Efficiency in the Trust Game: an Experimental Study of Preplay Contracting

We use a human-subjects experiment to test the effects of a simple mechanism designed to increase cooperation and efficiency in the trust game. In the equilibrium of the standard trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would have kept all of the returns from investment. Our mechanism adds a preplay escrow stage, in which the allocator places an amount (possibly zero) into escrow, to be forfeited if he keeps the proceeds of investment for himself. In the experiment, we vary the amounts that can be put into escrow. Our baseline treatment has no escrow. In a second treatment, only low escrow choices are possible, so the equilibrium is unaffected. In our third treatment, there is an escrow amount high enough that, in equilibrium, investment and sharing of the proceeds will occur. Two additional treatments mirror our second and third, except that in these, the escrow amount is randomly chosen and imposed on the allocator. We find that the high escrow amount, when chosen, does lead to the predicted efficient result. Contrary to the equilibrium prediction, we also find substantial investment in both the baseline and “low-escrow” treatments, leading to markedly higher efficiency than predicted (albeit well below that when the high amount is chosen). Over time, however, cooperation and efficiency after low or zero escrow amounts decline. We find only weak evidence for “crowding-out”, which predicts that given a low or zero amount placed into escrow in non-baseline treatments, investment and efficiency would actually be lower than in the baseline. We also find that initially, investment is more likely after allocators place the maximum possible amount into escrow – as if this action by allocators is being (mistakenly) read by investors as a signal that allocators plan to share. All of these results are seen when escrow choices are imposed as well as when they are voluntary.experiment, trust game, incentives, signal, crowding out

Impact of germanium on vacancy clustering in germanium-doped silicon

Recent density functional theory calculations by Chen et al. [J. Appl. Phys. 103, 123519 (2008)] revealed that vacancies (V) tend to accumulate around germanium (Ge) atoms in Ge-doped silicon (Si) to form GeVn clusters. In the present study, we employ similar electronic structure calculations to predict the binding energies of GeVn and Vn clusters containing up to four V. It is verified that V are strongly attracted to pre-existing GeVn clusters. Nevertheless, by comparing with the stability of Vn clusters, we predict that the Ge contribution to the binding energy of the GeVn clusters is limited. We use mass action analysis to quantify the relative concentrations of GeVn and Vn clusters over a wide temperature range: Vn clusters dominate in Ge-doped Si under realistic conditions

Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment

This paper reports on experiments designed to compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods problems. One mechanism rewards and penalizes deviations from the average contribution of the other agents to the public good (tax-subsidy mechanism). Another mechanism allows agents to subsidize the other agents’contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contribution to the public good. The tax-subsidy mechanism allows for good point and interval prediction of the average level of contribution. The compensation mechanism allows for less reliable prediction of the average level of contributions.public goods, voluntary provision, incentive mechanisms

Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro Level Panel Data

Consumer prices in many markets are persistently dispersed both across retail outlets and over time. While the cross sectional distribution of prices is stable, individual stores change their position in the distribution over time. It is a challenge to model oligopolistic price adjustment to capture these features of consumer markets. In belief based models of price adjustment stores react to expected profits. The expectations are based on the observed vector of market prices in the previous periods. In a reinforcement model of price adjustment, if a strategy has proven fruitful in the past, it is apt to be the strategy relied upon at the present. We collect price data on a homogeneous consumer product in Israel. We estimate the structural parameter of the models. We find that the reinforcement model describes the data better than the belief based models. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - ( Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro Level Panel Data) Preise für viele Konsumgüter sind weit verteilt. Dies gilt sowohl für die Verteilung über die Zeit als auch für die Verteilung zwischen den Verkaufsstellen. Während die Querschnittsverteilung der Preise stabil ist, wechseln die einzelnen Verkaufsstellen ihre Position in der Verteilung über die Zeit. Es stellt eine Herausforderung dar, diese Merkmale der Märkte für Konsumgüter zu modellieren. Im Vermutungslernen bilden die Verkaufstätten Erwartungen über das zukünftige Preissetzungsverhalten der Konkurrenz. Die Erwartungen basieren auf dem vorherigen Entscheidungsverhalten der Konkurrenz. Im Bekräftigungslernen werden erfolgreiche Strategien gerne wiederholt. Preisdaten eines homogenen Gutes in Israel werden erhoben. Die strukturellen Parameter der Modelle werden geschätzt. Bekräftigungslernen beschreibt das tatsächliche Entscheidungsverhalten besser als Vermutungslernen.Experiments; Information; Learning

Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment.

We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.incentive mechanisms; voluntary provision; public goods;

Nonlinear stability of <i>E</i> centers in Si_1-<i>x</i>Ge_<i>x</i>: electronic structure calculations

Electronic structure calculations are used to investigate the binding energies of defect pairs composed of lattice vacancies and phosphorus or arsenic atoms (E centers) in silicon-germanium alloys. To describe the local environment surrounding the E center we have generated special quasirandom structures that represent random silicon-germanium alloys. It is predicted that the stability of E centers does not vary linearly with the composition of the silicon-germanium alloy. Interestingly, we predict that the nonlinear behavior does not depend on the donor atom of the E center but only on the host lattice. The impact on diffusion properties is discussed in view of recent experimental and theoretical results

Diffusion and defect reactions in isotopically controlled semiconductors

Point defects in semiconductors play a decisive role for the functionality of semiconductors. A detailed, quantitative understanding of diffusion and defect reactions of dopants is required for advanced modelling of modern nanometer size electronic devices. With isotope heterostructures which consist of epitaxial layers of isotopically pure and deliberately mixed stable isotopes, we have studied the simultaneous self- and dopant diffusion in several major semiconductors such as silicon and germanium. Detailed analysis of the simultaneous diffusion of self- and dopant atoms in Si and Ge yields information about the ionization levels of native defects and about dopant-defect interactions in Si and Ge. The results of these diffusion studies are highlighted in this work

Partnership Taxation and the Paycheck Protection Program: Understanding Existing Guidance and How to Resolve Outstanding Issues

When Congress established the Paycheck Protection Program as part of the response effort to the COVID-19 pandemic, it failed to anticipate the multiple tax uncertainties that resulted from tax-exempt loan forgiveness. Despite further legislation addressing various concerns, guidance by the Internal Revenue Service has been complex and confusing in some areas and wholly lacking in others. This article identifies tax issues raised by the Paycheck Protection Program, explains the existing IRS guidance, and suggests a framework for future guidance regarding the sale of a partnership interest

Genocide in German South West Africa & the Herero Reparations Movement

During my spring 2015 Semester at Sea voyage, the ship docked in Walvis Bay, Namibia for five days. Prior to the voyage, I knew nothing about Namibia’s history. I was surprised to learn of its treacherous past and the role Germany played in shaping its political and economic condition. I took a tour of the Himba settlement, driving hours across the barren, dry land to a small circle of huts. Women cover their skin with red clay and continue the tradition of sauna bathes, never bathing in water in their entire lives. The Himba culture was captivating and it was immense honor to be welcomed to their homes. We also stopped to see the Bushman, or San people, to learn about their fleeting lifestyle. Without enough land or livestock to survive on, both the Himba and San are becoming ever more dependent on tourism and modern-day jobs. They fight to preserve their culture, aware that doing so becomes more difficult each year. Most men wear t-shirts and shorts, and dinner is no longer fresh, but store-bought. For lunch we stopped at a German farm. The majority of working farms in Namibia are owned by Germans, first acquired during colonization in the early 20th century. Upon returning to the ship, I learned more about German colonization, and came across the Herero War and the first genocide of the 20th Century. The Holocaust in Europe was not Germany’s first genocide, yet most of the world only studies the Second World War. The death of 80% of a population at the hand of a major European power should be acknowledged, and so I dedicate my senior thesis to telling this story. The Herero tribe’s fight for acknowledgement and reparations for the atrocities committed between 1904-1908 is a significant issue still debated today. The Herero are relentless in trying to regain enough land to sustain a cattle-herding lifestyle once more

Defect interactions in Sn_1-<i>x</i>Ge_<i>x</i> random alloys

Sn1-xGex alloys are candidates for buffer layers to match the lattices of III-V or II-VI compounds with Si or Ge for microelectronic or optoelectronic applications. In the present work electronic structure calculations are used to study relative energies of clusters formed between Sn atoms and lattice vacancies in Ge that relate to alloys of low Sn content. We also establish that the special quasirandom structure approach correctly describes the random alloy nature of Sn1-xGex with higher Sn content. In particular, the calculated deviations of the lattice parameters from Vegard's Law are consistent with experimental results