Asterix, Carnival, and the Wonder of Everyday Life

René Goscinny and Albert Uderzo’s Asterix novels present us with a charmingly silly world. Their shared premise is that, during the time of the Roman Empire, a tiny Gaulish village has a magic potion that makes its inhabitants extremely strong and fast, and this allows the village to keep the entire Roman Empire at a hopeless disadvantage. The main character is a wily little warrior named Asterix who, with his good, very large, and not very bright friend Obelix, has many absurd adventures as he travels in the Roman world and beyond. I shall explore Asterix at the Olympic Games, in which Asterix and a group of the villagers compete in the Olympic Games in ancient Greece. I shall try to show that the charmingly silly, unpretentious humor of Asterix at the Olympic Games does not just offer us escapist entertainment, but also embodies and so offers us a deep appreciation of the ordinary and everyday. (I should say that I have no objection to purely escapist entertainment; I just think that more is going on in this particular case.

Teaching Philosophy as a Way of Life with Respect to Our Being

What distinguishes philosophy is its attention to reality and sense as such, or what is traditionally called being and essence. As a result, philosophy as a way of life is, most fundamentally, not directly a matter of doing one kind of thing rather than another outside the classroom but instead of how we live with respect to our being. Enacting our being in one way rather than another inflects whatever it is we do, wherever we do it, even if none of the content of what we then do involves the content of philosophy. Consequently, if we do nothing in engaging philosophy but study it in the traditional, apparently unlived way in the classroom, we are in active relation to our being, and this is fully living philosophy as a way of life. We need, then, to reconceive conventional classroom philosophy as itself not primarily an intellectual exercise but an exercise of being. The essay elaborates on this point and its consequences for teaching philosophy

Philosophical Presentation and the Implicitly Humorous Structure of Philosophy

Philosophy often at least implicitly includes and depends on a logical structure which is also that of jokes. This is the case when philosophy involves questioning or establishing concepts in their own right, and when it involves the kinds of metaphysics which ask about reality and the world as a wholeor as such. Taking this humour-like structure into account in presenting philosophy helps, among otherthings, to lay open part of the character of philosophy itself, to underscore the radical self-perspective thatis constitutive of philosophy, and to contextualise the often confusing experience of coming to grips with anunfamiliar philosophical framework

The Convergent Conceptions of Being in Mainstream Analytic and Postmodern Continental Philosophy

There is ultimately a very close convergence between the conceptions of being in widely recurrent elements of both mainstream Anglo-American philosophy and mainstream postmodern Continental philosophy. One characteristic idea often drawn upon in Anglo-American or analytic philosophy is that we establish what has meaning (at all or as such) and so what we can say about what is, by making evident the limits of sense or what simply cannot be meant. A characteristic idea in Continental philosophy of being is that being emerges through contrast and interplay with what it is not, with what has no being at all and so is beyond sense. The two traditions consequently approach and conceive being in significantly related ways, either through the lack of meaning that establishes the defining boundaries of what is, or through what is without being and beyond sense. As a result, what the Continental tradition gets at with “the meaning of being as such and in general,” and how it gets at it, has much in common with what the Anglo-American tradition gets at, and how it gets at it, by establishing “what can be meaningfully said.

Dreams as a Meta-Conceptual or Existential Experience

The paper argues that dreams (or the recollected experience of dreams) consist partly in an awareness or experience of the conceptual fabric of our existence. Since what we mean by reality is intimately tied to the concepts given in our experience, dreams are therefore also partly an awareness of the fabric of what we mean by being itself and in general, that is, by objective as well as subjective reality. Further, the paper argues that this characteristic of dreams accounts for several other, more specific aspects of dreams and their possible interpretation, and that it allows us to see how these aspects are related to each other. These more specific aspects are the peculiar types of conceptual or logical relations and transitions that occur within dreams, dreams’ distinctive feeling texture, and some dimensions of the grounds and nature of suitable methods of interpreting dreams

The Logic of Comprehensive or Deep Emotional Change

The article proposes an analogue of conceptual change in the context of comprehensive or deep emotional change and growth, and explores some aspects of its logic in that context. This is not to reduce emotions to concepts, but to say that concepts express the sense that is already inherent in experience and reality. When emotional states change so thoroughly that their applicable concepts become completely different, they shift from one logical structure to another. At the moment or phase when one conceptual structure transforms into another, two logically incompatible descriptions both apply to the same state at the same time. As a result, the correct description of this moment and its development involves conceptual confusion, non sequitur, and logical contradiction. In these contexts, the sense itself of the emotional experience and process is partly characterized by what are otherwise violations of sense. Failure of sense is part of how these experiences make sense. The article explores some of the consequences of this paradox of sense for the nature and experience of deep emotional change and for the meaning of change itself in this context

Argumentative Rhetoric and Logical Reasoning as Engagement with Being

The paper tries to show that when the deepest or foundational aspects of truth are at issue, both consequentially logical argument and rhetoric that aims to establish truth or justified conviction must engage with the being, or the irreplaceable particularity, of its audience’s members and also that of the arguer, what we refer to in ordinary language as who the person is. Beyond the existing discussion of existential rhetoric, the paper argues that this engagement with being is necessary to establish not only truth that directly concerns or turns on the arguer’s and audience’s being, but also truth or justification about fundamental aspects of things and issues in general. Further, the address of being requires us to suspend both our own and our addressees’ familiar conceptual frameworks in order to allow being to emerge in its own terms. As a result, in contrast with our usual understanding of argumentation, the rhetorician’s initial aim and procedure will be to achieve a genuine suspension of conviction and even of the appropriate concepts under which to proceed, and so to produce a fundamental confusion. The paper then outlines some consequences for rhetoric and reasoning and also the structure of the process of working with this fundamental confusion

The Nature and Possibility of Public Philosophy

The article argues that there is a central problem with the concept of public philosophy, in that philosophy is partly defined by questioning reflection on its own sense, while public or popular culture characteristically relies unreflectively on its ultimate givens, and these are mutually exclusive modes of thought. The article proposes, however, that because of philosophy’s reflection on and potential questioning of its own sense it has a paradoxical structure of foundational and comprehensive conflict with itself and its own procedure, and that this self-divergence allows a genuinely philosophical role for public philosophy. In the public context, acknowledged failure to understand beyond a certain point makes room for a limitation of sense that incompletely but effectively substitutes for the properly philosophical explicit and questioning reflection on the nature of sense as such and on the possibility that even what we do understand about the relevant issues fails to have sense

The Nature of Persons and Our Ethical Relations with Nonhuman Animals

If we accept that at least some kinds of nonhuman animals are persons, a variety of paradoxes emerge in our ethical relations with them, involving apparently unavoidable disrespect of their personhood. We aim to show that these paradoxes are legitimate but can be illuminatingly resolved in the light of an adequate understanding of the nature of persons. Drawing on recent Western, Daoist, and Zen Buddhist thought, we argue that personhood is already paradoxical in the same way as these aspects of our ethical relations with nonhuman animals, and in fact is the source of their paradoxical character. In both contexts, depth and shallowness turn out to be internal to or crucial parts of each other, with logically anomalous consequences. We try to show that the character of this paradoxical relation between depth and shallowness in the nature of personhood involves a crucial inflection in the case of nonhuman animal persons that allows us to make sense of and resolve these ethical paradoxes

Thoughts on Wisdom and Its Relation to Critical Thinking, Multiculturalism, and Global Awareness

We want to propose a conception of wisdom with a view to exploring what insights it can give us into some basic dimensions of teaching in contemporary higher education. We hope to show that this conception allows us, on the one hand, to see some crucial inadequacies of existing approaches to critical thinking, multi-culturalism, and global awareness or internationalism. On the other hand, we believe that it also gives us some insight into the existentially or spiritually meaningful dimensions of learning. In this way, it bridges the most contemporary and practical foci of teaching and its most fundamental and timeless concerns. In the later part of the paper, we shall explore some of the characteristics of this conception further through the teachings of some of the longstanding wisdom traditions, including what they say about teaching itself