The Chicago Counter-Revolution and the Sociology of Economic Knowledge

This chapter is concerned with the internal phenomenon. One model that can be invoked to explain this internal phenomenon is the classical process whereby evidence is patiently accumulated until the weight of the argument favours one side or another. Alternatively, Stigler\u27s \u27model\u27 of the sociology of economic knowledge construction and destruction can be used to examine the internal opinion-changing process in the transition from the overwhelming defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 to the overwhelming victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 - two men with essentially the same programme and the same message (Friedman and Friedman 1982, viii). ISBN: 033373045

The Supreme Courte, Judicial Review, and the Public: Leadership Versus Dialogue

Appears in the Correspondence section; response to an article, Dialogue and judicial review, by Barry Friedman (91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993)

Book Review: Reclaiming the Federal Courts. by Larry W. Yackle.

Book review: Reclaiming the Federal Courts. By Larry W. Yackle. Cambridge, Massachusetts.: Harvard University Press. 1994. Pp. 297. Reviewed by: Barry Friedman

The Cycles of Constitutional Theory

Friedman presents information on the cyclical nature of constitutional theory. Because constitutional theory is a reaction to the current developments of constitutional law, it is interesting to view constitutional issues through the framework of different historical circumstances

Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People

Supreme Court Justices care more about the views of academics, journalists, and other elites than they do about public opinion. This is true of nearly all Justices and is especially true of swing Justices, who often cast the critical votes in the Court’s most visible decisions. In this Article, we will explain why we think this is so and, in so doing, challenge both the dominant political science models of judicial behavior and the significant work of Barry Friedman, Jeffrey Rosen, and others who link Supreme Court decision making to public opinion

Three Mistakes About Interpretation

The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is interpretation. The single most confusing word in modem constitutional theory is interpretation. What accounts for this unhappy state of affairs? I will try to show that Barry Friedman\u27s assertions, as well as others that are but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately incoherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language

Three Mistakes About Interpretation

The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is interpretation. The single most confusing word in modem constitutional theory is interpretation. What accounts for this unhappy state of affairs? I will try to show that Barry Friedman\u27s assertions, as well as others that are but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately incoherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language

Dialogue and Judicial Review

This article argues that most normative legal scholarship regarding the role of judicial review rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation. The goal of this article is to redescribe the landscape of American constitutionalism in a manner vastly different than most normative scholarship. At times this article slips across the line into prescription, but by and large the task is descriptive. The idea is to clear the way so that later normative work can proceed against the backdrop of a far more accurate understanding of the system of American constitutionalism. This article proceeds in three separate parts. Parts I and II argue that the very premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty are faulty. Part I challenges the basic notion that courts are countermajoritarian. Part II rejects the underlying premises of the countermajoritarian argument. Part III is a redescription of the landscape of American constitutionalism, one in which courts are seen as promoters of, and participants in, a national dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution