43 research outputs found

    The role of banks and the State in the shaping of the French fund industry

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    International audienceThe article deals with the issue of the French financial system design based on a historical analysis of the development of the fund management industry. It recounts how the main banks have become leaders in the global asset management industry. This success relies on a long-term institutional evolution towards a hybrid model and the ongoing close relationships between banks and the State since the end of World War II. The establishment of a friendly institutional framework for the bank intermediation expansion was rooted in the seizure of power by reformist civil servants in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, who would later become heads at the Treasury and the main banks. We also argue that the State’s ability to develop new forms of interventions, especially during financial liberalization and European construction, has been crucial in the development of a competitive fund industry. Finally, we show that the State’s and banks’ interests have driven the hybridization process of the fund sector and that the fund sector serves primarily the State’s interests and the funding needs of the financial sector at the expense of the real economy

    Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain: Opportunities and Limits of a New Monetary Regime

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    International audienc

    Do regional R&D subsidies foster innovative SMEs’ development: evidence from Aquitaine SMEs

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    International audienceMany studies have looked at the effectiveness of public schemes supporting private R&D but few have highlighted the role regions play in R&D funding. The present article investigates the effectiveness of R&D support at this level of analysis. More precisely, it assesses the R&D support scheme developed in Aquitaine, France's number one region in terms of proportion of budget spent on innovation. Its findings show that (i) public subsidies (regional and non-regional subsidies) have induced local SMEs to increase their R&D resources; (ii) effectiveness of public R&D support relies on the joint interventions of regional, national and supranational authorities; (iii) higher private R&D tends to be explained by an increase in the number of R&D employees, rather than an increase in their remuneration; (iv) regional action has a beneficial effect on business growth, and (v) job creation targets of the regional science and technology policy are satisfied, suggesting that regional subsidies are particularly effective when they help the region's innovative SMEs to expand and develop. More broadly, the article enhances understanding of the determinants explaining the effectiveness of public actions supporting private R&D

    La gouvernance dans les LBO

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    International audienceBased on the French case, this article addresses the question of governance in LBO transactions, i.e. the chain of delegation between Private Equity funds’ investors, funds, and target companies. It analyses the incentives and monitoring mechanisms as well as the regulatory framework. The French case highlights that governance in LBOs relies on institutional characteristics affecting the effectiveness of control and monitoring mechanisms. It also provides some evidence that LBO lead to an asymmetry between funds’ interests and funds’ investors’ interests at the expense of investors. Finally, this article shows that LBOs involving PE funds may be more interesting for banks than for acquired companies.À partir du cas français, cet article traite la question de la gouvernance dans les LBO définie comme une chaîne de délégation entre les investisseurs des fonds de private equity, les fonds et les entreprises acquises. Il s’attache notamment à analyser les relations de contrôle et de surveillance entre les différentes parties prenantes à travers l’étude des mécanismes incitatifs et des instruments de surveillance mis en œuvre ainsi que la réglementation en vigueur. L’étude du modèle français met en évidence que la gouvernance dans les LBO est dépendante de caractéristiques institutionnelles affectant l’efficacité des mécanismes de contrôle et de surveillance existants, que les LBO conduisent à une asymétrie entre les intérêts des fonds et de leurs investisseurs et que lorsqu’un fonds de PE participe au montage, les LBO présentent davantage d’intérêt pour les banques que pour les entreprises acquises

    La géographie mondiale du capital investissement

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