Work plan for the developmental control of portable SHMS-E+platform

This document describes the Developmental Control process to be used by Dyncorp Fabrication Services and SGN Eurisys Services Corporation - Remote Sensing and Sampling Equipment Engineering (RSSE) in the fabrication of two portable SHMS- E+ Platforms for Lockheed Martin Hanford (TWRS)

National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.publishedVersio

ENIGMA and global neuroscience: A decade of large-scale studies of the brain in health and disease across more than 40 countries

This review summarizes the last decade of work by the ENIGMA (Enhancing NeuroImaging Genetics through Meta Analysis) Consortium, a global alliance of over 1400 scientists across 43 countries, studying the human brain in health and disease. Building on large-scale genetic studies that discovered the first robustly replicated genetic loci associated with brain metrics, ENIGMA has diversified into over 50 working groups (WGs), pooling worldwide data and expertise to answer fundamental questions in neuroscience, psychiatry, neurology, and genetics. Most ENIGMA WGs focus on specific psychiatric and neurological conditions, other WGs study normal variation due to sex and gender differences, or development and aging; still other WGs develop methodological pipelines and tools to facilitate harmonized analyses of "big data" (i.e., genetic and epigenetic data, multimodal MRI, and electroencephalography data). These international efforts have yielded the largest neuroimaging studies to date in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance use disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorders, epilepsy, and 22q11.2 deletion syndrome. More recent ENIGMA WGs have formed to study anxiety disorders, suicidal thoughts and behavior, sleep and insomnia, eating disorders, irritability, brain injury, antisocial personality and conduct disorder, and dissociative identity disorder. Here, we summarize the first decade of ENIGMA's activities and ongoing projects, and describe the successes and challenges encountered along the way. We highlight the advantages of collaborative large-scale coordinated data analyses for testing reproducibility and robustness of findings, offering the opportunity to identify brain systems involved in clinical syndromes across diverse samples and associated genetic, environmental, demographic, cognitive, and psychosocial factors

TWRS hydrogen mitigation portable standard hydrogen monitoring system platform design and fabrication engineering task plan

The primary function of portable gas monitoring is to quickly determine tank vapor space gas composition and gas release rate, and to detect gas release events. Characterization of the gas composition is needed for safety analysis. The lower flammability limit, as well as the peak burn temperature and pressure, are dependent upon the gas composition. If there is little or no knowledge about the gas composition, safety analysis utilize compositions that yield the worst case in a deflagration or detonation. This conservative approach to unknowns necessitates a significant increase in administrative and engineering costs. Knowledge of the true composition could lead to reductions in the assumptions and therefore contribute to a reduction in controls and work restrictions. Also, knowledge of the actual composition will be required information for the analysis that is needed to remove tanks from the Watch List. Similarly, the rate of generation and release of gases is required information for performing safety analysis, developing controls, designing equipment, and closing safety issues. To determine release rate, both the gas concentrations and the dome space ventilation rates (exhauster flow rate or passive dome/atmosphere exchange rate) are needed. Therefore, to quickly verify waste tank categorization or to provide additional characterization for tanks with installed gas monitoring, a temporary, portable standard hydrogen monitoring system is needed that can be used to measure gas compositions at both high and low sensitivities

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Set Point Determination

This document provides the calculations used to determine the error of safety class signals used for the CVD process These errors are used with the Parameter limits to arrive at the initial set point. The Safety Class Instrumentation and Control (SCIC) system provides active detection and response to process anomalies that, if unmitigated would result in a safety event. Specifically actuation of the SCIC system includes two portions. The portion which isolates the MCO and initiates the safety-class helium (SCHe) purge, and the portion which detects and stops excessive heat input to the MCO on high tempered water MCO inlet temperature. For the MCO isolation and purge the SCIC receives signals from MCO pressure (both positive pressure and vacuum) helium flow rate, bay high temperature switches, seismic trips and time under vacuum trips

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) OCRWM Loop Error Determination

Characterization is specifically identified by the Richland Operations Office (RL) for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), as requiring application of the requirements in the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (QARD) (RW-0333P DOE 1997a). Those analyses that provide information that is necessary for repository acceptance require application of the QARD. The cold vacuum drying (CVD) project identified the loops that measure, display, and record multi-canister overpack (MCO) vacuum pressure and Tempered Water (TW) temperature data as providing OCRWM data per Application of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) Quality Assurance Requirements to the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project HNF-SD-SNF-RPT-007. Vacuum pressure transmitters (PT 1*08, 1*10) and TW temperature transmitters (TIT-3*05, 3*12) are used to verify drying and to determine the water content within the MCO after CVD

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Electrical Equipment Hydrogen Hazard Protection

This document explains that with the use of a helium purge and adequate control, the systems attached to the MCO in the CVDF are not in a flammable environment. Effective safeguards against ventilation failure are provided which reduces the flammability hazard classification within the protected enclosure to Unclassified. Intrinsically safe components are not required for this system

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Set Point Determination

The Safety Class Instrumentation and Control (SCIC) system provides active detection and response to process anomalies that, if unmitigated, would result in a safety event. Specifically, actuation of the SCIC system includes two portions. The portion which isolates the MCO and initiates the safety-class helium (SCHe) purge, and the portion which detects and stops excessive heat input to the MCO annulus on high Tempered Water (TW) inlet temperature. For the MCO isolation and purge, the SCIC receives MCO pressure (both positive pressure and vacuum), helium flow rate, bay high temperature switch status, seismic trip status, and time-under-vacuum trips signals. The SCIC system will isolate the MCO and start an SCHe system purge if any of the following occur. (1) Isolation and purge from one of the SCHe ''isolation'' and ''purge'' buttons is manually initiated (administratively controlled). (2) The first vacuum cycle exceeds 8 hours at vacuum, or any subsequent vacuum cycle exceeds 4 hours at vacuum without re-pressurizing the MCO for a minimum of 4 hours. (This is referred to as the 8/4/4 requirement and provides thermal equilibrium within the MCO.) (3) MCO is below atmospheric pressure and the helium flow is below the minimum required to keep hydrogen less than 4% by volume. (When MCO pressure is below 12 torr there is insufficient hydrogen to exceed the 4% level and therefore no purge is required. A five minute time delay on low flow allows flow to be stopped in order to reach < 12 torr.) (4) The duration for the transition from above atmospheric pressure to vacuum (time to reach pressure below -11.7 psig [{approx}155 torr]) exceeds 5 minutes. (5) The duration for the transition from vacuum (below -11.1 psig [{approx}185 torr]) back to pressure [greater than 0.5 psig] exceeds 5 minutes. (6) MCO reaches a vacuum state (<0.5 psig) without an adequate, verified purge volume. (The MCO must be maintained above atmospheric pressure (approximately 0.5 psig) to prevent oxygen ingress unless a purge of adequate volume has been completed. During bulk water draining, the MCO must remain above atmospheric pressure.) (7) Seismic event of sufficient magnitude is detected. (Trip point is below the Uniform Building Code levels). Setpoint determination is required for trips C through H. Sensor error determination for additional safety-significant sensors used by the HVAC system or the SCHe system are also required

Design layout for gas monitoring system II (GMS-2) computer system

This document provides a general overview of the computer systems software that perform the data acquisition and control for the 241-SY-101 Gas Monitoring System II (GMS-2). It outlines the system layout, and contains descriptions of components and the functions they perform. The GMS-2 system was designed and implemented by Los Alamos National Laboratory and supplied to Westinghouse Hanford Compan