Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic

Time After Time

VERSE 1What can I do to wake youUp to the things you miss?What can I do to make youThrill to an honest kiss?What can I do that I haven’t doneTo make you believeI love only one! CHORUSTime after time I’ve told youHow much I miss your smile;Hoping you’d let me hold youJust for a little while.Time after time you refuse me,Refuse me your lips sublime,You don’t seem to know that I love you so,Tho’ I’ve told you time after time. VERSE 2Is there no love comes stealingInto your sleeping heart?Is there no lonesome feelingFills you when we’re apart?Is there no way to win your dear hand?What more can I say,So you’ll understand? CHORU

Appraisal of Property owned by Edward Ball

Appraisal of property owned by Edward Ballhttps://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/lantern-mcpc/1135/thumbnail.jp

Hiring Out Document, Edward Ball

Hiring out of enslaved peopled owned by Edward Ballhttps://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/lantern-mcpc/1136/thumbnail.jp

Estate Document, Edward Ball

Estate document referencing an enslaved people owned by Edward Ball, including the following enslaved people: Sob, Unknown, Sarah, Dinah, Amy, and Isaac.https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/lantern-mcpc/1133/thumbnail.jp

Lawyer\u27s Bill, Edward Ball Estate Document

Lawyer\u27s invoice for defending an enslaved person owned by Edward Ball accused of murderhttps://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/lantern-mcpc/1134/thumbnail.jp

The intersection between Descriptivism and Meliorism in reasoning research: further proposals in support of ‘soft normativism’

The rationality paradox centers on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative standards. Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favor of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) position, we defend an alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism,’ which allows for normative evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. We propose that normative theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilizing normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on the concept of ‘informal reflective equilibrium.’ Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programs that are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research programs have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning. In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined