Review of The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History.

Like every nation in the world, John Moore argues in this exceptionally candid and respectful study, the Cheyenne have cosmopolitan origins. Building on the Cheyenne case, Moore convincingly challenges the persistent characterization of tribal societies as static crystals shattered by their collision with European states

Is There Any Indian Law Left? A Review of the Supreme Court\u27s 1982 Term

The Supreme Court\u27s decisions have been characterized by an absence of general principles, which the Justices rationalize as the particularization of their analysis. The standards that do appear from time to time, such as balancing interests and implied repeal, are merely euphemisms for discretion. There has been no consistent authorship of opinions because the Justices hold little enthusiasm for Indian law cases, and the Court seems to treat each dispute as if it were a matter of first impression. Generalizations on this subject have become . . . treacherous as a result of the Court\u27s failure to make and stick to general guiding principles. The Court\u27s 1982 Term, its busiest ever for Indian decisions, was no exception. In the four opinions reviewed in detail here, the Court abandoned any pretense that the scope of tribal sovereignty or the nature of federal trusteeship can be determined save on the facts of each case. At the same time, it strengthened the notion that state and national interests, as construed by the Justices, override any rights Indians may yet have

\u3ci\u3eFelix S. Cohen\u27s Handbook of Federal Indian Law\u3c/i\u3e, 1982 ed. (1982)

Forty-one years ago, the legend goes, Harvard-educated Interior Department Solicitor Felix Cohen brought order and light into what Justice Frankfurter called the mish-mash of Indian affairs law. Cohen\u27s work was published by the government as a guide for Indian Bureau employees, but quickly assumed the role of an undisputed authority in litigation. Lawyers read Cohen instead of the cases, and judges quoted or paraphrased Cohen in their opinions. The treatise attracted almost biblical reverence, a Prosser in a rather arcane sub-discipline. It is in the nature of treatises to make a lawyer\u27s task easier. Treatises locate and summarize the case record, making it more accessible to the unfamiliar, hasty, and inexperienced. Inherent in this is the tendency to establish more or less authoritative interpretations in gray areas, steering practitioners away from the disputed points that make new law. Treatises jeopardize critical thinking when they reconcile what judges have said and rationalize complexity into neat rules. This danger is greatest where the intellectual turf is truly perplexing, the subject political, and the bench and bar relatively unmotivated and ignorant. In such instances treatises become more than scholarly summaries. They become the law