Multinational financial structure and tax competition

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational's affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. However, there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment if the debt externality is not negative

Internal equity financing and the performance of multinational subsidiaries in emerging economies

We examine the internal equity financing of the multinational subsidiary which retains and reinvests its own earnings. Internal equity financing is a type of firm-specific advantage (FSA) along with other traditional FSAs in innovation, research and development, brands and management skills. It also reflects subsidiary-level financial management decision-making. Here we test the contributions of internal equity financing and subsidiary-level financial management decision-making to subsidiary performance, using original survey data from British multinational subsidiaries in six emerging countries in the South East Asia region. Our first finding is that internal equity financing acts as an FSA to improve subsidiary performance. Our second finding is that over 90% of financing sources (including capital investment by the parent firms) in the British subsidiaries come from internal funding. Our third finding is that subsidiary-level financial management decision-making has a statistically significant positive impact on subsidiary performance. Our findings advance the theoretical, empirical and managerial analysis of subsidiary performance in emerging economies