H-Diplo ISSF round table: Steven Ward. status and the challenge of rising powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Published versio

India and the Crisis in Kashmir

With the end of the Cold War, regional security problems have become paradigmatic. Whereas they were once seen primarily as functions of-or in some cases even epiphenomenal to-superpower rivalry, they are now central. International security is largely regional security in the absence of a global strategic conflict. As a result, attention has shifted from consideration of the global strategic balance to local conflict. Broadly, these local conflicts are a function of two factors: regional distributions of power but also animosities rooted in ethnic, religious, territorial, and irredentist contestation. The problem for policy is that the latter factors are more intractable than the former; distributions of power are more amenable to management than are animosities based on, or evocative of seemingly old quarrels and fears. This article focuses on one of the most costly and dangerous of these animosities, namely, the Indian and Pakistani contest over the divided state of Kashmir

Indian Higher Education: Privatization, Dignified Spaces, and Curricular Reform

The Future of Indian Universities167-19

An inquiry into colonial disengagement : the cabinet delegation to India, March to June, 1946

This thesis is about colonial disengagement, a term signifying the process of decolonisation from the decision to end colonial rule to the final withdrawal of imperial officials and armed personnel. Specifically, this thesis is about British colonial disengagement as revealed in a vital case—India during the period March 1946 to August 1947. The focus is on the role of the British Government in that process, which, in the Indian case, involved the transfer of political authority—that is of ultimate responsibility for government— from imperial to nationalist hands. This occurred in two phases: the first, during the Cabinet Delegation's mission to India from March to June 1946; and the second, during Mountbatten's mission from March to August 1947. In analysing the role of the British Government, the inquiry will deal with the former phase, of which a detailed first-hand account is available in "The Transfer of Power" archival documents recently released by the British Government pertaining to the period 1942-1947. The documents are used extensively in the analysis. The attempt is made to explain the role of the British Government in terms of the interaction and impact of five factors: (i) British interests; (ii) British obligations; (iii) the desire for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority; (iv) the momentum of constitutional change; and (v) declining British power in the face of the increasingly powerful and polarised nationalist movement. On the basis of the evidence collected primarily, from the documents, but also from important secondary sources, it is argued that while each of these factors had an impact on how Britain disengaged, three factors in particular were most significant: British strategic interests, the desire for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority and the lack of British power in relation to the nationalist movement. These three factors, it is further argued, interacted to cause the government to pursue a disengagement plan that would elicit the agreement of the two major nationalist parties—the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League—and that this pursuit, in turn, seriously limited its room for manoeuvre in the process of transferring authority. It is shown, finally, that the lack of room for manoeuvre was partly inherent in the Indian political situation and partly in British objectives, and that the Congress and the League were equally constrained by similar factors. Thus, in the end, it is concluded that to the extent that the Indian case is paradigmatic of British disengagements generally a more pessimistic view of what accommodations and political arrangements the departing imperial administrations and nationalist movements can or cannot make during the process of transferring authority may be necessary.Arts, Faculty ofPolitical Science, Department ofGraduat

The origins of association in South Asia: SAARC, 1979-1989

This dissertation asks: why, since 1979, have the seven South Asian states decided to come together in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)? Why, in other words, did a region marked by unrivalled differences in size, capabilities, and political systems as well as past and present conflict come to associate? A general explanation of regional association is formulated on the basis of answers to two questions: why do states associate; and what is a region? States associate, it is argued, for three "reasons": because others do; out of affinity for other states; and to better protect or advance cherished values, pre-eminently, status, welfare, and security. A region, it is argued, features the following characteristics: cultural affinity; interdependence, especially "ecological" and specifically in respect of water resources (rivers, seas, oceans); a skewed distribution of power such that a region typically consists of a "core" or "predominant" power and a host of secondary powers; inferiority of status where status rests on the reputation for autonomy and independence in international affairs; and the site of the most important conflicts facing its constituents. Thus, if association is emulative, then regional association has been a popular level of association; if association is by affinity, then a region maximizes affinity; if association arises from threats and opportunities to status, welfare and security, then given feelings of status inferiority, ecological interdependence, the skewedness of power and the rifeness of conflict, regions are where threats and opportunities are most salient.In the case of SAARC--notwithstanding the official rhetoric about "developmental" concerns as well as our findings relating to the desire to emulate other regions, the quest for status and recognition of affinity, the existence of interdependencies in river water management and exploitation--the primary motive for association is security: SAARC is seen as (i) a means of mutual "containment" wherein the small states wish to contain India's power and India wishes to contain the small states' links to extra-regional powers and (ii) an arena for intra-regional conflict resolution.U of I OnlyETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissio

Introduction: Explaining Cooperation and Rivalry in China-India Relations

Journal of Contemporary China32141353-36