1,610 research outputs found

    Recurrence spectrum in smooth dynamical systems

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    We prove that for conformal expanding maps the return time does have constant multifractal spectrum. This is the counterpart of the result by Feng and Wu in the symbolic setting

    Periodicity of mass extinctions without an extraterrestrial cause

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    We study a lattice model of a multi-species prey-predator system. Numerical results show that for a small mutation rate the model develops irregular long-period oscillatory behavior with sizeable changes in a number of species. The periodicity of extinctions on Earth was suggested by Raup and Sepkoski but so far is lacking a satisfactory explanation. Our model indicates that this is a natural consequence of the ecosystem dynamics, not the result of any extraterrestrial cause.Comment: 4 pages, accepted in Phys.Rev.

    Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices

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    An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD games with the ``neighbors.'' The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies is allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to study how the measure of cooperation is affected by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to defect. According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be observed at the top level if the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q<4). For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators occurs in the middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest average (total) income for the whole community.Comment: appendix adde

    Dynamics of Multidimensional Secession

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    We explore a generalized Seceder Model with variable size selection groups and higher dimensional genotypes, uncovering its well-defined mean-field limiting behavior. Mapping to a discrete, deterministic version, we pin down the upper critical size of the multiplet selection group, characterize all relevant dynamically stable fixed points, and provide a complete analytical description of its self-similar hierarchy of multiple branch solutions.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, PR

    State Differentiation by Transient Truncation in Coupled Threshold Dynamics

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    Dynamics with a threshold input--output relation commonly exist in gene, signal-transduction, and neural networks. Coupled dynamical systems of such threshold elements are investigated, in an effort to find differentiation of elements induced by the interaction. Through global diffusive coupling, novel states are found to be generated that are not the original attractor of single-element threshold dynamics, but are sustained through the interaction with the elements located at the original attractor. This stabilization of the novel state(s) is not related to symmetry breaking, but is explained as the truncation of transient trajectories to the original attractor due to the coupling. Single-element dynamics with winding transient trajectories located at a low-dimensional manifold and having turning points are shown to be essential to the generation of such novel state(s) in a coupled system. Universality of this mechanism for the novel state generation and its relevance to biological cell differentiation are briefly discussed.Comment: 8 pages. Phys. Rev. E. in pres

    Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies

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    Cooperation and defection may be considered as two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the common pool that emerges if the evolution is guided by different benefit functions. Here we consider the steepness and the threshold as two parameters defining an array of generalized benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases the characteristic threshold decreases, while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

    Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts

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    We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p \rightarrow 1- cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation

    Networking Effects on Cooperation in Evolutionary Snowdrift Game

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    The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, is studied in the Watts-Strogatz network that spans the regular, small-world, and random networks through random re-wiring. Over a wide range of payoffs, a re-wired network is found to suppress cooperation when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. Two extinction payoffs, that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state, are identified. It is found that, unlike in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the standard deviation of the degree distribution is the dominant network property that governs the extinction payoffs.Comment: Changed conten

    Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

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    The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolated convex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review
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