Notes on Buraghmah [Burma] by Captain George Baker, c. 1755

In the collection of notes included here, “The Palace at Pegu” has been extracted from Alexander Dalrymple’s introduction. As he explains of the origin of the note, “I find amongst my memos of information, received from Captain Baker, the following account of Pegu, which could not properly be introduced in any other place, and therefore I have inserted it here.

Observations at Persaim and in the Journey to Ava and Back in 1755 by Captain George Baker

These materials from Captain George Baker’s diaries and other records and notes were originally published in Alexander Dalrymple’s Oriental Repertory in 1808. Baker has left numerous other reports, many found in the Records of Fort St. George for the period. These latter materials will be published in later editions of the SBBR. Baker’s account is especially useful for being one of the few first- hand accounts written by a European, of Alaunghpaya, the founder of the Konbaung Dynasty

Effects of lender decisions on farm financial planning : some solutions to problems arising from credit limitations set by commercial lenders

Bibliography: p. 20

Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking

We investigate how the contractibility of actions affecting the value of an asset affects asset ownership. We examine this by testing how on-board computer (OBC) adoption affects truck ownership. We develop and test the proposition that adoption should lead to less ownership by drivers, particularly for hauls where drivers have the greatest incentive to drive in non-optimal ways or engage in rent-seeking behavior. We find evidence in favor: OBC adoption leads to less driver ownership, especially for long hauls and hauls that use specialized trailers. We also find that non-owner drivers with OBCs drive better than those without them. These results suggest that technology-enabled increases in contractibility may lead to less independent contracting and larger firms.

Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information

Explaining patterns of asset ownership in the economy is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that OBCs' incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but their resource-allocation-improving features pushed them toward for-hire carriage. We conclude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance of both incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart (1986)) and of job design and measurement issues (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994)).

Thermodynamic and transport properties of simple ionic melts

Imperial Users onl