Subjectivism and degrees of well-being

In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory

Optimism about moral responsibility

In his classic “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson introduces us to an “optimist” who believes that our moral responsibility practices are justified by their beneficial consequences. Although many see Strawson as a staunch critic of this consequentialist position, he actually claims only that there is a gap in the optimist’s story, and that the reactive attitudes are needed to fill it. In this paper, I fill in this gap. I show how optimism can be suitably modified to reflect an appreciation of the reactive attitudes, and argue that the ensuing position—on which our moral responsibility practices, taken as a whole, are justified both by their regulation of behavior in socially desirable ways and by their enabling of valuable interpersonal relationships—provides us not only with a plausible justification of our moral responsibility practices, but also with a fruitful framework for criticizing particular features of these practices and for evaluating potential reforms

Ideology critique and game theory

Ideology critics believe that many bad social practices persist because of ideology, and that critiquing ideology is an effective way to promote social reform. Skeptics draw on game theory to argue that the persistence of such practices is better explained by collective action problems, and that ideology critique is causally inefficacious. In this paper, I reconcile these camps. I show that while game theory can help us identify contexts where ideology critique makes no difference, it also reveals causal mechanisms by which ideology critique can have a significant effect. I then consider some objections and directions for further research

Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

Hobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality

Deviating from the ideal

Ideal theorists aim to describe the ideally just society. Problem solvers aim to identify concrete changes to actual societies that would make them more just. The relation between these two sorts of theorizing is highly contested. According to the benchmark view, ideal theory is prior to problem solving because a conception of the ideally just society serves as an indispensable benchmark for evaluating societies in terms of how far they deviate from it. In this paper, I clarify the benchmark view, argue that existing criticisms of it are unsuccessful, and develop a novel redundancy objection to the benchmark view and the claim of priority it allegedly entails. I then consider the extent to which ideal theory might facilitate problem solving without being prior to it and argue that it can only play a modest role in this regard. The upshot is that ideal theory is neither required for nor especially relevant to problem solving—but it is not completely irrelevant either. It facilitates problem solving to some limited degree, but no more, say, than theorizing about dystopia

Combining SAT Methods with Non-Clausal Decision Heuristics

AbstractA decision procedure for arbitrary first-order formulas can be viewed as combining a propositional search with a decision procedure for conjunctions of first-order literals, so Boolean SAT methods can be used for the propositional search in order to improve the performance of the overall decision procedure. We show how to combine some Boolean SAT methods with non-clausal heuristics developed for first-order decision procedures. The combination of methods leads to a smaller number of decisions than either method alone

Self-Wiring of Neural Networks

In order to form the intricate network of synaptic connections in the brain, the growth cones migrate through the embryonic environment to their targets using chemical communication. As a first step to study self-wiring, 2D model systems of neurons have been used. We present a simple model to reproduce the salient features of the 2D systems. The model incorporates random walkers representing the growth cones, which migrate in response to chemotaxis substances extracted by the soma and communicate with each other and with the soma by means of attractive chemotactic "feedback".Comment: 10 pages, 10 PostScript figures. Originally submitted to the neuro-dev archive which was never publicly announced (was 9710001

Moral uncertainty and public justification

Moral uncertainty and disagreement pervade our lives. Yet we still need to make decisions and act, both individually and politically. So, what should we do? Moral uncertainty theorists provide a theory of what individuals should do when they are uncertain about morality. Public reason liberals provide a theory of how societies should deal with reasonable disagreements about morality. They defend the public justification principle: state action is permissible only if it can be justified to all reasonable people. In this article, we bring these two approaches together. Specifically, we investigate whether considerations of moral uncertainty support public reason liberalism: given moral uncertainty, should we favor public justification? We argue that while moral uncertainty theory cannot vindicate an exceptionless public justification principle, it supports adopting public justification as a pro tanto principle – albeit one that can be overridden when the moral stakes are high. It also provides new answers to some intramural debates among public reason liberals and new responses to some common objections

Near-Infrared and Visible Photoactivation to Uncage Carbon Monoxide from an Aqueous-Soluble PhotoCORM.

Multiphoton excitation allows one to access high energy excited states and perform valuable tasks in biological systems using tissue penetrating near-infrared (NIR) light. Here, we describe new photoactive manganese tricarbonyl complexes incorporating the ligand 4'-p-N,N-bis(2-hydroxyethyl)amino-benzyl-2,2':6',2″-terpyridine (TPYOH), which can serve as an antenna for two photon NIR excitation. Solutions of Mn(CO)3(TPYOH)X (X = Br- or CF3SO3-) complexes are very photoactive toward CO release under visible light excitation (405 nm, 451 nm). The same responses were also triggered by multiphoton excitation at 750 and 800 nm. In this context, we discuss the potential applications of these complexes as visible/NIR light photoactivated carbon monoxide releasing moieties (photoCORMs). We also report the isolation and crystal structures of the TPYOH complexes Mn(TPYOH)Cl2 and [Mn(TPYOH)2](CF3SO3)2, to illustrate a possible photolysis product(s)