government as an amorphous aspea of the political-legal environment, in this case government is an active participant and influence in the performance of international joint ventures (UVs). It has both a constraining and enabling effect on LJV structure, strategy, and performance. For example, limits can be placed on ownership shares of joint ventures and on prices of the output. At the same time, government can cooperate with LJVs and foreign parent companies by creating partners for foreign parent companies, acting as major customers, and improving financial performance by lowering taxes

Negotiating over Bundles and Prices Using Aggregate Knowledge

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a technique for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. When the current negotiations progress slows down, the shop may suggest the most promising of those alternatives and, depending on the customers response, continue negotiating about the alternative bundle, or propose another alternative. Extensive computer simulations show that our approach increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and quality of the deals reached, as compared to a benchmark, and that these results are robust to variations in the negotiation strategies employed by the customers

Payment Instruments as Perceived by Consumers – Results from a Household Survey

cost efficiency, household survey, non-price features, payment instruments, retail payments, D12, D61, G20,

A Theoretical Inefficiency in the International Marketing of Tradable Global Warming Emission Permits

When the disutility of global pollution is measured in units of a numeraire good that is polluting in consumption, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption are generally weighted differently in each country’s calculation of marginal damages. In that case, it is inefficient to control global warming by tradable emission permits, which in theory trade at a unique international equilibrium price. This conclusion is derived from a model of Shibata (1996) in which consumption is pervasively polluting in global warming gases. Shibata dubiously based the inefficiency he discovered on the reciprocal external damages of global warming emissions rather than on the nullibicity he posed for a non-polluting numeraire good. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005non-uniform Pigouvian taxes, global pollutant, global warming, emission permits,

Green and blue dividends and environmental tax reform: dynamic CGE model

The challenge of climate change needs to be tackled with environmental policies carefully designed for achieving environmental benets and avoiding negative economic eects. The introduction of an environmental tax in the economic system, can generate a double benet represented by the attainment of the environmental target (rst or green dividend) and other additional benets (second/third or blue dividends) represented by gains in welfare, employment, consumption etc. The policy should be therefore analysed through a general equilibrium analysis that is able to quantify the environmental and welfare direct and indirect eects generated within the economic system. Since international environmental agreements set clear target deadlines on the reduction of GHG emissions, in this paper a dynamic CGE model is developed, which is based on a bi-regional SAM framework for Italy