Large-scale association analyses identify host factors influencing human gut microbiome composition

To study the effect of host genetics on gut microbiome composition, the MiBioGen consortium curated and analyzed genome-wide genotypes and 16S fecal microbiome data from 18,340 individuals (24 cohorts). Microbial composition showed high variability across cohorts: only 9 of 410 genera were detected in more than 95% of samples. A genome-wide association study of host genetic variation regarding microbial taxa identified 31 loci affecting the microbiome at a genome-wide significant (P <5 x 10(-8)) threshold. One locus, the lactase (LCT) gene locus, reached study-wide significance (genome-wide association study signal: P = 1.28 x 10(-20)), and it showed an age-dependent association with Bifidobacterium abundance. Other associations were suggestive (1.95 x 10(-10) <P <5 x 10(-8)) but enriched for taxa showing high heritability and for genes expressed in the intestine and brain. A phenome-wide association study and Mendelian randomization identified enrichment of microbiome trait loci in the metabolic, nutrition and environment domains and suggested the microbiome might have causal effects in ulcerative colitis and rheumatoid arthritis

The Book of Rijndaels

This paper is the full book of the 240 dual ciphers of Rijndael, in which only the constants differ from Rijndael. See: ``In How Many Ways Can You Write Rijndael?\u27\u27, http://eprint.iacr.org

Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communication

In this paper we present a very practical ciphertext-only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communication, and various active attacks on the GSM protocols. These attacks can even break into GSM networks that use &quot;unbreakable&quot; ciphers. We describe a ciphertext-only attack on A5/2 that requires a few dozen milliseconds of encrypted offthe -air cellular conversation and finds the correct key in less than a second on a personal computer. We then extend this attack to a (more complex) ciphertext-only attack on A5/1. We describe new attacks on the protocols of networks that use A5/1, A5/3, or even GPRS. These attacks are based on security flaws of the GSM protocols, and work whenever the mobile phone supports A5/2. We emphasize that these attacks are on the protocols, and are thus applicable whenever the cellular phone supports a weak cipher, for instance they are also applicable using the cryptanalysis of A5/1. Unlike previous attacks on GSM that require unrealistic information, like long known plaintext periods, our attacks are very practical and do not require any knowledge of the content of the conversation. These attacks allow attackers to tap conversations and decrypt them either in real-time, or at any later time. We also show active attacks, such as call hijacking, altering of data messages and call theft