3 research outputs found
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an
evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are
risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed
earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the
three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random
regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player
reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner
strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective
behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square
lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the
cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of
oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether
damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared
to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable
of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the
average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are
well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure