Land Distribution, Incentives and the Choice of Production Techniques in Nicaragua

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution. The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land. Further evidence suggests that, in this context, the inefficiency derives from lack of commitment.Agricultural productivity, asymmetric information, crop choice.

Diversity and the Power of the Elites inDemocraticSocieties: A Model and a Test.

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determinedby the preferences of the median - typically poor - agents or whether they reflect thewishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging todifferent groups can form coalitions, the wealthy elites' influence on policy choices isendogenously higher when there is diversity in preferences among the poor. In linewith the theoretical predictions, the pattern of public good provision by localgovernments in Indonesia reveals that when individuals have different preferences— here due to different ethnicities — democratic policy outcomes are closer to thepreferences of the elites, rather than the preferences of the poor majority.

Relative and Absolute Incentives: Evidence on Worker Productivity

Using personnel data, we compare worker productivity under a relative incentive scheme -where pay is based on individual productivity relative to the average productivity of the group- to productivity under piece rates. We find that productivity is at least 50% higher under piece rates. Further analysis shows this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their effort imposes on others under the relative incentive scheme. Workers internalize this externality to a greater extent when they work with fewer co-workers, and a greater share of their coworkers are their close friends. The relationship among workers has no affect on productivity under piece ratesabsolute incentives, relative incentives, social preferences.

Robin Hood’s compromise : the economics of moderate land reforms.

This paper analyses the consequences of an unusual type of land redistribution; we take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that such “moderate” reform reduces agency costs and thereby increases productivity, total surplus in the economy, and the welfare of rural workers. Compared to the classic redistribution ”to the tiller”, moderate reforms do worse in terms of equity and do not give the poor a collaterizable asset. They can however do equally well in terms of efficiency and might be more sustainable both financially and politically.

Zambia’s Ministry of Health works with economists to determine how best to recruit and retain community health workers

Oriana Bandiera describes the close collaboration between a team of economists and the Government of Zambia to evaluate strategies to recruit, motivate and retain agents in the rollout of its National Community Health Assistant Programme. Using a randomised experiment the findings illustrate that there is no tradeoff between career incentives, skills and social values. Providing career opportunities attracts more skilled individuals who perform better and seem to be equally socially motivated. The findings also provide empirical insight into how governments can implement and manage large-scale civil service initiatives

Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern Mozambique

Despite their potentially strong impact on poverty, agricultural innovations are often adopted slowly. Using a unique household dataset on sunflower adoption in Mozambique, we analyse whether and how individual adoption decisions depend upon the choices of others in the same social networks. Since farmers anticipate that they will share information with others, we expect farmers to be more likely to adopt when they know many other adopters. Dynamic considerations, however, suggest that farmers who know many adopters might strategically delay adoption and to free-ride on the information gathered by others. We present empirical evidence which shows that the relationship between the probability of adoption and the number of known adopters is shaped as an inverse-U. In line with information sharing, the network effect is stronger for farmers who report discussing agriculture with others. The data contains information which is needed to ameliorate the identification issues that commonly arise in this context. In particular social networks are precisely identified, and in addition we can control for village heterogeneity and endogenous group information.Social networks, technology adoption, information sharing.

Recruiting and compensating civil servants: a field experiment in Zambia

The civil service – public cadres of bureaucrats, local administrators, teachers and health workers – is a key component of the state’s capacity to govern and provide public goods. In the effort to create an effective civil service, states face key questions regarding how to recruit, train and motivate competent agents to ensure their high performance and long-term retention

From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure

Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers.

Heterogeneous Class Size Effects: New Evidence from a Panel of University Students

Over the last decade, many countries have experienced dramatic increases in university enrolment, which, when not matched by compensating increases in other inputs, have resulted in larger class sizes. Using administrative records from a leading UK university, we present evidence on the effects of class size on students’ test scores. We observe the same student and faculty members being exposed to a wide range of class sizes from less than 10 to over 200. We therefore estimate non-linear class size effects controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of both individual students and faculty. We find that (i) at the average class size, the effect size is -0.108; (ii) the effect size is however negative and significant only for the smallest and largest ranges of class sizes and zero over a wide range of intermediate class sizes; (iii) students at the top of the test score distribution are more affected by changes in class size, especially when class sizes are very large. We present evidence to rule out class size effects being due solely to the non-random assignment of faculty to class size, sorting by students onto courses on the basis of class size, omitted inputs, the difficulty of courses, or grading policies. The evidence also shows the class size effects are not mitigated for students with greater knowledge of the UK university system, this university in particular, or with greater family wealth.class size, heterogeneity, university education