Risk-sorting and preference for team piece rates

Incentive schemes not only influence the effort provision of workers, but might also induce sorting. As drivers of self-selection, the literature mainly focuses on measures of productivity; however, other variables, such as preferences, beliefs and personality, also play a role. With this paper, we contribute to the literature on drivers of self-selection by analyzing the role of perceived wage risks as potential influences on the sorting decision. To this end, we study a sorting decision between two variable compensation systems, where both options carry wage risks. Specifically, we look at sorting between individual piece rates and team piece rates. Using experimental data, we find evidence for both risk diversification considerations and free-riding concerns (i.e., risk of teaming-up with low-productive teammates) as drivers of self-selection. However, our data does not support the concern of our experimental subjects that others actually reduce their effort when working under team compensation, as compared to individual-based compensation

Three-Person Envy Games. Experimental Evidence and a Stylized Model

In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and thus – being the residual claimant – defines his own payoff. While in the dictator variant of the envy game, responder and dummy can only refuse their own shares, in the ultimatum variant, the responder can accept or reject the allocator’s choice with rejection leading to zero payoffs for all three players. Comparing symmetric and asymmetric agreement payoffs for responder and dummy shows that equality concerns are significantly context-dependent: allocators are willing to leave more money on the table when universal equality can be achieved than when only partial equality is at stake. Similarly, equality seeking of responders is most prominent when universal equality is possible

The downside of looking for team players in job advertisements

Over the last two decades, the percentage of job advertisements requiring teamwork skills has greatly increased. However, the effects of requiring teamwork skills on the applicant pool are not yet clear. Addressing this research gap, this article makes use of original data from an online survey applying conjoint design. The survey evidence points to (a) effectively induced self-selection with respect to teamwork skills, but also (b) an adverse effect of requiring teamwork skills on the task-related skills of the applicants. More specifically, requiring teamwork skills in job advertisements resulted in potential employees with higher teamwork skills, ceteris paribus, applying with a significantly higher probability. However, it also resulted in potential employees with higher task-related skills, ceteris paribus, applying with a significantly lower probability. Considering that organizations always need employees with high task-related skills, but that they may not always need team players, they should carefully consider when the requirement for teamwork skills is listed in their job advertisements—because there is a downside to looking for team players

A Service of zbw The role of task meaning on output in groups: Experimental evidence The Role of Task Meaning on Output in Groups: Experimental Evidence The role of task meaning on output in groups: Experimental evidence

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper analyzes experimentally how the interaction of task meaning and peer presence affects work effort. We build on the experimental designs of Falk and Ichino Terms of use: Documents in EconStor ma

The ambivalent role of idiosyncratic risk in asymmetric tournaments

In our paper, we analyze the interplay of contestant heterogeneity and idiosyncratic risk in rank-order tournaments: While in symmetric tournaments an increase in idiosyncratic risk reduces incentives, in asymmetric tournaments this is not necessarily the case: Rather, we show that increasing the level of idiosyncratic risk in asymmetric tournaments will at first increase and - only after a critical risk level has been reached - reduce incentives. We find this critical risk level to be higher, the larger the degree of contestant heterogeneity. Concerning practical implications, it is more important to reduce idiosyncratic risk in the tournament when contestants are similar and less beneficial when contestants are heterogeneous. In light of the fact that equilibrium effort levels in tournaments with a low level of contestant heterogeneity are by far higher than those in tournaments with high levels of contestant heterogeneity, the advice would be to simultaneously reduce contestant heterogeneity (e.g., by league-building or handicapping) and idiosyncratic risk

Non-tenured post-doctoral researchers’ job mobility and research output: An analysis of the role of research discipline, department size, and coauthors

To succeed in academia, non-tenured researchers aim to maximize their quality-adjusted research output. This paper analyzes if and how changing institutional affiliations as a non-tenured post-doctoral researcher influences publications, and how potential effects depend on the context of the researcher. Theoretically, moving to another university at another place can have positive and negative effects on career success. On the one hand when moving to another institution one stands to gain knowledge (human capital), colleagues and coauthors (social capital). On the other hand part of one's knowledge might no longer be relevant and contacts to colleagues and even coauthors might be lost. In line with the latter arguments, matching analysis of an extensive dataset of German-speaking economists and management researchers reveals a short-term negative effect on publications across contexts. Examining the researchers’ contexts reveals that this negative effect of mobility seems to be driven by researchers with social capital (i.e. coauthors or colleagues) tied to the doctorate granting institution