Home values and firm behaviour

The homes of those in charge of firms are an important source of finance for ongoing businesses. We use firm level accounting data, transaction level house price data and loan level residential mortgage data from the UK to show that a £1 increase in the value of the residential real estate of a firm’s directors increases the firm’s investment and wage bill by £0.03 each. These effects run through smaller firms and are similar in booms and busts. In aggregate, the homes of firm directors are worth 80% of GDP. Using this, a back of the envelope calculation suggests that a 1% increase in real estate prices leads, through this channel, to up to a 0.28% rise in business investment and a 0.08% rise in total wages paid. We complement this with evidence on how a firm responds to changes in the value of its own corporate real estate; we find that, in aggregate, the residential real estate of directors is at least as important for activity. We use an estimated general equilibrium model to quantify the importance of both types of real estate for the propagation of shocks to the macroeconomy

The residential collateral channel

We present evidence on a new macroeconomic channel which we call the residential collateral channel. Through this channel, an increase in real estate prices expands firm activity by enabling company directors to utilise their residential property as a source of funds for their business. This channel is a key determinant of investment and job creation, with a £1 increase in the combined residential collateral of a firm’s directors estimated to increase the firm’s investment by £0.02 and total wage costs by £0.02. To show this, we use a unique combination of UK datasets including firm-level accounting data matched with transaction-level house price data and loan-level residential mortgage data. The aggregate value of residential collateral held by company directors (around 70% of GDP) suggests that this channel has important macroeconomic effects. We complement this with further evidence on the corporate collateral channel whereby an increase in real estate prices directly expands firm activity by enabling businesses to borrow more against their corporate real estate. An estimated general equilibrium model with collateral constrained firms is used to quantify the aggregate effects of both channels

Systemic sovereign risk: macroeconomic implications in the euro area

What are the macroeconomic implications of changes in sovereign risk premia? In this paper, I use a novel identification strategy coupled with a new dataset for the Euro Area to answer this question. I show that exogenous innovations in sovereign risk premia were an important driver of the economic dynamics of crisis-hit countries, explaining 30-50% of the forecast error of unemployment. I also shed light on the mechanisms through which this occurs. Fluctuations in sovereign risk premia explain 20-40% of the variance of private borrowing costs. Increases in sovereign risk result in substantial capital flight, external adjustment and import compression. In contrast, governments appear not to increase their primary balances in response to increases in sovereign risk. Identifying these causal effects involves isolating a source of fluctuations in sovereign borrowing costs exogenous to the economy in question. I address this problem by relying upon the transmission of country-specific events during the crisis in Europe to the sovereign risk premia in the remainder of the union. I construct a new dataset of critical events in foreign crisis-hit countries and I measure the impact of these events on yields in the economy of interest at an intraday frequency. An aggregation of foreign events serve as a proxy variable for structural innovations to the yield to identify shocks in a proxy SVAR. I extend this methodology into a Bayesian setting to allow for flexible panel assumptions. A counterfactual analysis is used to remove the impact of foreign events from the bond yields of crisis hit countries: I find that 40-60% of the trough-to-peak moves in bond yields in crisis-hit countries are explained by foreign events, thereby suggesting that the crisis was not purely a function of weak local economic conditions