Preference purification and the inner rational agent:A critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational-choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic

Coordination when there are restricted and unrestricted options

One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the number of options increases. Contrary to this expectation, we report an experiment which found more frequent coordination when the option set was unrestricted than when it was restricted. To try to explain this result, we develop a method for eliciting the general rules that subjects use to identify salient options in restricted and unrestricted sets. We find that each such rule, if used by all subjects, would generate greater coordination in restricted sets. However, subjects tend to apply different rules to restricted and unrestricted sets

Searching for Radio Pulsars in 3EG Sources at Urumqi Observatory

Since mid-2005, a pulsar searching system has been operating at 18 cm on the 25-m radio telescope of Urumqi Observatory. Test observations on known pulsars show that the system can perform the intended task. The prospect of using this system to observe 3EG sources and other target searching tasks is discussed.Comment: a training project about MSc thesi

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117–147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264–265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on the conditions on collective action and intention that need to be fulfilled for Bacharach’s “team reasoning” to occur. Two influential approaches to collective action are related to the idea of team reasoning: Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intention and Raimo Tuomela’s theory of a we-mode of intending. I argue that neither captures the “agency transformation” that team reasoning requires. That might be an acceptable conclusion for Bratman but more problematic for Tuomela, who claims that Bacharach’s results support his theory. I sketch an alternative framework in which the perspectival element that is required for team reasoning - the ‘we-perspective’ - can be understood and functionally characterized in relation to the traditional distinction between mode and content of intentional states. I claim that the latter understanding of a collective perspective provides the right kind of philosophical background for team reasoning, and I discuss some implications in relation to Tuomela’s assumption that switching between individual and collective perspectives can be a matter of rational choice

Work-Unit Absenteeism: Effects of Satisfaction, Commitment, Labor Market Conditions, and Time

Prior research is limited in explaining absenteeism at the unit level and over time. We developed and tested a model of unit-level absenteeism using five waves of data collected over six years from 115 work units in a large state agency. Unit-level job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and local unemployment were modeled as time-varying predictors of absenteeism. Shared satisfaction and commitment interacted in predicting absenteeism but were not related to the rate of change in absenteeism over time. Unit-level satisfaction and commitment were more strongly related to absenteeism when units were located in areas with plentiful job alternatives

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Segmentation of Gated Tl-SPECT Images and Computation of Ejection Fraction: A Different Approach

Background. We describe a set of image processing algorithms and mathematical models that can be advantageously used in schemes for the segmentation of thallium-201-single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) images and for computation of left ventricular ejection fraction (EF). Methods. The system consists of two independent blocs for image segmentation and computation of function. The former is based on a multiresolution elliptical coordinate transformation and dynamic contour tracking. Computation of EF is formulated on the basis of both the endocardial and epicardial contours, and we compare this formulation with that using only the endocardial border for images with low signal-to-noise ratios. The accuracy of border detection was validated against manual border tracing on FDG-PET images, simulated Tl-201-SPECT images where the true underlying borders were known, and actual Tl-201-SPECT images. Finally, we compared EFs computed for FDG-PET, technetium-99m-SPECT and Tl-201-SPECT with those obtained from planar gated blood pool imaging. Results. The automatically obtained results always were within the manual uncertainty range. Agreement between myocardial volumes from positron emission tomography and automatically obtained values from the simulated Tl-201-SPECT images was excellent (r = 0.95, n = 32). Agreement between EFs from planar gated blood pool imaging and the other image modalities was good (FDG-PET: y = 5.89 + 1.21x, r = 0.92, see = 6.24, n = 19, Tc-99m-SPECT: y = -3.86 + 1.06x, r = 0.88, see = 7.78, n = 9, Tl-201-SPECT: y = 17.8 + 0.81x, r = 0.77, see = 7.44, n = 26). For noisy input data the combined use of information from epicardial and endocardial contours gives more accurate EF values than the traditional formula on the basis of the endocardial contour only. Conclusions. Alternate approaches for segmentation and computation of function have been presented and validated. They might also be advantageously incorporated into other existing techniques

Monitoring international migration flows in Europe. Towards a statistical data base combining data from different sources

The paper reviews techniques developed in demography, geography and statistics that are useful for bridging the gap between available data on international migration flows and the information required for policy making and research. The basic idea of the paper is as follows: to establish a coherent and consistent data base that contains sufficiently detailed, up-to-date and accurate information, data from several sources should be combined. That raises issues of definition and measurement, and of how to combine data from different origins properly. The issues may be tackled more easily if the statistics that are being compiled are viewed as different outcomes or manifestations of underlying stochastic processes governing migration. The link between the processes and their outcomes is described by models, the parameters of which must be estimated from the available data. That may be done within the context of socio-demographic accounting. The paper discusses the experience of the U.S. Bureau of the Census in combining migration data from several sources. It also summarizes the many efforts in Europe to establish a coherent and consistent data base on international migration. The paper was written at IIASA. It is part of the Migration Estimation Study, which is a collaborative IIASA-University of Groningen project, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The project aims at developing techniques to obtain improved estimates of international migration flows by country of origin and country of destination

Full Agreement and the Provision of Threshold Public Goods

The experimental evidence suggests that groups are inefficient at providing threshold public goods. This inefficiency appears to reflect an inability to coordinate over how to distribute the cost of providing the good. So, why do groups not just split the cost equally? We offer an answer to this question by demonstrating that in a standard threshold public good game there is no collectively rational recommendation. We also demonstrate that if full agreement is required in order to provide the public good then there is a collectively rational recommendation, namely, to split the cost equally. Requiring full agreement may, therefore, increase efficiency in providing threshold public goods. We test this hypothesis experimentally and find support for it