Prizefighting and the Birth of Movie Censorship

Censorship scholars unanimously, but mistakenly, treat a 1907 ordinance of the City of Chicago as the first act of censorship in the United States. This Article finds, however, that movie censorship was born in March 1897 with prohibitions against a now-extinct genre: prizefight films that depicted real and staged boxing fights. At the time, boxing was generally illegal, yet the sport was enormously popular and boxers enjoyed privileged social status. In fact, shortly after Thomas Edison commercialized moving picture technologies in 1894, he accommodated the production of prizefight films at his studio in New Jersey, where prizefighting was prohibited. The Article documents the reasons for Edison\u27s decision to veto of the use of his equipment for prizefight films, only a few months after the production of prizefight films at his studio. Because of Edison\u27s position in the industry, this decision effectively constituted the first form of content self-regulation in the motion-picture industry, approximately thirteen years before the presently-believed-to-be first form of content self-regulation in the industry. This Article, therefore, begins to close a neglected gap in the literature on movie censorship. Its findings require a reexamination of content regulation in the motion picture industry, whose presumed twentieth century origins hide legislatures and industries already experienced with censorship campaigns and laws. Despite this Article\u27s historical reach, it provides important insights into modem-day social regulation. The failures of the nineteenth-century regulators to curtail popular activities like prizefighting can inform and shape current regulatory efforts, such as the design of anti-smoking policies

The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets

This Article studies the durapolist, the durable-goods monopolist. Durapolists have long argued that, unlike perishable-goods monopolists, they face difficulties in exercising market power despite their monopolistic position. During the past thirty years, economists have extensively studied the individual arguments durapolists deploy regarding their inability to exert market power. While economists have confirmed some of these arguments, a general framework for analyzing durapolists as a distinct group of monopolists has not emerged. This Article offers such a framework. It first presents the problems of durapolists in exercising market power and explains how courts have treated these problems. It then analyzes the strategies durapolists have devised to overcome difficulties in acquiring and maintaining monopoly power and the legal implications of these strategies. This Article\u27s major contributions are (a) expanding the conceptual scope of the durapolist problem, (b) presenting the durapolist problem as an explanation for many common business practices employed by durapolists, and (c) analyzing the legal implications of strategies employed to overcome the durapolist problem

Piggybackers and freeloaders: platform economics and indirect liability for copyright infringement

Many, if not most, copyright cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright infringement arise in platform markets: One of the litigating parties is a market intermediary that connects members of different distinct groups. Indirect liability for copyright infringement is still controversial and frequently litigated. This paper develops an analytical framework that is applicable to many of the debated cases. The presented framework offers strong justifications for the imposition of indirect liability for copyright infringement in platform markets and offers tools to establish certain elements of indirect liability for copyright infringement

Piggybackers and freeloaders: platform economics and indirect liability for copyright infringement

Many, if not most, copyright cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright infringement arise in platform markets: One of the litigating parties is a market intermediary that connects members of different distinct groups. Indirect liability for copyright infringement is still controversial and frequently litigated. This paper develops an analytical framework that is applicable to many of the debated cases. The presented framework offers strong justifications for the imposition of indirect liability for copyright infringement in platform markets and offers tools to establish certain elements of indirect liability for copyright infringement

Contemporary evaluation of the causes of cardiac tamponade: Acute and long-term outcomes

Background: Cardiac tamponade is a life-threatening state that complicates various medical conditions. The contemporary interventional era may have led to changes in clinical characteristics, causes and outcomes of cardiac tamponade. Methods: We investigated all patients diagnosed with cardiac tamponade, based on clinical and echocardiographic findings, at a single medical center between the years 2000 and 2013. Data on medical history, index hospitalizations, pericardial fluid etiologies, and acute and long-term outcomes were collected. Results: Cardiac tamponade was observed in 83 patients (52% females). Major etiologies included complications of percutaneous cardiac interventions (36%) and malignancies (primarily lung cancer; 23%), infectious/inflammatory causes (15%) and mechanical complications of myocardial infarction (12%). Sixteen (19%) patients died during the index hospitalization. Acute presentation of symptoms and lower quantity of effusion were associated with in-hospital mortality (p = 0.045 and p = 0.007). Tamponade secondary to malignancy was associated with the most substantial increment in post-discharge mortality (from 16% in-hospital to 68% 1-year mortality). During the mean follow-up of 45 months, 39 (45%) patients died. Malignancies, mechanical complications of myocardial infarction and bleeding/coagulation abnormalities were etiologies associated with poor survival (80% mortality during follow-up). Tamponade secondary to complications of percutaneous cardiac interventions or infectious/inflammatory causes were associated with significantly lower mortality (28% and 17%; log rank p < 0.001). Conclusions: In a contemporary cohort, complications of percutaneous cardiac intervention replaced malignant diseases as the leading cause of cardiac tamponade. Nevertheless, these iatrogenic complications were associated with a relatively favorable outcome compared to tamponade induced by complications of myocardial infarction, coagulation abnormalities and malignant diseases.

Piggybackers and freeloaders: platform economics and indirect liability for copyright infringement

Many, if not most, copyright cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright infringement arise in platform markets: One of the litigating parties is a market intermediary that connects members of different distinct groups. Indirect liability for copyright infringement is still controversial and frequently litigated. This paper develops an analytical framework that is applicable to many of the debated cases. The presented framework offers strong justifications for the imposition of indirect liability for copyright infringement in platform markets and offers tools to establish certain elements of indirect liability for copyright infringement.

Prizefighting and the Birth of Movie Censorship

Censorship scholars unanimously, but mistakenly, treat a 1907 ordinance of the City of Chicago as the first act of censorship in the United States. This Article finds, however, that movie censorship was born in March 1897 with prohibitions against a now-extinct genre: prizefight films that depicted real and staged boxing fights. At the time, boxing was generally illegal, yet the sport was enormously popular and boxers enjoyed privileged social status. In fact, shortly after Thomas Edison commercialized moving picture technologies in 1894, he accommodated the production of prizefight films at his studio in New Jersey, where prizefighting was prohibited. The Article documents the reasons for Edison\u27s decision to veto of the use of his equipment for prizefight films, only a few months after the production of prizefight films at his studio. Because of Edison\u27s position in the industry, this decision effectively constituted the first form of content self-regulation in the motion-picture industry, approximately thirteen years before the presently-believed-to-be first form of content self-regulation in the industry. This Article, therefore, begins to close a neglected gap in the literature on movie censorship. Its findings require a reexamination of content regulation in the motion picture industry, whose presumed twentieth century origins hide legislatures and industries already experienced with censorship campaigns and laws. Despite this Article\u27s historical reach, it provides important insights into modem-day social regulation. The failures of the nineteenth-century regulators to curtail popular activities like prizefighting can inform and shape current regulatory efforts, such as the design of anti-smoking policies