Incidence and routes of transmission of hepatitis B virus in England and Wales, 1995-2000: implications for immunisation policy.

BACKGROUND: The incidence of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in the UK is low. Since the infection can have serious sequelae, there is a continuing need to examine its epidemiology so as to inform control measures. OBJECTIVES: We aimed to describe the current HBV incidence and patterns of transmission in the UK, to estimate the rate of new carrier infections, and to discuss implications for the control of HBV through immunisation. STUDY DESIGN: We analysed routine England and Wales laboratory surveillance data of acute HBV infection (1995-2000) and data on migration and global HBsAg prevalence. RESULTS: The estimated annual incidence of HBV infection in England and Wales was 7.4 per 100,000. Injecting drug use was the most frequently reported route of transmission. The number of cases attributed to heterosexual contact was fairly stable, whereas the number of cases in men having sex with men decreased. These observations continue trends reported for the early 1990s. Transmission during childhood was rarely reported, but was more frequent among South Asians. The incidence in South Asians is relatively high, and their main risk factors are medical treatment overseas and heterosexual contact. For about a third of cases of acute HBV infection no route of transmission is reported, but analysis of secular trends and age distribution suggest that many of these may be related to injecting drug use. Endemic transmission gives rise to only a small proportion of all new chronic infections, with the vast majority arising from immigration of established HBV carriers. CONCLUSIONS: The incidence of acute HBV infection in England and Wales has remained low, with a similar pattern of reported routes of transmission compared to the early 1990s. The UK prevalence of HBV infection is dependant on global rather than national immunisation policy. Endemic transmission may be reduced by improving immunisation coverage among injecting drug users, which is expected to also reduce the number of cases without a risk factor reported. In addition, immunisation options that better suit the needs of ethnic minorities need to be explored

The molecular epidemiology of a large outbreak of hepatitis B linked to autohaemotherapy

Background Unregulated skin-piercing procedures potentially facilitate the transmission of bloodborne pathogens. In February, 1998, a patient who had recently received autohaemotherapy at an alternative medicine clinic in the UK was diagnosed with acute hepatitis B. The autohaemotherapy procedure involved the drawing of 1 mL of the patient's blood, mixing with saline, and reinjection of the autologous blood mixture. We investigated the extent of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in patients and staff of the clinic. Methods Patients who had attended the clinic between January, 1997, and February, 1998, were tested for serological markers of HBV, and for HBV DNA by PCR. HBV DNA was sequenced to assess the relatedness of the virus identified in the cases. We analysed the number and dates of visits with regard to HBV status. Findings Serum samples were received from 352 patients and four staff members. Serological evidence of exposure to HBV was found in 57 (16%). Of the 33 patients and staff who were positive for hepatitis B surface antigen, 30 (91%) showed complete nucleotide identity in the DNA segments derived from the surface and core genes. Five patients with linked infection had markers of chronic hepatitis B, and one of these was regarded as the likely source of the outbreak. The attack rate was associated with the number of visits (p Interpretation We have described a large community-based outbreak of hepatitis B due to transmission by a single HBV variant. Our findings emphasise the continuing risk of transmission of bloodborne viruses in all health-care settings where skin-piercing procedures are used

Two concurrent outbreaks of hepatitis A highlight the risk of infection for non-immune travellers to Morocco, January to June 2018

From January to June 2018, two ongoing hepatitis A outbreaks affected travellers returning from Morocco and cases in Europe without travel history, resulting in 163 patients in eight European countries. Most interviewed travel-related cases were unaware of the hepatitis A risk in Morocco. Molecular analysis revealed two distinct hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains (subgenotype IA DK2018_231; subgenotype IB V18-16428). Vaccination recommendations should be emphasised to increase awareness among non-immune travellers to Morocco and HAV-endemic countries.First, we thank the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)’s Food- and Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses team, particularly Ettore Severi and Johanna Takkinen for their support of this joint investigation. We also thank Lelia Thornton, HSE - Health Protection Surveillance Centre, Dublin, Ireland for sharing information on the Irish hepatitis A patient. Moreover, we greatly acknowledge the work of local and state health departments for their support of epidemiological investigations and molecular surveillance.S

Improving preparedness to respond to cross-border hepatitis A outbreaks in the European Union/European Economic Area: towards comparable sequencing of hepatitis A virus

IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.We have received valuable comments to the manuscript from Mike Catchpole, Piotr Kramaz and Marc Struelens and acknowledge their contribution in improving the paper.S