Narcissism and Risk-Taking for Others

While prior findings demonstrate that narcissists are excessively risk-seeking for themselves, research does not yet understand if their risk-seeking behaviors extend to others as well. This paper examines the role of narcissism in risk-taking on behalf of others. I hypothesize that narcissists will take more risks when deciding for others because they lack empathy and perspective taking. Therefore, narcissists are more likely to take risks based on their personal preferences, rather than the recipient’s desires. To test my hypotheses, participants completed the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) for themselves, another individual, and an anonymous individual, followed by completing the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) in a pre-registered experiment (Link). Using multi-level modeling, I found that narcissism is negatively related to risk-taking for the self and positively related to risk-taking for anonymous individuals

Search of X-ray emission from roAp stars: The case of gamma Equulei

The detection of X-ray emission from Ap stars can be an indicator for the presence of magnetic activity and dynamo action, provided different origins for the emission, such as wind shocks and close late-type companions, can be excluded. Here we report on results for gamma Equu, the only roAp star for which an X-ray detection is reported in ROSAT catalogs. We use high resolution imaging in X-rays with Chandra and in the near-infrared with NACO/VLT that allow us to spatially resolve companions down to ~1" and ~0.06" separations, respectively. The bulk of the X-ray emission is associated with a companion of gamma Equu identified in our NACO image. Assuming coevality with the primary roAp star (~900 Myr), the available photometry for the companion points at a K-type star with ~0.6 M_sun. Its X-ray properties are in agreement with the predictions for its age and mass. An excess of photons with respect to the expected background and contribution from the nearby companion is observed near the optical position of gamma Equu. We estimate an X-ray luminosity of log L_x [erg/s] = 26.6 and log(L_x/L_bol) = -7.9 for this emission. A small offset between the optical and the X-ray image leaves some doubt on its association with the roAp star. The faint X-ray emission that we tentatively ascribe to the roAp star is difficult to explain as a solar-like stellar corona due to its very low L_x/L_bol level and the very long rotation period of gamma Equu. It could be produced in magnetically confined wind shocks implying a mass loss rate of ~10^(-14) M_sun/yr or from an additional unknown late-type companion at separation ~0.4". If confirmed by future deeper X-ray observations this emission could point at the origin for the presence of radioactive elements on some roAp stars.Comment: Accepted for publication in Astronomy & Astrophysics (5 pages

When Falsification is the Only Path to Truth

Can people consistently attempt to falsify, that is, search for refuting evidence, when testing the truth of hypotheses? Experimental evidence indicates that people tend to search for confirming evidence. We report two novel experiments that show that people can consistently falsify when it is the only helpful strategy. Experiment 1 showed that participants readily falsified somebody else’s hypothesis. Their task was to test a hypothesis belonging to an ‘imaginary participant’ and they knew it was a low quality hypothesis. Experiment 2 showed that participants were able to falsify a low quality hypothesis belonging to an imaginary participant more readily than their own low quality hypothesis. The results have important implications for theories of hypothesis testing and human rationality

Causes, Enablers and the Law

Many theories in philosophy, law, and psychology, make no distinction in meaning between causing and enabling conditions. Yet, psychologically people readily make such distinctions each day. In this paper we report three experiments, showing that individuals distinguish between causes and enabling conditions in brief descriptions of wrongful outcomes. Respondents rate actions that bring about outcomes as causes, and actions that make possible the causal relation as enablers. Likewise, causers (as opposed to enablers) are rated as more responsible for the outcome, as liable to longer prison sentences, and as liable to pay higher fines. Moreover, the more actors involved, the more blame volume there is psychologically to be apportioned between them. The implication is that theories and the law in practice, both criminal and civil, may dangerously mismatch the intuitions of those to whom they are supposed to apply. The findings are discussed in light of contemporary psychological theories of how people reason about cause. The paper presents the extended findings supplementary to the conference paper: Frosch, C. A., Johnson-Laird, P. N., Cowley, M. (2007). Don’t blame me your Honor, I’m only the enabler. Proceedings of the Twenty–Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, p. 1755, Mahweh, N. J: Erlbaum. Nashville, USA. *Main findings now cited in the Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning

‘The Innocent v The Fickle Few’: How Jurors Understand Random-Match-Probabilities and Judges’ Directions when Reasoning about DNA and Refuting Evidence

DNA evidence is one of the most significant modern advances in the search for truth since the cross examination, but its format as a random-match-probability makes it difficult for people to assign an appropriate probative value (Koehler, 2001). While Frequentist theories propose that the presentation of the match as a frequency rather than a probability facilitates more accurate assessment (e.g., Slovic et al., 2000), Exemplar-Cueing Theory predicts that the subjective weight assigned may be affected by the frequency or probability format, and how easily examples of the event, i.e., ‘exemplars’, are generated from linguistic cues that frame the match in light of further evidence (Koehler & Macchi, 2004). This paper presents two juror research studies to examine the difficulties that jurors have in assigning appropriate probative value to DNA evidence when contradictory evidence is presented. Study 1 showed that refuting evidence significantly reduced guilt judgments when exemplars were linguistically cued, even when the probability match and the refuting evidence had the same objective probative value. Moreover, qualitative reason for judgment responses revealed that interpreting refuting evidence was found to be complex and not necessarily reductive; refutation was found indicative of innocence or guilt depending on whether exemplars have been cued or not. Study 2 showed that the introduction of judges’ directions to linguistically cue exemplars, did not increase the impact of refuting evidence beyond its objective probative value, but less guilty verdicts were returned when jurors were instructed to consider all possible explanations of the evidence. The results are discussed in light of contradictory frequentist and exemplar-cueing theoretical positions, and their real-world consequences

Hypothesis Falsification in the 2-4-6 Number Sequence Test: Introducing Imaginary Counterparts

Two main cognitive theories predict that people find refuting evidence that falsifies their theorising difficult, if not impossible to consider, even though such reasoning may be pivotal to grounding their everyday thoughts in reality (i.e., Poletiek, 1996; Klayman & Ha, 1987). In the classic 2-4-6 number sequence task devised by psychologists to test such reasoning skills in a simulated environment – people fail the test more often than not. In the 2-4-6 task participants try to discover what rule the number triple 2-4-6 conforms to. The rule is ‘ascending numbers’, but it is tricky to discover this rule. Participants tend to generate hypotheses with the properties of the 2-4-6 triple, for example, ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. They must search for evidence to test whether their hypothesis is the rule. But experimental evidence has shown that they tend to generate confirming triples that they expect to be consistent with their hypothesis rather than inconsistent falsifying triples. Counter to the two main hypothesis testing theories this paper demonstrates that falsification is possible in five 2-4-6 task experiments when participants consider an Imaginary Participant’s hypothesis. Experiment 1 and 2 show that competition with an opponent hypothesis tester facilitates falsification. Experiments 3 to 5 show that the consideration of an alternative hypothesis helps this falsification of hypotheses lead to rule discovery. The implications of the results for theories of hypothesis testing and reasoning are discussed

Chess Masters' Hypothesis Testing in Games of Dynamic Equilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed technical protocol analysis of chess masters' evaluative expertise, paying particular attention to the analysis of the structure of their memory process in evaluating foreseen possibilities in games of dynamic equilibrium. The paper has two purposes. First, to publish a results chapter from my DPhil thesis (in revised journal article form) attending to the measurement of foresight in chess masters' evaluation process, testing alternative theories of cognitive expertise in the domain of chess; and second to provide a subset of the technical graphical analysis that corresponds to that measurement to preserve this protocol analysis for access in the academic domain for future studies of expert memory and foresight (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1993). The step-by-step protocol analysis consists of: (i) an introduction to foresight cognition as hypothesis testing, (ii) a theoretical review in the domain of chess masters' expertise according to the theoretical frameworks in that field purporting hypotheses relevant to chess masters' evaluative skill processes, and (iii) summary tables and non-parametric statistical analysis corroborating chunking theory frameworks of expert cognition (e.g., DeGroot, 1965; Newell & Simon, 1972; Gobet, 1998; Gobet et al., 2004), and refuting the alternative search-evaluation models (e.g., Holding & Reynolds, 1982). Moreover, the journal article espouses the preservation of the traditional protocol analysis method core to the field of expert cognition (DeGroot, 1969; Kotov, 1971). The full protocol analysis can be found in monograph form here on my SSRN profile in ‘The role of falsification in hypothesis testing’. It takes the form of a specialist population study (e.g., detailed case study work; Luria, 1987). Thus the outline consists of a short introduction, a theoretical methodological review discussing protocol analysis methods for specialist population studies in cognition (with particular attention to the preservation of protocol analysis methods for chess studies in cognition and expert memory/ with a fresh angle on the foresight process), and the full set of protocol analyses with corresponding problem behaviour graphs. A subset of the main results has been published elsewhere (e.g., Cowley & Byrne, 2004; Cowley 2006), receiving scientific and scientific journalistic acclaim (e.g., Nature Online News 2004)

Chess Masters' Hypothesis Testing

Falsification may demarcate science from non-science as the rational way to test the truth of hypotheses. But experimental evidence from studies of reasoning shows that people often find falsification difficult. We suggest that domain expertise may facilitate falsification. We consider new experimental data about chess experts’ hypothesis testing. The results show that chess masters were readily able to falsify their plans. They generated move sequences that falsified their plans more readily than novice players, who tended to confirm their plans. The finding that experts in a domain are more likely to falsify their hypotheses has important implications for the debate about human rationality

Intended and Merely Foreseen Consequences: The Psychology of the ‘Cause or Allow’ Offence

Intended and merely foreseen consequences: The psychology of the ‘cause or allow’ offence. A short report for the Socio-Legal Community on ESRC Grant RES-000-22-3114