Aggregate demand and Long-Run Unemployment

macroeconomics, unemployment, aggregate

Short-run Money Demand

This paper estimates a long-run demand function for M1, using U.S. data for 1959-1993. The paper interprets deviations from this long-run relation with Goldfeld=s partial adjustment model. A key innovation is the choice of the interest rate in the money demand function. Most previous work uses a short-term market rate, but this paper uses the average return on "near monies" -- close substitutes for M1 such as savings accounts and money market mutual funds. This approach yields a predicted path of M1 velocity that closely matches the data. The volatility of velocity after 1980 is explained by volatility in the returns on near monies.

Policy Rules and External Shocks

This essay discusses rules for monetary policy in open economies. If policymakers seek to stabilize output and inflation, optimal rules in open economies differ considerably from optimal rules in closed economies. In open economies, stability is best achieved by targeting long-run inflation, a measure of inflation adjusted to remove transitory effects of exchange-rate movements. Stability is also enhanced by adding an exchange-rate term to "Taylor rules" for setting interest rates. Finally, central banks must choose whether their policy instrument is an interest rate or a "monetary conditions index": an average of the interest rate and the exchange rate. The nature of shocks to the exchange rate determines which of these choices keeps output and inflation more stable.

Ben Bernanke and the Zero Bound

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money-financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3-4%. Yet, since U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke has taken more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero-bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the FOMC meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff’s views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision-making.

Helicopter Drops and Japanfs Liquidity Trap

This paper examines the effects of a money-financed fiscal expansion? a helicopter drop?when an economy is in a liquidity trap. It uses a textbook-style model calibrated to fit Japanfs economic slump and deflation as of 2003. According to the results, money-financed transfers totaling 9.4 percent of GDP end the output slump and guide the economy to a steady state with 2 percent inflation. By raising output and inflation, the policy also reduces the ratio of government debt to GDP. The policyf s long-run effects are the same as those of a bond-financed fiscal expansion, but money finance prevents a short-run rise in debt.Helicopter drop; Liquidity trap; Deflation

Why Does High Inflation Raise Inflation Uncertainty?

This paper presents a model of monetary policy in which a rise in inflation raises uncertainty about future inflation. When inflation is low, there is a consensus that the monetary authority will try to keep it low. When inflation is high, policymakers face a dilemma: they would like to disinflate, but fear the recession that would result. The public does not know the tastes of future policymakers, and thus does not know whether disinflation will occur.

Ben Bernanke and the Zero Bound

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money-financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3-4%. Yet, since U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke has taken more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero-bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the FOMC meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision-making.