Evolution of Asylum Legislation in the EU: Insights from Regulatory Competition Theory

The paper proposes to use regulatory competition theory in order to better understand the evolution of the EU member States' asylum legislation. It argues that regulatory competition theory can explain the rapid trend of legislative amendments from the mid-80's onwards, the progressive yet incomplete convergence of the EU member States' legislation, and the spiral of restrictions of legal norms originally enacted to protect asylum seekers. Competition among legal norms also explains EU Member States' reticence to collaborate and share the burden. The first argument of the paper is that a phenomenon of competition developed because Member States were convinced that generous asylum policies would be a pull factor for asylum seekers. They feared that regulatory arbitrage (i.e. asylum shopping) would lead asylum seekers to select their destination State on the basis of the level of protection offered. States have entered into a process of de-regulation and, because of their interdependence, national measures have become instruments of a general race to externalise. The result has turned out to be negative and corresponds to a 'race-to-the-bottom'. This negative result can be observed at two levels : competition was detrimental to both asylum seekers and States; the rules enacted were suboptimal.The paper then explains why the first cooperation instruments introduced at the end of the 80's and onwards have failed to meet their objective. The effects of cooperation schemes like the Dublin Convention or burden sharing projects are negligible and there was no shift from costly and unilateral aylum policies towards fairer and more efficient collective action. It is an example of cooperation in the shadow of competition.Finally the paper evaluates the communautarisation of the competence to act in the field of asylum. It is unlikely to permit the emergence of a federal and centralised regulation able to change the nature of the game. In conclusion, the paper seeks to assess if a good combination of cooperation and competition is likely to produce 'good' asylum policy in Europe and investigates the 'co-opetition' model promoted by Esty and Gerardin.enlargement; European identity; identity

CONTRIBUTION(S) DU MODELE DE CONCURRENCE REGULATRICE A L'ANALYSE DES MODES ET NIVEAUX DE REGULATION

International audiencePour qui cherche un éclairage nouveau sur la question des modes et niveaux de régulation, il existe un modèle économique peu connu des juristes français : le modèle de la concurrence régulatrice. Ce modèle, que les anglo-saxons appellent Regulatory Competition, sera nommé ici indifféremment concurrence normative, concurrence régulatrice, ou concurrence entre les systèmes juridiques 1. Il met en évidence le processus par lequel les régulateurs (ou autorités titulaires du pouvoir normatif) élaborent des réglementations ou régulations en fonction des demandes des destinataires de ces régulations et normes juridiques (particuliers, entreprises) et en fonction de leurs compétiteurs (les autres régulateurs ou autorités normatives). Ainsi par exemple lorsqu'ils modifient leur réglementation sociale, fiscale ou environnementale, les Etats peuvent être amenés à adapter cette réglementation aux besoins exprimés ou pressentis des entreprises qu'ils tentent d'attirer – en leur proposant un environnement juridique le moins contraignant possible - et à celle des autres Etats en concurrence

Burden Sharing in the Field of Asylum : Legal Motivations and Implications of a Regional Approach

This paper aims at explaining and evaluation the current development of burden sharing schemes among EU member states in the field of asylum. It purports to assess the motivations and detect the potential effects and consequences of the European burden sharing project. To achieve this objective, the paper confronts the potentialities and virtues of burden sharing development with recently enacted legal norms at the EU level (mainly the July 2001 Temporary Protection Directive and the October 2000 European Refugee Fund Regulation but also other norms regulating immigration and impacting on asylum)

Chronique Droit de l'asile et immigration - Être ou ne pas être en situation irrégulière

International audience(CJUE 19 juin 2018, aff. C-181/16, Sadikou Gnandi c/ État belge, ECLI:EU:C:2018:465, AJDA 2018. 1603, chron. P. Bonneville, E. Broussy, H. Cassagnabère et C. Gänser ; D. 2018. 1313

Chronique Droit de l'asile et de l'immigration - L'accord UE-Turquie devant le juge

International audience[Tribunal (1re ch. élargie), 28 févr. 2017, N. F. c/ Conseil européen, aff. T-192/17

Sommaire

Barbou des Places Ségolène. Sommaire. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 64, 2018. pp. 459-468

Le dispositif Dublin 2 ou les tribulations de la politique communautaire d’asile

International audienc

La Cour de Justice et l’accord d’Ankara : variations jurisprudentielles sur la vocation européenne des travailleurs turcs

International audienc

Chronique Droit de l'asile et de l'immigration – Les États membres veulent-ils vraiment construire une politique commune d'immigration légale ? À propos de la demi-réforme de la directive carte bleue

International audience(Directive (UE) 2021/1883 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 oct. 2021 établissant les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des ressortissants de pays tiers aux fins d'un emploi hautement qualifié, et abrogeant la directive 2009/50/CE du Conseil, JO L 382, 28 oct. 2021, p. 1-38