21 research outputs found
Privacy Amplification from Non-malleable Codes
Non-malleable Codes give us the following property: their codewords cannot be tampered into codewords of related messages. Privacy Amplification allows parties to convert their weak shared secret into a fully hidden, uniformly distributed secret key, while communicating on a fully tamperable public channel. In this work, we show how to construct a constant round privacy amplification protocol from any augmented split-state non-malleable code. Existentially, this gives us another primitive (in addition to optimal non-malleable extractors) whose optimal construction would solve the long-standing open problem of building constant round privacy amplification with optimal entropy loss. Instantiating our code with the current best known NMC gives us an -round privacy amplification protocol with entropy loss and min-entropy requirement , where is the security parameter and is the length of the shared weak secret. In fact, for our result, even the weaker primitive of Non-malleable Randomness Encoders suffice.
We view our result as an exciting connection between two of the most fascinating and well-studied information theoretic primitives, non-malleable codes and privacy amplification
Non-malleable Codes against Lookahead Tampering
There are natural cryptographic applications where an adversary only gets to tamper a high- speed data stream on the fly based on her view so far, namely, the lookahead tampering model. Since the adversary can easily substitute transmitted messages with her messages, it is farfetched to insist on strong guarantees like error-correction or, even, manipulation detection. Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICSâ2010) introduced the notion of non-malleable codes that provide a useful message integrity for such scenarios. Intuitively, a non-malleable code ensures that the tampered codeword encodes the original message or a message that is entirely independent of the original message.
Our work studies the following tampering model. We encode a message into k>=1 secret shares, and we transmit each share as a separate stream of data. Adversaries can perform lookahead tampering on each share, albeit, independently. We call this k-lookahead model.
First, we show a hardness result for the k-lookahead model. To transmit an l-bit message, the cumulative length of the secret shares must be at least kl/(k-1). This result immediately rules out the possibility of a solution with k = 1. Next, we construct a solution for 2-lookahead model such that the total length of the shares is 3l, which is only 1.5x of the optimal encoding as indicated by our hardness result.
Prior work considers stronger model of split-state encoding that creates k>=2 secret shares, but protects against adversaries who perform arbitrary (but independent) tampering on each se- cret share. The size of the secret shares of the most efficient 2-split-state encoding is l*log(l)/loglog(l) (Li, ECCCâ2018). Even though k-lookahead is a weaker tampering class, our hardness result matches that of k-split-state tampering by Cheraghchi and Guruswami (TCCâ2014). However, our explicit constructions above achieve much higher efficiency in encoding
Non-Malleable Codes, Extractors and Secret Sharing for Interleaved Tampering and Composition of Tampering
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (JACM 2018) as a generalization of standard error correcting codes to handle severe forms of tampering on codewords. This notion has attracted a lot of recent research, resulting in various explicit constructions, which have found applications in tamper-resilient cryptography and connections to other pseudorandom objects in theoretical computer science.
We continue the line of investigation on explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in the information theoretic setting, and give explicit constructions for several new classes of tampering functions. These classes strictly generalize several previously studied classes of tampering functions, and in particular extend the well studied split-state model which is a ``compartmentalized model in the sense that the codeword is partitioned a prior into disjoint intervals for tampering. Specifically, we give explicit non-malleable codes for the following classes of tampering functions.
(1) Interleaved split-state tampering: Here the codeword is partitioned in an unknown way by an adversary, and then tampered with by a split-state tampering function.
(2) Affine tampering composed with split-state tampering: In this model, the codeword is first tampered with by a split-state adversary, and then the whole tampered codeword is further tampered with by an affine function. In fact our results are stronger, and we can handle affine tampering composed with interleaved split-state tampering.
Our results are the first explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in any of these tampering models. As applications, they also directly give non-malleable secret sharing schemes with binary shares in the split-state joint tampering model and the stronger model of affine tampering composed with split-state joint tampering. We derive all these results from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors, which we believe are of independent interest.
Using our techniques, we also give an improved seedless extractor for an unknown interleaving of two independent sources
Non-malleable Randomness Encoders and their Applications
Non-malleable Codes (NMCs), introduced by Dziembowski, Peitrzak and Wichs (ITCS 2010), serve the purpose of preventing related tampering of encoded messages. The most popular tampering model considered is the -split-state model where a codeword consists of 2 states, each of which can be tampered independently. While NMCs in the -split state model provide the strongest security guarantee, despite much research in the area we only know how to build them with poor rate (, where is the codeword length). However, in many applications of NMCs one only needs to be able to encode randomness i.e., security is not required to hold for arbitrary, adversarially chosen messages. For example, in applications of NMCs to tamper-resilient security, the messages that are encoded are typically randomly generated secret keys. To exploit this, in this work, we introduce the notion of Non-malleable Randomness Encoders (NMREs) as a relaxation of NMCs in the following sense: NMREs output a random message along with its corresponding non-malleable encoding.
Our main result is the construction of a -split state, rate- NMRE. While NMREs are interesting in their own right and can be directly used in applications such as in the construction of tamper-resilient cryptographic primitives, we also show how to use them, in a black-box manner, to build a -split-state (standard) NMCs with rate . This improves both the number of states, as well as the rate, of existing constant-rate NMCs
Continuous Space-Bounded Non-Malleable Codes from Stronger Proofs-of-Space
Non-malleable codes are encoding schemes that provide protections against various classes of tampering attacks. Recently Faust et al. (CRYPTO 2017) initiated the study of space- bounded non-malleable codes that provide such protections against tampering within small- space devices. They put forward a construction based on any non-interactive proof-of-space (NIPoS). However, the scheme only protects against an a priori bounded number of tampering attacks.
We construct non-malleable codes that are resilient to an unbounded polynomial number of space-bounded tamperings. Towards that we introduce a stronger variant of NIPoS called proof-extractable NIPoS (PExt-NIPoS), and propose two approaches of constructing such a primitive. Using a new proof strategy we show that the generic encoding scheme of Faust et al. achieves unbounded tamper-resilience when instantiated with a PExt-NIPoS. We show two methods to construct PExt-NIPoS:
1. The first method uses a special family of âmemory-hardâ graphs, called challenge-hard graphs (CHG), a notion we introduce here. We instantiate such family of graphs based on an extension of stack of localized expanders (first used by Ren and Devadas in the context of proof-of-space). In addition, we show that the graph construction used as a building block for the proof-of-space by Dziembowski et al. (CRYPTO 2015) satisfies challenge-hardness as well. These two CHG-instantiations lead to continuous space-bounded NMC with different features in the random oracle model.
2. Our second instantiation relies on a new measurable property, called uniqueness of NIPoS. We show that standard extractability can be upgraded to proof-extractability if the NIPoS also has uniqueness. We propose a simple heuristic construction of NIPoS, that achieves (partial) uniqueness, based on a candidate memory-hard function in the standard model and a publicly verifiable computation with small-space verification. Instantiating the encoding scheme of Faust et al. with this NIPoS, we obtain a continuous space-bounded NMC that supports the âmost practicalâ parameters, complementing the provably secure but ârelatively impracticalâ CHG-based constructions. Additionally, we revisit the construction of Faust et al. and observe that due to the lack of uniqueness of their NIPoS, the resulting encoding schemes yield âhighly impracticalâ parameters in the continuous setting.
We conclude the paper with a comparative study of all our non-malleable code constructions with an estimation of concrete parameters
Non-Malleable Codes for Decision Trees
We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by decision trees of depth . In particular, each bit of the tampered codeword is set arbitrarily after adaptively reading up to arbitrary locations within the original codeword. Prior to this work, no efficient unconditional non-malleable codes were known for decision trees beyond depth .
Our result also yields efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are -secure against constant-depth circuits of -size. Prior work of Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017) and Ball et al. (FOCS 2018) only provide protection against -size circuits with -security.
We achieve our result through simple non-malleable reductions of decision tree tampering to split-state tampering. As an intermediary, we give a simple and generic reduction of leakage-resilient split-state tampering to split-state tampering with improved parameters. Prior work of Aggarwal et al. (TCC 2015) only provides a reduction to split-state non-malleable codes with decoders that exhibit particular properties
Revisiting Non-Malleable Secret Sharing
A threshold secret sharing scheme (with threshold ) allows a dealer to share a secret among a set of parties such that any group of or more parties can recover the secret and no group of at most parties learn any information about the secret. A non-malleable threshold secret sharing scheme, introduced in the recent work of Goyal and Kumar (STOC\u2718), additionally protects a threshold secret sharing scheme when its shares are subject to tampering attacks. Specifically, it guarantees that the reconstructed secret from the tampered shares is either the original secret or something that is unrelated to the original secret.
In this work, we continue the study of threshold non-malleable secret sharing against the class of tampering functions that tamper each share independently. We focus on achieving greater efficiency and guaranteeing a stronger security property. We obtain the following results:
- Rate Improvement. We give the first construction of a threshold non-malleable secret sharing scheme that has rate . Specifically, for every , we give a construction of a -out-of- non-malleable secret sharing scheme with rate . In the prior constructions, the rate was where is the length of the secret and thus, the rate tends to 0 as . Furthermore, we also optimize the parameters of our construction and give a concretely efficient scheme.
- Multiple Tampering. We give the first construction of a threshold non-malleable secret sharing scheme secure in the stronger setting of bounded tampering wherein the shares are tampered by multiple (but bounded in number) possibly different tampering functions. The rate of such a scheme is where is an apriori bound on the number of tamperings. We complement this positive result by proving that it is impossible to have a threshold non-malleable secret sharing scheme that is secure in the presence of an apriori unbounded number of tamperings.
- General Access Structures. We extend our results beyond threshold secret sharing and give constructions of rate-efficient, non-malleable secret sharing schemes for more general monotone access structures that are secure against multiple (bounded) tampering attacks
Non-Malleability against Polynomial Tampering
We present the first explicit construction of a non-malleable code that can handle tampering functions that are bounded-degree polynomials.
Prior to our work, this was only known for degree-1 polynomials (affine tampering functions), due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017). As a direct corollary, we obtain an explicit non-malleable code that is secure against tampering by bounded-size arithmetic circuits.
We show applications of our non-malleable code in constructing non-malleable secret sharing schemes that are robust against bounded-degree polynomial tampering. In fact our result is stronger: we can handle adversaries that can adaptively choose the polynomial tampering function based on initial leakage of a bounded number of shares.
Our results are derived from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors that can handle bounded-degree polynomial tampering functions. Prior to our work, no such result was known even for degree-2 (quadratic) polynomials
Robustly Reusable Fuzzy Extractor from Standard Assumptions
A fuzzy extractor (FE) aims at deriving and reproducing (almost) uniform cryptographic keys from noisy non-uniform sources. To reproduce an identical key R from subsequent readings of a noisy source, it is necessary to eliminate the noises from those readings. To this end, a public helper string P, together with the key R, is produced from the first reading of the source during the initial enrollment phase.
In this paper, we consider computational fuzzy extractor. We formalize robustly reusable fuzzy extractor (rrFE) which considers reusability and robustness simultaneously in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. Reusability of rrFE deals with source reuse. It guarantees that the key R output by fuzzy extractor is pseudo-random even if the initial enrollment is applied to the same source several times, generating multiple public helper strings and keys (P_i, R_i). Robustness of rrFE deals with active probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, who may manipulate the public helper string P_i to affect the reproduction of R_i. Any modification of P_i by the adversary will be detected by the robustness of rrFE
Generic Constructions of Robustly Reusable Fuzzy Extractor
Robustly reusable Fuzzy Extractor (rrFE) considers reusability and robustness simultaneously.
We present two approaches to the generic construction of rrFE. Both of approaches make use of a secure sketch and universal hash functions. The first approach also employs a special pseudo-random function (PRF), namely unique-input key-shift (ui-ks) secure PRF, and the second uses a key-shift secure auxiliary-input authenticated encryption (AIAE). The ui-ks security of PRF (resp. key-shift security of AIAE), together with the homomorphic properties of secure sketch and universal hash function, guarantees the reusability and robustness of rrFE. Meanwhile, we show two instantiations of the two approaches respectively. The first instantiation results in the first rrFE from the LWE assumption, while the second instantiation results in the first rrFE from the DDH assumption over non-pairing groups